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FOREWORD
Dr. Kamolnick’s book is a meticulously docu-
mented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda 
Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organiza-
tion (ISO) across three key strategically relevant di-
mensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; 
strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; 
and in the final chapter, specific implications, and rec-
ommendations for current U.S. Government policy 
and strategy. Through this comparison, he supplies 
far greater clarity on, incisive analysis of, and poten-
tial answers for such key questions as: How is each 
terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to 
the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “ji-
hadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, 
if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways 
from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially 
define these entities? How does each understand and 
operationalize strategy? What critical requirements 
and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, 
what implications, recommendations, and propos-
als are advanced that are of particular interest to U.S. 
Government strategists and professional military edu-
cators?  
Dr. Kamolnick’s book substantially advances 
the knowledge and strategy pertinent to combat-
ing these terrorist entities more effectively. I highly 
recommend it. 
   DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
   Director
   Strategic Studies Institute and
          U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to 
degrade, defeat, and destroy two transnational ad-
versaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni 
Islam: the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Is-
lamic State Organization (ISO). The present book has 
been written to assist policymakers, military plan-
ners, strategists, and professional military educators 
to more effectively accomplish that objective. Chapter 
1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs 
of each organization; Chapter 2 examines AQO’s and 
ISO’s basic strategic concept and terrorist modus ope-
randi; and Chapter 3 recapitulates chief conclusions, 
considers strategic implications, and supplies select 
recommendations.
AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abid-
ing interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us 
Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. This 
book finds that this is unsupported by the evidence. 
Instead, AQO and ISO may be conceived in the very 
terms of the Sunni Islam they themselves profess, as 
deviant criminal terrorist organizations guilty of com-
mitting reprehensible and forbidden acts, undermin-
ing Islamic interests, and besmirching rather than el-
evating Islam in the eyes of the non-Muslim world. A 
more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction 
of each entity is therefore warranted. The world’s 
Sunni Muslims must make that determination, how-
ever, and define for themselves where the bounds of 
faith, godly fear (taqwa), and righteous conduct begin 
and end; who may or may not legitimately claim to 
speak and act in their name; and who may or may not 
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be deemed a genuine ally, fellow soldier, friend, or 
enemy in this historic endeavor.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite their common genus as violent transna-
tional Sunni “jihadist” organizations, AQO and ISO 
are distinct species that substantially diverge in con-
ceptions of doctrine and creed, strategy, and terror-
ist modus operandi. Doctrinally, the original AQO 
“idea” first arises in opposition to Palestinian-Jordani-
an Shaykh Dr. Abdallah Azzam’s conception of Sunni 
global jihadism. AQO shares with “Azzamism” a 
Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical approach embodied in 
Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion. 
This mission is originally one of lumping, not split-
ting, Church not sect, openness not exclusivity, and 
emphasizes intra-Sunni solidarity, unity, community, 
brotherhood, and the tolerance of differences among 
all fighting elements willing to serve as force multi-
pliers and allies within broader alliances in a now-
fermenting Arab Muslim world. 
AQO differs from Azzamism in two key respects. 
Osama bin Laden sought to create an autonomous bin 
Laden-led army; whereas Azzam viewed his role as 
one of assisting, complementing, and subordinating 
Arabic volunteers to the Afghan-led Islamic forces 
fighting against the Communist-installed and backed 
Afghan regime. Second, for Azzam, Palestine occupied 
a privileged theater of future near-term operations, 
whereas the original AQO, instead, de-privileged 
Palestine and conceived itself as an Arab-led transna-
tional military expeditionary force, a type of Arabic 
jihadi Foreign Legion, serving as a force multiplier. 
Consequently, they deployed high-quality operatives 
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with advanced training possessed of the AQO world-
view, belief-system, and a desire to co-opt localized 
insurgencies into various AQO nodes, fighting to first 
win Islamic lands with the intent of reestablishing an 
Islamic Caliphate, and eventually launching a future 
offensive jihad against the original infidels. 
The AQO idea’s second chief opponent was jihadi 
takfirism, i.e., rigidly-extremist sectarians who ex-
travagantly accuse other Muslims of apostasy (Ridda). 
Though bin Laden’s emergent “Base of the Jihad Or-
ganization” (Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad) viewed the Shia 
as a wayward and deviant sect, it did not at any time 
privilege a war against Shi’ism per se as the essential 
starting point for the purification and revivification 
of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. Moreover, 
AQO in its training camps deliberately policed and 
opposed takfirism, and in its stead supplied indoctrina-
tion into the uniquely ecumenical AQO pan-Islamist 
Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard Sunni armed or-
ganization whose singular mission was to unite dis-
parate struggles into a broader transnational struggle 
to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sover-
eign. The AQO idea is not exclusively Salafist, though 
it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively 
Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes 
their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid 
Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pio-
neering jihadi thinker. It is rather a broad, transna-
tional Church-like conglomerate whose vision, val-
ues, and mission statement prohibit extremely strict 
“Muslimness” tests or other instruments designed to 
split into ever-smaller numbers those considered vir-
tuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the 
occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands.
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This original AQO idea was eventually transformed 
into a terrorist entity controlled by bin Laden and fo-
cused nearly exclusively on orchestrating highly sym-
bolic mass casualty attacks against all Americans—
civilian and military—wherever they may be found. 
Five key elements, according to AQO chief spokesman 
Adam Yahiye Gadahn, characterize this “bin Laden-
ism”: its global/international reach and membership 
as a type of “Islamic Internationale”; its exclusive fo-
cus on fighting America, the Crusader West, and the 
Jews; its lack of a written religious creed, doctrine, or 
specific strategy that every prospective member must 
agree to before joining; emphasis on the critical role of 
Muslim popular support for an enduring, long-term 
victory; and its unique privileging of, and subordina-
tion to, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e., the 
Afghan Taliban). 
Bin Ladenism is characterized by a unique mixture 
of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and hu-
bris. It rests on a deeply flawed analogy between the 
United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), and a grossly caricatured under-
standing of the civil society foundations of enduring 
American power. Moreover, there is no precedent in 
Sunni Islam for bin Ladenism’s signature “Far En-
emy” doctrine. It was never embraced by the vast ma-
jority of existing Sunni Islamist insurgents. Bin Laden 
was deeply criticized from within his own ranks for 
having caused the practical extinction of a decade’s 
long effort to recruit, train, deploy, and create a global 
Sunni jihadist movement, and by other Salafi-Jihad-
ists as unlawful and at the very least imprudent. 9/11 
may be usefully viewed as a “lone wolf” terrorist at-
tack and AQO’s first and last great “one-off” based in 
treachery, criminality, and the USG’s unpreparedness 
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for that plot’s unprecedented use of American civil 
aviation as a weapon of mass destruction.
AQO’s most lethal affiliate, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has amended but not 
ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible 
difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, 
and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic attri-
tion conception of collapsing the American economy 
and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.
ISO, in stark contrast, is that very type of extreme 
ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization AQO oppos-
es. ISO’s “idea” originates in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 
“Zarqawism,” and is characterized by three principal 
doctrines: ultra-sectarianism, an abiding fundamental 
commitment to annihilate in masse all Shia Muslims, 
leader and lay; an unprecedented conduct of ultra-
violence as a media-based spectacle; and focus on the 
immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the 
prophesied return of the Caliphate. Zarqawi’s original 
notions are later extended to “Neo-Zarqawism,” and 
its current incarnation as “Baghdadism.” Four doc-
trines uniquely characterize the present ISO’s “idea,” 
each of which starkly contrasts with the AQO’s spe-
cies of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and escha-
tological beliefs informing its sense of temporality 
and morality; its doctrine proclaiming the mass an-
nihilation of all Shia Muslims; its prioritizing of the 
“Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement 
of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief in 
its right to monopolize and immediately declare the 
Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of ISO’s 
worldview and doctrine place it on the remote fringes 
not just of Sunni Islam generally, but also of the vast 
majority of Sunni global jihadist organizations.
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AQO and ISO exhibit similarities as transnational 
terrorist entities, but as the author’s Terrorist Quad-
rangle Analysis (TQA) heuristic confirms, they sub-
stantially diverge in their respective conceptions of 
strategy and terrorist modus operandi. Bin Laden-
ism’s sequenced strategy requires the removal of U.S. 
and allied militaries from the Arab Muslim world and 
territories, thus undermining U.S. military presence, 
power projection, and access to energy reserves; the 
overthrow of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes 
and replacing them with orthodox Sunni Muslim gov-
ernments that adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy; 
uniting Muslim states into a supra-state caliphate that 
shall serve as a religio-political base for further amass-
ing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to 
confront the remaining world of infidelity (dar al-Ku-
fr); and, a sustained, permanent offensive jihad to be 
fought until all other forms of worship and polity are 
overthrown. 
The USG, while still focused on AQO external 
operations, intentions, and capacities, has practically 
decimated AQO. Assisted by recent upheavals in the 
Arab Muslim world, AQO has apparently shifted to 
focus far more on the Near rather than Far Enemy. This 
new direction suggests a more gradual, evolutionary 
insurgent strategy involving a greater emphasis on 
preaching (da’wa); embedding within various ongo-
ing rebellions and working within and through the 
various nationalist-Islamist currents often dominant 
in these theaters; and rebranding as local supporters/
helpers for the rule of Islamic law (Ansar al-Sharia), 
such as has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt.
AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep 
doctrinal affinities to AQO, has substantially departed 
in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-down 
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model for carefully planned, long-term, high-visi-
bility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting. 
AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what it 
calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In 
its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist 
operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and de-
ploy individual persons—glorified in its media opera-
tions as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada) 
destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise—to 
commit what the vast majority of Muslims consider 
forbidden terrorist acts, such as sabotage, targeted as-
sassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, and 
a vast array of highly deviant acts generally classified 
within religious law as major sins and crimes, and 
within secular law as intentional acts of malicious, fe-
lonious criminal conduct.
The ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi 
is carefully outlined in its inaugural online publica-
tion Dabiq, and ideally comprises five key stages: (1) 
emigration from a hostile milieu to one where sanc-
tuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts 
(Hijra); (2) creation of the nucleus jihadist organiza-
tion (Jama’ah); (3) destabilization of the existing “infi-
del” regime through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah) 
eventuating in the collapse of existing authority, and 
thereby fomenting chaos and mayhem (Tawahhush); 
(4) creation and consolidation of a territory, resources, 
and base accompanied with the immediate declara-
tion of the Islamic State (Tamkin); and (5) further con-
solidation and expansion of the Islamic State with the 
immediate declaration of the Caliphate (Khilafa). 
However, this idealized five-stage blueprint for 
restoring the Caliphate (Khilafa) was not followed in 
practice. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-sectar-
ian jihadi takfiri organization led it to hereticize (takfir) 
xxii
virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, 
and movements. As a result, the stage of Fitnah (con-
flict, strife)—a stage not specified in their ideal mod-
el—has accompanied ISO from its beginnings in Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi through each of its metamorpho-
ses. Further, the ISO’s blueprint exhibits ambiguity 
regarding the precise timing for declaring a State and 
later Caliphate. ISO’s achievements have been sub-
stantially assisted by its fearsome and highly profes-
sional military leadership cadre, comprised of former 
Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and by 
the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former 
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan 
al-Maliki in the context of a dramatically changed re-
gional dynamic enervated by the “Arab Spring.”
Our findings largely support existing USG policy 
and strategy vis-à-vis classic bin Ladenism. What 
arose in its wake, however—though AQO classic “Far 
Enemy” attacks must still be countered—was an al-
ternative “lone mujahid” terrorist modus operandi 
currently employed by AQO’s most lethal affiliate, 
AQAP. Current policy and strategy are sufficient to 
meet that latter challenge. Findings also substantially 
support current USG policy and strategy to degrade, 
defeat, and destroy ISO, though further recommenda-
tions are suggested by the present author to address 
its specific “stateness” dimension. Our findings also 
strongly support current USG explicit repeated dec-
larations that the USG could temporarily defeat ISO 
within a brief period; however, the permanent defeat 
of the ISO idea will only occur when Iraqis themselves 
make the choice to create a new social compact in 
which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, 
and protected.
xxiii
RECOMMENDATIONS
Doctrine-independent recommendations include 
advocating well-known methods for combating ter-
rorism. Doctrine-dependent recommendations in-
clude developing a deeper understanding of  Sunni Is-
lam, of AQO’s and ISO’s extreme deviance in relation 
to Sunni Islam, and of how Sunni Islamic orthodoxy, 
including some militant strands, may be leveraged 
to more effectively delegitimize, marginalize, and 
implode these unlawful criminal terrorist entities.

1PROLOGUE
RELEVANCE 
The present book holds relevance for military 
planners, strategists, and professional military educa-
tors whose mission demands a deep understanding 
of the strategically relevant differences between two 
transnational terrorist entities, the al-Qaeda Organiza-
tion (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). 
The only investment required is one’s willingness to 
sequester an afternoon or two for careful reading and 
reflection. It is presumed that a significant sub-set of 
readers do not possess requisite knowledge of Islam 
generally, and militant Islamic politics specifically; 
therefore, brief expository asides and explanatory 
notes clarifying key Islamic religious and religio-po-
litical concepts are sprinkled throughout. 
INTRODUCTION 
This book analyzes the AQO (Tanzim Qa’idat al-
Jihad) and the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya) and 
proposes U.S. Government (USG) strategies for their 
permanent defeat.1 AQO and ISO claim to represent 
the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni 
Muslims (Ahl-us-Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 
billion persons.2 It is the argument of this book, how-
ever, that grounds exist for why this need not be the 
case. AQO and ISO may be conceived in the theology 
they themselves profess as two deviant organizations 
guilty of committing major sins and besmirching the 
Islamic Call. I believe a more optimistic prognosis for 
the future destruction of each entity is warranted. It 
will be for the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) 
2to make that determination; to define for themselves 
where the bounds of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa), 
and righteous conduct begin and end; and who may 
or may not legitimately claim to speak in their name.
AQO and ISO have distinct doctrines, methodolo-
gies, and strategies of victory. Each entails distinct 
implications for USG strategy. This book is organized 
as follows. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history 
and doctrinal beliefs of each organization. In Chapter 
2, AQO’s and ISO’s basic terrorist modus operandi is 
examined. Lastly, in Chapter 3, a summary of conclu-
sions is first supplied, and implications and recom-
mendations are then offered for further enhancing 
USG policy, strategy, and professional military edu-
cators’ effectiveness in expediting the demise of these 
two terrorist entities. 
3CHAPTER 1
BELIEF-SYSTEM, CREED, WORLDVIEW,  
DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept “doctrine” as used throughout refers 
to a more or less presumed “worldview” or “ideolo-
gy” rooted in a set of core beliefs about how the world 
works, and in particular, about a presumed reality 
that describes the factual state of Islam and Muslims 
in the present socio-political, socio-cultural world. 
Doctrine is rooted in belief-systems: it is about what 
is true or false, real or unreal. Belief-systems are about 
statements of fact; and for their adherents, about what 
they take to be the definite factual reality of the world 
as it is. Belief-systems are not knowingly rooted in the 
will or intention to deceive others; they are Truth, and 
a Truth to be known and shared. Beliefs are not there-
fore deceptive, manipulative, or intentionally dis-
torted propaganda—a form of communication, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 2. One can refer to an ad-
herent as a believer, ideologue, or doctrinaire, but not 
a deceiver, or not an intentional deceiver at least. 
The term “doctrine” is similar but distinct from 
the term “creed” (aqida) in that doctrine extends be-
yond orthodox beliefs that cannot be denied if one is 
to maintain one’s status as an orthodox adherent of 
a particular faith. They include religious faith but ex-
tend beyond to beliefs about past and current history 
as it pertains to the origins, development, rise and 
fall, and the current status of Sunni Muslims in the 
present world. In other words, it also involves certain 
fundamental beliefs about the how, why, and “what 
4for” of politics, culture, power, and violence that en-
compass and extend beyond the articles of creedal 
faith that makes one an “orthodox Sunni Muslim,” 
a term that seems to encompass both worldview or 
weltanschauung—literally “world picture”—captures 
these elements in a simple phrase and will be used 
interchangeably with belief-system in this course of 
exposition.
5II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION  
(TANZIM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)
SUNNI ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY
AQO’s worldview or doctrine has been consistent-
ly propounded over the course of nearly 30 years and 
is contained in a number of publicly available sources. 
Relative to the ISO, it has been subject to extensive 
scholarly analysis, and a more or less rough consen-
sus has been reached regarding its essential premise. 
Though simplified, the following is an accurate depic-
tion. First, a Perfect and Final faith was revealed by 
the seal of the prophet, Prophet Muhammad. Second, 
the one and almighty sovereign, Allah (God), blessed 
this singular faith to conquer the Earth and eventu-
ally to establish Allah’s rule, manifest especially in 
the maintaining of essential legal requirements and 
punishments contained in Allah’s Divine word, the 
Quran and other sources and principles deemed es-
sential to a proper legal judgment; for example, the 
Traditions of the Prophet (ahadith), consensus of the 
learned scholars and jurisprudents (ijma), and use 
of analogical reasoning to infer to new cases from 
past judgments (qiyas). Third, Allah’s rule on Earth 
as manifest in conquered lands ruled by an imperial 
Muslim religio-political sovereign, the Caliph, repre-
sented the singular triumph and exclusive example of 
Allah’s word, law, and sovereignty. That Islam is the 
perfected final faith—revealed through the perfected 
final prophet and his immediate companions and 
successors; blessed by the singular sovereign Allah 
to conquer and rule; and to be manifest in an earthly 
Caliphal imperium charged with upholding and fur-
ther spreading the worship of Allah—is an essential 
6starting point for discerning the AQO worldview. 
Contained here is an inarguable premise within Sunni 
orthodoxy that Allah is the one and only God, and that 
Muhammad is his final messenger.
SUNNI SALAFISM/“FUNDAMENTALISM” 
A “Salafist” sub-set of Sunnism is also key, how-
ever. Salafism as a genus—despite its varieties—is 
manifest in the belief that Islam reached its noblest 
and purest expression in Prophet Muhammad’s own 
exemplary conduct (Sunnah), and those of his closest 
companions and the first three generations of his suc-
cessors known collectively as al-salaf al-salih (the pious 
ancestors).3 Salafists seek to emulate these truest and 
most faithful exemplars of the Prophet’s Message, and 
believe that genuine Islam—Prophet Muhammad’s Is-
lam—requires that one adhere as faithfully as possible 
to what is known of their sayings and doings, without 
amendment. To introduce innovation (bida) to what 
is believed to be the Prophet’s own exemplary path 
(Sunnah), or “the prophetic methodology” (manhaj), 
is to insinuate an imperfect present into the perfected 
past.
THE MUWAHHIDUN/WAHHABISM/ 
SALAFI-WAHHABISM 
The reformist Muwahhidun (Oneness of Allah) or 
“Wahhabi” movement established by the neo-Hanba-
li Najd Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 
1792) and his faithful adherents and proponents fur-
nish an essential re-statement of the orthodox Sunni 
fundamentals in their most rigorous form.4 These con-
sist in the following. Chief among al-Wahhab’s con-
7tributions was his reconceptualization of the manner 
in which “faith” or Iman—what it actually means to 
believe—is to be proven as fact. This also applies to 
its opposite—Kufr (unbelief/infidelity), and whether 
takfir (apostasy, heresy) is declared against persons ac-
cused of such. Al-Wahhab declared that genuine faith 
is not merely a matter of an internal belief—belief of 
the heart or the mind—of those twin creedal essentials 
comprising the Shahada or first pillar of Islam—Allah 
is One, and Muhammad is his final messenger. Private 
confessions of faith are necessary, but insufficient. 
Faith must also and especially be manifest publicly 
through active worship of Allah in public utterance, 
as well as deeds that openly signify the operational-
ization of the principle of Allah’s Oneness (tawhid) in 
one’s life activities. Other pillars of Islam—the obliga-
tory five prayers (salat), obligatory giving of alms (za-
kat), obligatory fasting on Ramadan (sawm), and the 
obligatory pilgrimage (Hajj)—are essential dimen-
sions of faith in action and as action. 
Failure to actively and correctly worship Allah may 
indicate ignorance, error, moral weakness, or coercion, 
and an active program of education, instruction, and 
moral rectification may be required. This is the func-
tion of preachers and learned scholars (ulema), and the 
Call to Tawhid (da’wa). However, to voluntarily and in-
tentionally deny in one’s mind, heart, tongue, or hand 
these practical manifestations of faith; to willfully and 
knowingly deny the worship of Allah through these 
visible signs of submission and surrender, is to be 
guilty of infidelity (Kufr). It is to deny Allah what is 
owed to Allah. It is to be guilty of disloyalty, infidel-
ity (Kufr). For al-Wahhab, the rigorous enforcement of 
all practical dimensions of worship, including but ex-
tending far beyond an internal conviction of belief, is 
8therefore essential to proving one’s faith in Islam. The 
question of what exactly constitutes idolatry (shirk), 
distinctions between greater and lesser shirk, and the 
lawful and prudent means for combating shirk, are 
core theological questions at the heart of the present 
schism between AQO and ISO.
At the core of al-Wahhab’s preaching and program 
for reforming Islam is the essential master concept that 
Judaism, and later Islam, bequeaths to the world: the 
concept of God’s/Allah’s Oneness (tawhid). Tawhid, 
according to al-Wahhab, following Shaykh ul Islam 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s (d. 1328) original coinage, comprises 
three integral dimensions: Allah’s Oneness as Sover-
eign Creator, Sustainer, Provider (Tawhid al-Ruboobi-
yyah); Allah’s Oneness as Sovereign Lord worthy of 
exclusive worship (Tawhid al-Uloohiyyah); and Allah’s 
Oneness as His Unique Names (Tawheed al-Asma’ was-
Sifaat).5 The implications al-Wahhab derived from 
this re-statement of Sunni orthodoxy was profound, 
highly controversial, profoundly unsettling, and even 
revolutionary for his present milieu. The opposite of 
tawhid, and the greatest of sins in Islam which even 
Allah does not forgive, is the sin of worshipping/
associating other deities with Allah (shirk). The abso-
lute uncompromising monotheism represented by al-
Wahhab’s Muwahiddun reformist movement demands 
monolatry. It is unsparing in its denunciation and dis-
avowal of, and obligation to, uproot shirk.
Theologically armed with a re-conceptualized no-
tion of Iman as faith, as actualized in essential wor-
shipful acts and rituals; and Tawhid actualized in 
beliefs and actions displaying loyalty to the Singular 
Absolute Sovereign that is Allah as Creator, Lord, 
and Unique and Ineffable Names; al-Wahhab and his 
Muwahiddun movement proceeded to purge the Saudi 
9landmass and its immediate environs. Sharing a divine 
kinship with Islam, we find the “People of the Book/
Covenant/Divine Scripture” (Ahl al-Khitab). Jews, 
Christians, and often Zoroastrians, though deemed 
guilty of adulterating original scripture were—owing 
to their adherence to worshiping a singular Deity—
granted the right to retain ancestral faiths and prac-
tices, though not in Prophet Muhammad’s ancestral 
homeland. Though subject to submission and humili-
ation displays, and liabilities to their further expan-
sion and preservation, these groups could maintain 
their worship in their status as dhimmis required to 
pay a “protection” or head tax, the jizya. 
Toleration, even if intolerant, was not to be ex-
tended any further, however. For the Muwahhidun 
followers of al-Wahhab, the true eternal, abiding 
threat to Allah’s Sovereignty does not come from the 
original infidels (original Kufr)—obvious enemies 
from without and against whom jihad, both defen-
sive if necessary and offensive if legal and prudent, 
be waged.6 True, targets outside the faith included 
sorcerers, magicians, and others claiming intercessory 
powers that the Muwahhidun claimed were the exclu-
sive prerogative of Allah. However, within the faith, 
the Muwahhidun waged war against Sufi mysticism 
and its doctrines and practices granting mystics and 
holy men intercessory powers. And, also against the 
Shia—those partisans of the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali, 
the fourth Caliph—who based in unique theological 
conceptions endowing and privileging the Prophet’s 
family with divinely-sanctioned spiritual powers, en-
gaged in reverential treatment and worship of saints, 
shrines, and tombs, and attributed divine qualities 
and powers to an infallible Imamate. 
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For the followers of al-Wahhab—the Muwahh-
idun—the genuine, abiding, and eternally greatest 
threat is this internal enemy—this nearest enemy. At 
best, it is the one who claims Islam, but who is either 
a pretender (the hypocrite), or an innovator (bida) (the 
heretic). At worst, it is a Muslim apostate (murtadd) 
who willfully, with complete knowledge, publicly 
disavows essential tenets of tawhid as conceptualized 
by al-Wahhab and, if unrepentant, is guilty of Islam’s 
greatest sin: apostasy (ridda). The narrowness of the 
Muwahhidun bridge to salvation—rooted in its unique 
conceptions of iman/Kufr, Sunnah/bida, tawhid/shirk—
narrows the distance between salvation and sin, sal-
vation and heresy, and salvation and apostasy. 
It is not just in Islam that the true enemy of genu-
ine faith arises from within. It is the unique nature of 
orthodoxy (literally, “correct belief”) that gives rise to 
the fact that it is what is closest, not furthest and most 
obviously distant, from one’s essential core tenets that 
genuinely threatens one’s foundations. One only has 
to recall the very origins of the concept of the satanic 
in the Gospel of Matthew’s denunciation of the Jew-
ish Pharisees,7 or the rise of the Reformation and its 
inauguration of bloody centuries of intra-Christian 
warfare, to understand an essential sociological law 
explaining the intensity of conflict: i.e., that a feared 
and dreaded treason within mobilizes far greater en-
mity, and policing, than the expected and prepared for 
enemy without; again, the smaller the differences that 
divide, the greater the perceived injury those smaller 
differences make.8  
This depiction of Sunni theological orthodoxy, 
Sunni conservative Salafism, and Muhammad al-
Wahhab’s Muwahiddun movement provides the es-
sential theological background required for under-
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standing precisely how the AQO and ISO dip from the 
same well—Sunni, Salafi-Muwahhidun/Wahhabi—but 
with varying foci, in quite different doses, and with 
quite different additives that led to novel synthetic 
organisms.9 It marks an essential point of departure 
required to understand their last shared common an-
cestor before their marked divergence as species, and 
eventually with additional mutation, as contemporary 
terrorist entities claiming to represent the worldwide 
Sunni (Ahl-us Sunnah). Our first task is to describe 
the terrorist species Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad (AQO). To 
do so, we will trace a brief history that begins with 
Abdullah Azzam and ends with the codification of 
Osama bin Laden’s mature “Far Enemy” doctrine. 
SHAYKH SCHOLAR-MUJAHID, DR. ABDALLAH 
AZZAM: THE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO 
JOIN THE CARAVAN IN DEFENSE OF MUSLIM 
LANDS: AN ARMED MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-
SALAFI-WAHHABI SYNTHESIS
Dr. Abdullah Azzam is the Palestinian-Jordanian 
Shaykh, scholar, charismatic preacher, and inspi-
rational organizer whose firebrand sermons and 
passionate calls for mobilization against the Soviet 
Communist-installed and militarily backed Afghan 
regime, provides the entre point for understanding 
AQO’s mature doctrine.10 Besides the qualities listed 
earlier, there are three essential contributions Azzam 
made toward AQO. First, Azzam characterized the 
armed Muslim opposition to Soviet occupation as a 
defensive jihad (jihad al-daf),11 and authored the key 
legal opinion (fatwa)—backed by evidence from the 
Quran, authoritative traditions (ahadith), and scholar-
ly consensus (ijma) of all four Sunni schools (mad’haab) 
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of jurisprudence (fiqh)—requiring participation in the 
anti-Communist jihad as an individual obligation 
(fard ‘ayn) devolving on every able-bodied, capable 
member of the Muslim community (the Ummah). This 
opinion, Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation 
After Iman, was vetted by highly-prestigious senior re-
ligious scholars, and provided what became the con-
temporary restatement of the classical jurisprudence 
governing the waging of defensive jihad.12 
Second, Azzam re-conceptualized the concept of 
“defensive jihad” to justify military jihad against all 
existing non-Muslim governments ruling over major-
ity or minority Muslim populations. For this Shaykh, 
and Sunni orthodoxy generally, once a land has been 
conquered and ruled by Islam, it forever remains 
a permanent territory belonging to the Abode of Is-
lam (Dar al-Islam) and Allah’s True Faith. Azzam’s 
conception of a nation’s “Muslimness” is essentially 
populist-territorial, and it is not the existence or non-
existence of Islamic law, but the existence of a Muslim 
populace that defines the “Muslimness” of this land. 
Having a people, and a land, what is needed is the 
restoration of the state governed by the Sharia or le-
gal prescriptions and proscriptions enjoined by the 
Quran and learned jurisprudents and legal officials. 
Of special importance to the Brotherhood, to Azzam, 
and to many that would later be enticed to AQO’s 
call, was what was regarded as the great catastro-
phe or nakhbah that befell the indigenous Palestinian 
population following the creation of the State of Israel 
in 1948; and over the next several decades, the deg-
radation, humiliation, and powerlessness befalling a 
Palestinian population uprooted, and now a diasporic 
people unwelcome in other lands and occupying per-
manent refugee camps. While many Muslim peoples 
now living in non-Muslim lands would eventually be 
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encompassed in Azzam’s transnational call to indi-
vidual Muslims to assist brothers and sisters fighting 
to recover, secure, or restore Muslim-ruled states or 
statelets in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the Phil-
ippines, for example, Palestine was without question 
at the very heart of Azzam’s mission. It was the next 
stop, after Afghanistan, which the caravan enjoining 
defensive jihad should travel. 
Azzam’s affiliation with and assimilation of a pan-
Islamic and ecumenical conception of the Muslim 
Ummah likely derives from his Muslim Brotherhood 
roots. This earliest modern pan-Islamic organization, 
conceived and founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school 
teacher Hassan al-Banna, arose as a direct response 
to his revulsion toward the European colonization of 
formerly Islamically-governed territories and their 
broader Western, secular, scientific civilizational im-
ports that demoted and delegitimized a conservative 
Islamic-centered polity, culture, and social order. As 
a form of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-secular, 
conservative religious social movement, the Brother-
hood eventually spread to dozens of nations, and pio-
neered a variety of reformist strategies for re-Islamiz-
ing these secular liberal colonial-oriented states. 
Azzam was also influenced, like many others of 
his generation—as noted in his published writings—
by the emergence of a uniquely radical variant of 
Brotherhood thought and activism originating in the 
writings, personal example, and inspired followers of 
the Egyptian literary intellectual and totalistic Islamic 
philosophical system builder Sayyid Qutb.13 It was 
Qutb who decried the gradualist, reformist, cultural, 
and educational Islamization strategy of the existing 
mainstream Brothers, and in its place, appropriating 
key concepts from secular revolutionary thinkers like 
Marx and Lenin, and also the thought and writings of 
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the Pakistani Islamist intellectual Mawlana Mawdudi, 
he argued  in favor of the creation of an elite vanguard 
leading a comprehensive revolution against the exist-
ing Muslim and Western orders. This total revolution 
was required to reinstall what Qutb believed had been 
a Past Perfect Quranic revelation that owing to con-
temporary forms of non-Allah-centered sociocultural, 
sociopolitical order was subverted and completely 
extracted from current history. Qutb claimed that a 
modern ignorance of Allah, a modern Jahiliyyah or 
Age of Ignorance, one analogous to that Arab pagan 
and polytheistic ignorance preceding the Truthful 
Revelation received by the very first Quranic genera-
tion, had now enveloped all existing Muslim societies. 
The overthrow of this Modern Jahiliyyah by a Revolu-
tionary Vanguard re-immersed into the now-hidden 
truth of Allah’s Absolute Rulership, was the method 
required for a complete liberation. 
The modern Jahiliyyah is defined by Man’s rule over 
Man, subject to the tyranny of Man’s vicarious whims 
and oppressive and unjust instincts, and ensconced in 
materialist ethics. It was Man’s absolute and complete 
dependence on God’s Absolute Sovereignty—the Rule 
of Divine Law and the Divine Legislator—and com-
plete and total submission to this Absolute, that is the 
liberating condition of Man’s emancipation from the 
Rulership of Man, and its replacement by the Abso-
lute Sovereignty of God. Gone would be the alienated 
social order evacuated from the contemporary world; 
present would be the absolute authority of Allah at 
the level of Rulership, Legislation, and Sovereignty. 
Qutb’s principal contribution, then, was to propose 
an amendment to Ibn Taymiyyah’s, and later Mu-
hammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s, tri-partite conception 
of Tawhid. Added to Allah’s Unicity as Sole Creator, 
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Sole Lord, and Uniquely Named, is Allah’s character 
as Sole Divine Ruler/Legislator/Law-Giver and Law-
Maker, captured in the Qutbist employed concept 
Hakimiyyah. 
Qutb claimed that it was this fourth dimension of 
tawhid, Hakimiyyah, then, that truly provides the miss-
ing master key explaining in total the abyss in which 
existing Islam has fallen, and despite a somewhat en-
viable material success, the vacuousness, spiritual pu-
tridness, and worship of Man typified by the Western 
mind, philosophy, and sociopolitical order remains. 
We shall see that this Qutbian Hakimiyyah straddles 
the AQO versus ISO divide, and each finds in it a 
means of legitimizing the violent overthrow of every 
existing Muslim order. For now, however, we return 
to the remaining Azzamist contributions to the AQO 
Doctrine.
Third, Azzam viewed his role as one of assist-
ing and complementing the Islamic forces fighting 
against the Communist-installed and backed Afghan 
regime, and not one of creating an autonomous Arab 
army that would usurp existing forces and impose 
its will, vision, and particular Islamic creedal beliefs 
on these indigenous forces. Melting into the fabric of 
the Afghan jihad and assisting in the recruitment of 
Arab manpower to its cause, Azzam played the role of 
catalyst, charismatic preacher, and a scholar-mujahid, 
not an imperious and distant commander demanding 
obedience to an alien cause. Solidarity with the Af-
ghan mujahidin, and the willingness to accede to their 
unique cultural milieu and in solidarity fight the forces 
of the invading Communist Kufr, was essential to his 
mission.
Finally, Shaykh Azzam was remarkable for his 
obsessive fascination with and prolific contribution 
to what may be called jihadist martyrology. As ably 
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documented by David Cook,14 ample precedent exists 
within Islam for the production of a unique form of 
literature, which exalts, celebrates, and creates a vir-
tual cult around the superlative and extraordinary 
rewards that accompany those who willingly sacrifice 
themselves on the field of jihad. Killing in the process 
of one being killed is viewed as a means of salvific 
action, a means of worshiping Allah and receiving in 
exchange for one’s life an eternal paradise resplendent 
with the sumptuous delights befitting a noble knight 
upholding with one’s life, honor, and wealth—Allah’s 
True Word. The virtues, delights, and superlatives of 
jihad as salvific martyrdom are another contribution, 
we shall see, that also spans the AQO-ISO divide. 
To summarize, Azzam’s main contributions to the 
AQO Doctrine are the following: authoring the legal 
opinion (fatwa) justifying defensive jihad (jihad al-daf) 
in Afghanistan as an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn); 
his conception that this defensive jihad was obliga-
tory not just in Afghanistan but in all former Muslim-
conquered territories and peoples, now under the sov-
ereignty of non-Muslim rulers; his prioritizing of the 
Palestine question as central to the Ummah’s concerns; 
and Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-influenced con-
ceptions that first include commitment to an anti-colo-
nial, anti-imperialist, pan-Islamic Ummah, conceived 
broadly and in non-sectarian terms in opposition 
primarily to the original Kufr—European Christianity 
and secularism in particular—and not in opposition to 
other Muslims on the basis of their strictness in adher-
ence to “Wahhabi” or Salafist orthodoxy. In addition, 
the Qutbist legacy identifies the militant requirement 
to privilege Allah’s Sovereign Rule as an element of 
fully restoring the Islamic State. 
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THE “BASE OF THE JIHAD”; AL-QAEDA 
(QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD) 
Al-Qaeda, or Qa’idat al-Jihad, is the name given for 
a type of expeditionary or mobile global army—the 
Revolutionary Sunni International fighting force—
that emerged in 1988 from the coalescence of several 
fighting organizations from various lands who, hav-
ing determined the Afghan jihad was nearing its end, 
sought to create an enduring organizational form to 
permanently institutionalize an elite army of Islamic 
fighters—a kind of Islamic Foreign Legion.15 The idea 
behind this organization, whose Founding Minutes 
make for fascinating reading, was to basically seed 
various theaters of jihad with a highly-skilled, highly 
trained cadre of Islamic fighters whose goal was to 
support and direct armed fighters toward the over-
throw of non-Muslim or so-called apostate govern-
ments and supplant them with governments based on 
the primacy of  Islamic law or Sharia, and the rulership 
of Muslim sovereigns. These Islamic insurgents, guer-
rillas, or “jihadis” differed from the vast majority of 
insurgents by privileging a transnational, pan-Islamic, 
Ummah-based concept. Just as in a previous century, 
Karl Marx imagined workers who had no nation to 
defend, or to lose, since it was only the universality 
of the proletarian class and international communism 
that represented the perfected future; this Qa’idat al-Ji-
had, though composed of specific fighters from specif-
ic lands, was to disprivilege land, people, nation, and 
all other affiliations other than their soldiery on behalf 
of Allah wherever Allah’s soldiers would be needed. 
These quality recruits would be force multipliers, a 
kind of highest quality recruit, a kind of special forces 
operative, who would embed, train, supply, and assist 
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in the triumph of polities whose identities would melt 
into and become one node in a broader re-imagined, 
and recreated  proto-caliphate—though one in its very 
earliest and barely sketched features. This Army of 
Allah, or Islamic Army, had its marching orders. 
The very name of this entity—The Base of the Ji-
had—tells all. This Base, as the Founding Minutes, 
By-Laws, and Constitutional Charter confirm,16 was 
initially understood in a military sense as a military 
base camp for general and more highly qualified re-
cruits that would—through a process of recruitment, 
vetting, training, supplying, and deploying—make 
the critical difference. The ultimate religio-political 
goal is repeated in these earliest documents and is un-
ambiguous: “To Raise the Word of Allah until it is tri-
umphant throughout the Earth.” Moreover, the means 
to pursue this ultimate objective is also unambiguous: 
“Jihad.” Other organizations can be involved in relief 
work, da’wa work, political work, educational work, 
and cultural work. However, Qa’idat al-Jihad is exclu-
sively dedicated to jihad as a fighting vanguard, as 
Mujahidin—those who engage in military jihad—and 
nothing else. This self-definition is aptly represented 
in the term “jihadism” or “jihadist,” and in its adjec-
tival form “global jihadism” and “global jihadist.” 
This may also be expanded slightly and accurately to 
“global Sunni Islamic jihadism.” 
Contained in this formula is Qa’idat al-Jihad’s ulti-
mate identity as a distinct type of fighting organization; 
but also contained, as we will soon see, are the seeds 
of its ultimate conflict with other types of “jihadist” 
organizations whose passion and mission is far closer 
to that espoused by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
and other variants of Salafism. The first fracture was 
between Osama bin Laden and Shaykh Azzam over 
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the precise nature and function of this newly consti-
tuted “Base.” Abdullah Azzam envisioned a more pro-
tracted involvement, with the Afghan mujahidin as a 
supporting player and not the organizer of a separat-
ist contingent of “Arab” Afghans.17 This tension was 
evident at the time of the formation with bin Laden 
of the Peshawar-based processing center, or Services 
Center (Maktab al-Khidimat), for newly arriving Arab 
recruits seeking to “join the caravan” in the Afghan 
theater. Bin Laden had already embarked, despite his 
lack of battlefield skill, on creating what amounted to 
a private Arab army under his direct command, and 
also a “legend” surrounding his actual role and ac-
complishments in a particular battlefield engagement 
in Baiji against Soviet units. Lauded in the Arab press 
at the time, bin Laden would (assisted by his financial 
largesse and unique persona as a tall, wealthy, soft-
spoken, deeply pious, apparently world-renouncing, 
martyrdom-seeking son of a Yemeni-born Saudi bil-
lionaire father) continue to cultivate his image. It was 
this emergent private army that bin Laden had as-
sembled that became part of the founding moments of 
“The Base.” A second dispute arose between Shaykh 
Azzam and bin Laden over prioritizing the next phase 
of the jihad. For Azzam, Palestine beckoned; for bin 
Laden, despite definite allegiances shared over the 
centrality of Palestine for Islam, it was other newly 
emerging fields that beckoned, including the desire 
to wage jihad in his ancestral homeland Yemen, its 
southern half then occupied by a Marxist state. 
On November 24, 1989, Shaykh Abdullah Az-
zam, who was a hugely significant inspiration for 
the mobilization of Sunnis for the Afghan jihad, and 
more generally the  “defense of Muslim lands,” was 
assassinated along with two of his sons by a road-
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side improvised explosive device (IED). His enemies 
had earlier placed, and his allies discovered, a bomb 
planted behind the lectern where he was to deliver 
the mosque sermon. The case remains unsolved, with 
various potential perpetrators in conflict with the 
Shaykh being suggested: Ayman al-Zawahiri and the 
Egyptians from Islamic Jihad; Osama bin Laden; or 
others annoyed by his alleged role in mismanagement 
or sequestering of funds for his beloved Palestinian 
cause. Azzam’s absence was still notable by its pres-
ence in having inspired a reawakening to the neces-
sity of defensive jihad, and those other contributions 
noted previously (i.e., his legal argument, expansive 
conception of defensive jihad and Muslim lands, and 
his passionate jihadism and martyrological beliefs 
and writings). The scholar-mujahid Dr. Abdullah Az-
zam’s exit further narrowed the leadership cadre and 
self-definition of the post-Afghan phase of this newly 
anointed global transnational conception of individu-
alized Sunni jihadism. 
Bin Laden’s other fracture was not with what 
might be termed “Azzamism” or the Azzamist vari-
ant of Sunni global jihadism. In fact, it shares with Az-
zamism a Sunni ecumenicalism that has far more to 
do with the Muslim Brotherhood quest for a unified 
Muslim front, without strict tests of “Muslimness,” be-
yond obvious adherence to general tenets and a mili-
tant desire to confront the cultural and socio-political 
imperialism encased in the modern, secular, liberal-
democratic—or Communist—state. The awakening of 
a stupefied Muslim Ummah through education, pros-
elytization, organization, and “lumping” rather than 
“splitting” based on acid tests of “Muslimness,” was 
the path, it was believed, for eventually reconquering 
the state for Islam. This Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical 
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approach was embodied in Azzam’s Muslim Brother-
hood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion; it was also at the heart of 
how bin Laden envisioned the al-Qaeda mission and 
doctrine. 
The danger bin Laden detected came from the 
Salafi-Wahhabi direction. It was represented in indi-
viduals, organizations, movements, and parties who 
focused far more on the internal enemy than the exter-
nal. In common with the mission of the Muwahiddun 
movement and also many Salafist-inspired offshoots, 
these groups espoused what from bin Laden’s and 
many orthodox Sunni Muslim quarters is a deviant 
and extremist penchant to emphasize sectarian purity, 
which taken to its extreme lends itself to what may be 
termed jihadi takfirism, or excessiveness in accusations 
against and the willingness to takfir other Muslims. 
This takes two forms. First, bin Laden’s emergent 
Qa’idat al-Jihad, though viewing the Shia as a wayward 
and deviant sect, did not at any time privilege a war 
against Shi’ism per se as the essential starting point 
for the purification and revivification of Sunni ortho-
doxy as a ruling imperium. The problem of Shi’ism 
was a secondary matter that would await the neces-
sary focus that now must be placed on the permanent 
mobilization of Sunni mujahidin, and arousing of 
the Sunni Muslim masses (Ummah), to rid formerly 
Muslim-conquered lands of their infidel overlords. 
From Spain to Indonesia, from Mauritania to Af-
ghanistan, European and Westernized secular hege-
mony first required removal. Seeding the battlefields 
of jihad as empires or secular despotisms receded or 
collapsed—for example, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bos-
nia, and South Yemen—was the order of the day. The 
fight against Kufr, and original Kufr at that, required 
a Sunni Muslim “church” in the sociological sense—
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that is, a broad-based, inclusive united front whose 
criteria for membership was significantly broad and 
its defining feature—the readiness and willingness to 
join the caravan and fight in the path of Allah to make 
Allah’s Word supreme in the lands now occupied by 
the Cross.18 This United Sunni Front approach applied 
equally to the key goal of recovering the now Zionist-
occupied land of Palestine and the revered holy sites, 
including al Haram Al Sharif (Temple Mount) and Al 
Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem (al-Quds). 
Additional sources of bin Laden’s penchant to 
demote the struggle against the Shia likely includes 
Qa’idat al-Jihad’s unique post-9/11 dependence on, 
and sometimes exploitation of, their Iranian captivity. 
Several high-ranking members of al-Qaeda remained 
in what amounted to house arrest with restricted priv-
ileges, and al-Qaeda engaged in tit-for-tat bargaining 
which in recent times, has led to the freeing of some 
of the USG’s most sought after terrorist operatives.19 
Additionally, bin Laden’s mother is Syrian with an 
Alawite background, and his known filial tenderness 
cannot be discounted. However, it is likely that these 
factors were secondary to bin Laden’s vision of the 
true and genuine enemy—the original Kufr. To this 
day, al-Qaeda’s jurisprudence strictly differentiates 
Shia culpability. Known and openly professing lead-
ers engaged in war against the Sunni are legitimate 
targets, and any and all who assist in the support of 
subverting or denying Allah’s Rule are to be fought. 
However, the Shia masses are not targeted, owing to 
the fact that like the vast majority of Sunnis, they are 
likely ignorant of the fundamentals of their own faith, 
and this ignorance is a hindrance for takfir of the Shia 
lay masses. Unlike the ISO, as we shall soon see, there 
is no cosmic backdrop asserting that venomously 
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treacherous Shia are the chief antagonists responsible 
for present Sunni humiliation and powerlessness. 
In short, a principled focus on targeting the Shia on 
grounds of their apostasy, heresy, or supposed trea-
sonous nature is rarely to be found. 
The predominant sectarian threat for bin Laden 
occurs within the people of the Sunnah (Ahl us-Sun-
nah). Sunnis attacking Sunnis on the grounds of their 
insufficient creedal orthodoxy, or orthopraxy, led to 
one negative object lesson in “How not to do jihad!” 
This involved what began and could have ended as a 
successful Sunni overthrow of a secular Westernized 
Algerian Government, but instead led to a bloodbath, 
which eventually consumed the jihadi movement it-
self. Takfir, Qa’idat al-Jihad proclaims, can be applied to 
the ruling regime and its loyal and obvious support-
ers in the security forces, police, and essential internal 
security apparatuses. This “takfir of the regime,” how-
ever, is very different from the “takfir of society.” In 
the Algerian case, takfir was eventually extended, by 
the bloody logic of its own extremist premises: first to 
apply to the regime; then to supporters of the regime; 
then to families—including women, children, and the 
elderly—of the supporters of the regime; and finally, 
to those denying that these persons are guilty of apos-
tasy from Islam. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA; from the French, Groupe Islamique Arme; Arabic, 
Jama’ah al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha) became for al-Qaeda 
in the mid-to-latter 1990s, and many other Sunni ji-
hadists including senior Sharia official and operative 
Atiyatullah al-Libi, a negative case study confirming 
the fratricidal consequences that arise from what is in 
effect, an uncontainable logic. This highly policed con-
tainment of takfirism within the “Base of the Jihad,” 
and indoctrination into the uniquely pan-Islamist 
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Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard seeding various 
insurgencies and rebellions against secular autocratic 
rule, meant that al-Qaeda would be viewed as a broad, 
inclusive, Sunni-armed organization whose singular 
mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader 
transnational struggle to eventually restore a suprana-
tional Caliphal sovereign empowered to continue the 
long-term battle against the original Kufr and continu-
ing infidelity. This Qa’idat al-Jihad is not exclusively 
Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is 
not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it 
also includes their number; it is not those exclusively 
inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and 
honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. Qa’idat al-Jihad 
is rather a broad, transnational church-like conglom-
erate whose vision, values, and mission statement do 
not employ “Muslimness” tests, purity tests, or other 
instruments designed to split into ever smaller num-
bers, those who are considered virtuous enough to 
wage a united Sunni war against the occupying “Cru-
saders” of Muslim lands.
One excellent recent example illustrating this fact 
is exemplified by Adam Yahiye Gadahn’s (whom we 
shall later encounter) account of his own journey to 
becoming a Muslim, and his answer to the question 
“Who is a Muslim?”  
Strictly speaking, one becomes a Muslim by pronounc-
ing the Shahaadah even if there is no one around to 
hear you; announcing it publicly is not a precondition 
of your Islam to be correct for you to be considered a 
Muslim in the eyes of God. Islam isn’t like the man-
made and adulterated religions which have elaborate 
and formal initiation ceremonies presided over by 
priests and rabbis. Therefore, as soon as one comes to 
the realization that Islam is the truth and all other reli-
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gions today are either false or abrogated, he must de-
clare right then and there that there is no God worthy 
of worship but God and Muhammad is the Messen-
ger of God (from the bottom of his heart and with full 
conviction), and preferably in Arabic too (if possible), 
because death can come suddenly and unexpectedly 
and one never knows when his time might come; and 
then after that, he is obligated to start discharging his 
Islamic duties as they come along [italics in original].20 
Gadahn’s view that becoming a Muslim is first 
achieved as a deeply private act based in the “leap of 
faith” one makes when professing a complete belief in 
a chosen creed, is not based in the Hanbali, Salafi-Wah-
habi tradition at all. It is essential to the Hanafi School, 
the most “liberal” of schools; but for Salafi-Wahhabis, 
it is a deficient and even heretical approach to faith 
(Iman). As described earlier, faith for them consists 
of “faith as action,” and only exists when beliefs are 
externalized in visible, essential worshipful practices 
that uphold the doctrine of Allah’s Oneness (tawhid), 
and also, the complete disavowal and disassociation 
from infidels, and avowal and love of worshipers of 
Allah’s Oneness (al-wala wa’l bara).21 
Shared by al-Qaeda and the worldwide Muslim 
Ummah is the basic Quranic idea that humans are cre-
ated with great moral liabilities, though they may as-
pire to righteous faith and virtuous conduct. Muslims, 
like all human beings, are prone to sin; and as sinners, 
are fallible, morally weak, prone to hedonic excess, 
slow to forgive, and quick to anger. This basic concep-
tion of a constrained and limited capability for human 
goodness, and the expectation of a permanent though 
malleable imperfection, explains the general mercy 
and leniency with which bin Laden and the senior 
theoreticians, religious scholars, jurisprudents, and 
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ideologues associated, extend to the Sunni Ummah, 
and often though with far more restriction, beyond. 
The project of purifying the Ummah of its moral foibles 
and failings shall continue under the guidance of the 
righteous scholars and Callers (Du’at; preachers). 
FROM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD TO BIN LADENISM
A final move is required before fully understand-
ing the doctrinal DNA of Qa’idat al-Jihad: the shift from 
Qa’idat al-Jihad to what may be infelicitously described 
as “Bin Ladenism.” Let us examine this more closely. 
Qa’idat al-Jihad’s original uniqueness was defined by 
its conception as a military expeditionary force serv-
ing as a seeding mechanism, force multiplier, and 
insurgency-directing organization that sought to 
transform locally focused national liberation move-
ments into transnational Islamic insurgencies. Fol-
lowing Gompert and Gordon,22 we may distinguish 
among four insurgency types: purely local, based on 
purely local resources; local, with external help; local, 
transformed with internal and external support into 
insurgency conceived in transnational, pan-Islamic 
terms; and global, pure and simple. Qa’idat al-Jihad 
is an excellent example of the “Type 3” insurgency 
strategy, whereby high-quality operatives and train-
ing enter the fray and, based in its unique worldview 
and belief-system, transform localized insurgents into 
nodes seeking to win Islamic lands back generally, 
and placing this local context, in those general Sunni 
Islamic terms. However, this original Qa’idat al-Jihad 
underwent what in retrospect must be deemed a great 
metamorphosis.
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“Bin Ladenism”: The Far Enemy is the Master Key 
to the Near Enemy. 
The original Qa’idat al-Jihad “idea” arose as a joint 
endeavor anointed in two meetings during August 
1988 as referenced in the Founding Minutes cited 
earlier. Over the next decade, this same organization 
morphed into a terrorist entity controlled by Osama 
bin Laden, whose uniqueness consisted in creating a 
global conspiratorial underground terrorist organiza-
tion. Its “brand” was based in a type of high-quality, 
carefully-planned, mass casualty terrorist attack de-
signed to monopolize the world’s attention, galvanize 
the world’s Sunni population, and following succes-
sive assaults in a prolonged war of attrition, destroy 
the American economy, eliminate the American pres-
ence in the Muslim Middle East and North Africa (and 
other lands), eliminate American support for the Zi-
onist occupation of Palestine, and over time, permit 
the operational space to recommence the struggle 
against apostate Muslim regimes, ultimately restoring 
Islamic hegemony and the long-lost Sunni Caliphate 
throughout the now-recovered Muslim world. 
In retrospect, one may identify two unique causes 
leading to the rise of “bin Ladenism” and the end of 
the original Qa’idat al-Jihad “Base” concept. The first 
is the failure of the violent Sunni armed movements 
in the 1980s and 1990s to overthrow their respective 
governments. This was especially the case with cur-
rent Emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who took what was 
a haunted, hunted, and bankrupt Egyptian Islamic Ji-
had organization, and folded it into bin Laden’s enter-
prise. Joining Qa’idat al-Jihad in this manner amounts 
to turning a vice—weakness, marginalization, implo-
sion, repression—into a virtue, i.e., re-focusing one’s 
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jihadi animus in the direction of a very different en-
emy known not for its nearness and apostasy, but 
farness and original infidelity. The second was bin 
Laden’s personal agenda.
Bin Ladenism’s Anti-Americanism and Anti-
Semitism: Irrational, Delusional, and Strategically 
Disastrous. 
Osama bin Laden’s mature doctrine arises in the 
1990s. Its precise motivation is hard to discern, but 
some hints exist. Beginning during the Gulf War com-
mencing on August 2, 1990, and soon thereafter, the 
original Qa’idat al-Jihad was transformed into bin Lad-
en’s primary vehicle for plotting and planning mass 
casualty terrorist attacks against the United States. 
This began with his apparent humiliation and possible 
deep resentment at the Saudi Government rejecting 
his offer to use his private Mujahidin army to counter 
Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait in July  1990. 
This was seconded by his apparent humiliation and 
resentment of having the United States invited instead 
to fight against Saddam’s forces, and during the early 
to mid-1990s, to be stationed in various installations 
and barracks on Saudi soil. The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’s (KSA) reasoning was that, given Saddam 
Hussein’s formidable military and the likelihood that 
Saudi Arabia was also vulnerable to invasion, instead 
of the mere paltry force of bin Laden’s hundreds or 
few thousands, a massive counter-attack was required 
for which only a great power could muster. Further, 
there is precedent within Sunni jurisprudence for 
seeking the assistance of infidel forces if deemed nec-
essary and prudent if one is under attack by other in-
fidel forces. Saddam’s Ba’athist regime was nominally 
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secular, pan-Arabist, socialist, and anti-Persian racial-
ist, and it was therefore permissible and legal, and the 
KSA managed, though with controversy, to secure 
from the Wahhabi senior ulema (religious scholars) the 
necessary fatwa (legal opinion) permitting such.23 
By the early-1990s, then, one can say the transition 
occurred from the original Qa’idat al-Jihad to bin Lad-
enism as defined through an obsessive “Far Enemy” 
focus on attacking the United States as the closest path 
to freeing Muslim lands and occupied Palestine. Relo-
cating to East Africa between 1992 and 1996, al-Qaeda 
organized attacks in Aden in 1992 and in Somalia 
in 1993. Bin Laden would soon declare war against 
America in a 1996 message; and through a new self-
named “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews 
and Crusaders,” he would issue a February 1998 hukm 
(judgment) asserting the Islamic legality of killing 
Americans, civilian or military, anywhere they may 
be found. The world would soon discover that this 
legal cover was necessary for what would come to be 
bin Laden’s inaugural signature attack: the August 11, 
1998, major mass casualty terrorist attacks against two 
United States embassies, one in Kenya and the other 
in Tanzania.24
Over the next 13 years until his targeted killing by 
the United States on May 2, 2012, bin Laden would 
strike or attempt to strike the United States, its chief 
allies, and interests. From the most infamous attack, 
9/11, to others less spectacular or prevented, the new-
ly defined enemy would be the supposed “Crusader-
Zionist,” “Zio-Crusader,” or “Crusader,” and bin 
Ladenism’s chief charge would be repeated ad infini-
tum: that this supposed Zionist-Crusader alliance was 
waging an unrelenting, hateful, deceitful war against 
Islam; that bin Ladenism represented the chief adver-
sary of this global conspiracy to subvert and destroy 
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Islam and Muslims; and that the Mujahidin carrying 
out these attacks were the vanguard of the worldwide 
Ummah, nobly engaged in fighting the mortal enemies 
of Islam in order to prevent the humiliation, subservi-
ence, and utter degradation of Islam and Muslims. Bin 
Laden actually believed—or certainly seemed to be-
lieve—these things, not in words destined for public 
consumption, but in words intended for the privacy of 
secret communiques or spoken within his privileged 
inner circle. 
Bin Ladenism as a belief system—as a worldview—
is premised in what at best, must be regarded as pro-
found ignorance and unlearnedness about the nature 
of the enemies he believed he was destined to fight 
and conquer—first and foremost, the United States. At 
worst—and I suspect this is closer to the mark—bin 
Ladenism is premised in hubris, or even a delusional 
or nearly delusional conception of his own powers, 
and those of his arch foes. The following assertions 
succinctly summarize bin Laden’s beliefs sustaining 
his obsessive focus on attacking the “Far Enemy.” 
A Deeply Flawed Analogy and a Deeply Flawed 
Strategy. 
Osama bin Laden’s “Far Enemy” strategy was 
based on a deeply flawed analogy. In his telling, it 
goes something like this: The former Communist So-
viet Union was a mighty empire. The Sunni Mujahi-
din, owing to their willingness and ability to wage 
jihad, and to Allah’s Divine mercy and assistance, 
dealt a crushing blow to this atheistic empire. Locked 
into an unwinnable counterinsurgency, the Mujahidin 
would force a war of attrition; and owing to its crush-
ing economic costs, the Soviet empire would collapse. 
Allah’s Divine aid, the Mujahidin’s glorious triumphs, 
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the former Soviet Union’s atheistic shallowness, and 
the economic costs borne were the necessary and suf-
ficient factors explaining the Soviet withdrawal, and 
later, the Soviet collapse. 
Before interrogating bin Laden’s forced analogy, 
it is worth offering an alternative account of these 
events, one that does not require Divine aid or mythic 
thinking, and one that is very much keeping with the 
facts. The Soviet Union by 1979, the year of its decision 
to intervene in Afghanistan to support a pro-Soviet 
surrogate, was a weakened and weakening Commu-
nist state 6 years away from its future disintegration, 
which began under Gorbachev’s call for “perestroika,” 
or restructuring. The United States had entered upon 
a Cold War commencing in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II, its former tactical ally against Na-
zism and Japanese Imperialism, now a Stalinist totali-
tarian enemy whose social system and one-party state 
represented the theoretical and practical antithesis of 
the voluntarist, liberal-democratic capitalist federal 
republican United States. The collapse of Soviet Com-
munism began well before their Afghan debacle, but 
the United States wasted no time in helping to turn 
that debacle to the Soviet’s supreme disadvantage and 
help to create for them a Soviet “Vietnam.” 
Through an anti-Communist alliance involving 
primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Paki-
stan, money from the Saudis and Americans would be 
funneled primarily through Pakistan, and through the 
covert services of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 
anti-Soviet guerrillas would be recruited, trained, 
armed, and deployed. A decisive turning point oc-
curred when the USG supplied the extremely lethal 
anti-aircraft shoulder-fired, ground-to-air Stinger mis-
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siles to Islamist guerrillas. Suffering greatly in their 
air campaign as a result, and increasingly bogged 
down in an unwinnable war of attrition, the Soviets 
determined they would end their involvement, and by 
1988, began the exodus that was concluded by 1989.25 
Though the Mujahidin inarguably played a role 
in the Soviet defeat, without Saudi and U.S. largesse, 
CIA and ISI involvement, and the furnishing of the 
game-changing Stinger missiles to neutralize Soviet 
air assets, the Mujahidin and others contesting the 
Soviet intervention would likely have been crushed. 
Possessed of a more objective account of facts, let us 
now consider bin Laden’s deeply flawed analogy. 
Bin Laden believed that, if subject to direct assault 
through mass casualty terrorist attacks, the United 
States—“the head of the [infidel] snake” or “base of 
the tree”—would, like the Soviet Union, be pushed to 
a state of economic exhaustion and ultimate collapse. 
However, there is a serious problem here. The Soviet 
Union’s collapse was not rooted in the exhaustion of 
its economic resources, but rather, in a Communist or-
der whose command economy, inefficiency, crisis of 
human motivation, and corrupted totalitarian police 
state, had developed deep and potentially irreparable 
fractures. Furthermore, a calculated effort by stridently 
anti-Communist American officials and citizens, who 
rejected a policy of détente and peaceful coexistence 
for rollback and collapse of the Soviet state, intention-
ally expedited this process of dissolution, decay, and 
bankruptcy by inaugurating an arms buildup, placing 
further massive pressure on an already creaking eco-
nomic order. One may add to this the deliberate objec-
tive by these self-same persons of bogging the Soviet 
Union down in a very expensive, unwinnable war of 
attrition, and one comes much closer to a fuller under-
standing of the causes of the eventual Soviet collapse. 
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Finally, just as it was not economic exhaustion 
per se that doomed the Soviet Union, bin Laden pro-
foundly misunderstood the true nature and power of 
America’s liberal democratic capitalist social struc-
ture and its capacity for absorbing shocks, adjusting 
course, empowering a free populace with expansive 
opportunities for employment, education, mobility, 
property ownership, self-government and, if deemed 
necessary, deploying its fighting forces and economic 
resources to challenge any foe that would endanger 
such. Bin Laden failed profoundly to understand the 
forces and values that lie behind the American eco-
nomic juggernaut. This was a rather predictable con-
sequence of his other prejudices to which we now turn.
Delusional Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism. 
Bin Laden held an economic-reductionist theory of 
America’s strength: that it is only owing to vast ma-
terial and economic resources at its command, and it 
possesses no other redeeming values. This wealth is 
believed to be tightly held by a relatively small cabal 
of soulless, greedy, powerful capitalists. Not only does 
this wealthy money-grubbing capitalist elite control 
American society through its control of capital, assets, 
banking and finance, and stock and bond markets, 
they are controlled in turn by an even tinier minor-
ity of Zionists. It is owing to this Zionist stranglehold 
on the American Government, economy, and mili-
tary, that the existence of de-fanged pro-American, 
Zionist-accommodating regimes are put in place and 
supported throughout the Arab Muslim world. As an 
ultimate consequence, the Muslim world is robbed 
of its wealth and energy reserves; subjected to anti-
Islamic tyrannies; the Zionist regime that usurped 
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the Ummah’s sacred lands and rights is defended; and 
the Sunni world, which should have the world be-
holden to it, kneels divided, subjugated, conquered, 
and humiliated.  
Bin Laden’s “demon theory” of Sunni Muslim hu-
miliation, which is used to explain the present predic-
ament of the Arab Muslim world, does not originate 
with him. Rather, bin Laden is a fellow traveler per-
petuating and trafficking in unfortunately commonly 
believed frustration, resentment, and hate-based uni-
dimensional, demonized caricatures widely circulat-
ing throughout these lands. While understandable as 
products arising in despair, projection, humiliation, 
scapegoating, and a will for revenge, these premises 
utterly fail to accurately, coherently, and judiciously 
comprehend the actual qualities of his chosen foe. 
This preposterous caricature of American society, 
economy, and government led bin Laden to massively 
inflate his own strengths and capacities for inflicting 
damage on America and Americans. This flawed pre-
ception caused him to massively underestimate the 
actual power that would be brought to bear against 
his terrorist enterprise and the actual sources of that 
power. 
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FROM BIN LADENISM BACK TO QA’IDAT  
AL-JIHAD? BACK TO THE FUTURE? HUBRIS, 
DELUSION, DISASTER, AND THE REMAKING/
REBIRTH OF A POST-BIN LADEN, POST-ARAB 
SPRING QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD
The Catastrophe (The Nakhbah). 
Against the significant plurality of his own Shura 
Committee, and with senior level dissenters having 
made their opinions known, bin Laden neverthe-
less carried out the 9/11 attack.26 The United States 
of America, it turns out, was in fact, far from being 
a cowardly, hollowed-out, spiritually vacuous and 
materialistic “Paper Tiger.” From that date until his 
own demise nearly 11 years later, bin Laden would 
face a global war of his own making, and in the pro-
cess, its brand would suffer irreparable harm, and its 
operatives would be practically hunted to extinction. 
9/11 was in its essence a lone-wolf terrorist operation: 
the final and successful operationalizing of a plan 
originally attempted in its first incarnation by Khalid 
Shaykh Muhammad’s (KSM) nephew Ramzi Yousef 
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; successfully 
thwarted owing to operational errors in its second in-
carnation as the 1995 Bojinka plot; and consummated 
in a plot known fully to only a half-dozen insiders, 
and excluding current Qa’idat al-Jihad Emir al-Zawa-
hiri. The “planes operation” was suggested by KSM 
to bin Laden in 1996, and 3 years later, finally set in 
motion. Two years from then, KSM finally extracted 
the revenge he and his nephew sought,27 their self-
professed motive to punish America for what they 
claimed was its support for authoritarian regimes 
countenancing Israel’s existence and thus underwrit-
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ing and enabling “Zionist” attacks, oppression, and 
the continued occupation of Palestinian lands. What-
ever the imagined virtues of the 9/11 “planes opera-
tion” to its perpetrators were, the consequences were 
clear: those whose unilateral actions to organize and 
execute this ignominious attack—one based in stealth, 
treachery, and the willful desire to murder thousands 
in cold blood—and potentially tens of thousands of 
ordinary civilians and residents, 32 of whom were 
Muslim28—would launch a war to hunt down and 
bring to justice those responsible. The world’s most 
formidable superpower would—and did—act,29 the 
consequences of which have led to what now appears 
to be the latest metamorphosis in the Qa’idat al-Jihad 
saga: a recent practical abandonment of bin Ladenism 
as doctrine, and a return with a difference, to a pre-
vious strategy focused far more on the “Near” rather 
than “Far Enemy,”30 and among its Qa’idat al-Jihad in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) affiliate, a new strat-
egy of “lone mujahid” terrorism. 
A Name Change Anyone? 
Hunkered down in Abbottabad, Pakistan for sev-
eral years, connected to the world through trusted 
couriers and flash drives for uploading instructions to 
key operatives, it appears bin Laden well-understood 
the practical failure of his strategy to attack the “head 
of the snake,” or the “base of the tree trunk.” Attack-
ing the head of a snake does not make sense if you are 
a gnat, and sawing at the base of a massive tree does 
not make sense if you have a plastic knife. Strangely, 
bin Laden had learned little from the theory and prac-
tice of asymmetric warfare or of the data reporting 
that nations who believe attacks are existential will 
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respond mercilessly to such.31 Owing to his prejudic-
es, ignorance, arrogance, and hubris, he imagined that 
he would be the new Salahuddin who would usher in 
the age of a defeated Crusaderdom, and re-open the 
Gates of Jerusalem to Allah’s faithful. Of the discover-
ies learned in Abbottabad,32 several are of relevance 
to the issues under consideration here. First, former 
President George W. Bush’s gut and basic instincts 
proved exactly right in the aftermath of that dastardly 
attack. It was not Islam that was at issue—a great faith, 
with noble values, and fully welcomed in our pluralis-
tic nation, even in a religiously conservative mode—it 
was terrorism, and very specifically the Qa’idat al-Jihad 
terrorist organization, with whom we were now “at 
war.” Bush succeeded in detaching Qa’idat al-Jihad 
from Sunni Islam far more effectively than bin Laden 
detached President Bush from a legitimate war waged 
in self-defense against terrorists. Terrorism belongs to 
no religion, he would say. A murderer is not a martyr.33 
Despite his Texas folksiness, and infamous “Bush-
isms,” Bush understood clearly what the battle lines of 
this new war would be. Apparently, some years later, 
bin Laden did as well. President Bush would declare, 
in a joint session of Congress merely 9 days after 9/11: 
The evidence we have gathered all points to a collec-
tion of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known 
as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted 
for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole 
 . . . Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. 
But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking 
the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people 
everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of 
Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim 
scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a 
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fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings 
of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to 
kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make 
no distinctions among military and civilians, includ-
ing women and children. This group and its leader, a 
person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many 
other organizations in different countries, including 
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in 
more than 60 countries. . . . The Taliban must act and 
act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or 
they will share in their fate. . . . I also want to speak 
tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. 
We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many 
millions of Americans and by millions more in coun-
tries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are 
good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the 
name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The ter-
rorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, 
to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our 
many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. 
Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every 
government that supports them. Our war on terror be-
gins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped and defeated.34
Eight years later, during his 2009 speech in Cairo, 
former President Obama would do the same:
I have come here to seek a new beginning between 
the United States and Muslims around the world; one 
based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and 
one based upon the truth that America and Islam are 
not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, 
they overlap, and share common principles—prin-
ciples of justice and progress; tolerance and the dig-
nity of all human beings. . . . Moreover, freedom in 
America is indivisible from the freedom to practice 
one’s religion. That is why there is a mosque in every 
state of our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our 
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borders. That is why the U.S. government has gone to 
court to protect the right of women and girls to wear 
the hijab, and to punish those who would deny it . . . 
So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America. 
And I believe that America holds within her the truth 
that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all 
of us share common aspirations—to live in peace and 
security; to get an education and to work with dignity; 
to love our families, our communities, and our God. 
These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity 
. . . In Ankara, I made clear that America is not—and 
never will be—at war with Islam. We will, however, 
relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose 
a grave threat to our security. Because we reject the 
same thing that people of all faiths reject: the killing of 
innocent men, women, and children. And it is my first 
duty as President to protect the American people.35
In his November 2015 speech at the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala 
Lumpur, the widely read, influential English-lan-
guage daily Islamabad outlet The News International 
would report:
US President Barack Obama has said that his country 
cannot be at war with an entire religion simply be-
cause of the actions of the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh 
militants . . . He added that many Muslim leaders 
have joined the global movement against the terrorist 
group, and Daesh only represents a ‘tiny fraction’ of 
the Muslim community. He said that the US is not at 
war with Muslims but with IS militants . . . whom he 
described as a ‘bunch of killers with very good social 
media.’36 
Three months later, in his first speech as president de-
livered in an American mosque, President Obama on 
February 3, 2016, again adamantly asserted that the 
United States is allied with the vast majority of Mus-
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lims in a common war not against Islam, but against 
a terrorist fringe whose principal victims are mostly 
Muslim and whose forbidden and reprehensible mur-
derous acts committed against non-combatant civil-
ians condemn them to the furthest fringes of deviant 
criminality. Seven years after his 2009 speech in Cairo, 
the President would again proclaim:
[T]here is an organized extremist element that draws 
selectively from Islamic texts, twists them in an at-
tempt to justify their killing and their terror. They 
combine it with false claims that America and the 
West are at war with Islam. And this warped thinking 
that has found adherents around the world—includ-
ing as we saw, tragically, in Boston and Chattanooga 
and San Bernardino – is real. It’s there. And it cre-
ates a tension and pressure that disproportionately 
burdens the overwhelming majority of law-abiding 
Muslim citizens. . . . Groups like ISIL are desperate 
for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as reli-
gious leaders and holy warriors who speak for Islam. 
I refuse to give them legitimacy. We must never give 
them legitimacy. (Applause.) They’re not defending 
Islam. They’re not defending Muslims. The vast ma-
jority of the people they kill are innocent Muslim men, 
women, and children. (Applause.) And, by the way, 
the notion that America is at war with Islam ignores 
the fact that the world’s religions are a part of who we 
are. We can’t be at war with any other religion because 
the world’s religions are a part of the very fabric of the 
United States, our national character. (Applause.) So 
the best way for us to fight terrorism is to deny these 
organizations legitimacy and to show that here in the 
United States of America, we do not suppress Islam; 
we celebrate and lift up the success of Muslim Ameri-
cans. That’s how we show the lie that they are trying 
to propagate. (Applause.)37
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In a telling letter from an unknown author, the dam-
age done to Qa’idat al-Jihad’s “brand” is explicitly ad-
dressed. Not blaming AQO’s own terrorist modus 
operandi as the principal culprit, this author instead 
blames its name—“al-Qa’ida”—for it fails to signify a 
cause, rather than merely an organization (Tanzim).38 
An organization, no less, that now stands marginal-
ized, divorced from its self-proclaimed mission as 
vanguard of the people of the Sunnah (Ahl-us Sun-
nah).39 It is worth quoting in full:
I make mention to you (plural) of a very important 
matter that came to me, which is changing the name of 
[Qa’ida al-Jihad], because there are several necessary 
and attention-worthy reasons to change it, of them: 
1. This name (Qa’ida al-Jihad) was abridged by the 
people and only a few people remember this name; 
it has come to be known as (al-Qa’ida) and this name 
reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them, 
and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they 
are not at war with Islam and Muslims, but they are 
at war with the organization of al-Qa’ida, which is an 
outside entity from the teachings of Islam and this is 
what was raised repeatedly in the past as indicated by 
Obama, that our war is not on Islam or on the Muslim 
people but rather our war is on the al-Qa’ida organi-
zation, so if the word al-Qa’ida was derived from or 
had strong ties to the word Islam or Muslims; or if it 
had the name Islamic party, it would be difficult for 
Obama to say that. It is clear from the past also that 
they [the enemies] have largely stopped using the 
phrase “the war on terror” in the context of not want-
ing to provoke Muslims, because they felt that saying 
the war on terror could appear to most people to be a 
war on Islam . . . 
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2. The name of an entity carries its message and rep-
resents it. Al-Qa’ida describes a military base with 
fighters without a reference to our broader mission 
to unify the nation. Building on what is presented, it 
would be nice if you could discuss and come up with 
appropriate names that would not be easily shortened 
to a word that does not represent us. It would help if 
the name is a method of delivery of our message to 
reach the sons of the Ummah/nation. 40
This unknown author then suggests potential alterna-
tive names that attempt to re-brand AQO in a man-
ner that masks its militarist roots and terrorist modus 
operandi: 
These are some suggestions [for alternative names]:
Taifat al-tawhid wal-jihad (TN: Monotheism and Jihad 
Group)
Taifat al-tawhid wal-difa’ an al-Islam (TN: Monotheism 
and Defending Islam Group)
Jama’at i’at al-khilafat al-rashida (TN: Restoration of the 
Caliphate Group)
Jama’at nasr al-Islam wal-aksa (TN: Support of Islam 
and Al-Aqsa Group)
Jama’at wihda al-Muslimin (TN: Muslim Unity Group)
Tanthim al-Jihadi li-tawhid al-Ummah wa-inkathiha (TN: 
Jihad Organization for Unification [Monotheism] and 
Rescue of the Nation)
Tanthim al-Jihadi litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Ummah 
(TN: Jihad Organization to Liberate Al-Aqsa and Uni-
fy the Nation)
Hizb tawhid al-Ummah al-Islamiya (TN: Islamic Nation 
Unification Party)
Jama’at tahrir al-aksa (TN: Al-Aqsa Liberation Group)
Jama’at inkath wanahdat al-Ummah (TN: Rescue and Re-
vitalization of the Nation Group)41
A second theme emerges from these captured doc-
uments.42 Bin Laden was in the midst of “new think-
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ing.” Although killed in the beginning months of the 
“Arab Spring,” bin Laden had earlier begun to question 
whether an alternative path to the Caliphate might be 
required. It was not the Muslim Brotherhood path of 
education, politics, reform, eschewal of violence, and 
pursuit of a long-term cultural revolution Islamizing 
societies from below, slowly capturing them through 
a creeping majority seeking, and winning office to 
return Islamicity to the public square. Nor, however, 
was it exclusively the planning and executing of mass 
casualty terrorist attacks directed at the head of world 
infidelity. This new direction seemed to suggest a 
gradual, evolutionary insurgent strategy involving 
a greater emphasis on preaching (da’wa), on embed-
ding within various ongoing rebellions, and working 
within and through the various nationalist-Islamist 
currents often dominant in these theaters. This slow 
march also called for working within existing “Sykes-
Picot” borders, rather than advocating their smashing. 
Nationalist sensibilities and territorial boundaries, 
while anathema to the ultimate reconstituted global 
Caliphate, were the necessary starting-points, and it 
was crucial not to proceed faster than the Ummah was 
prepared to go. Also, a rebranding of the local sup-
porters and helpers for the rule of Islamic law (An-
sar al-Sharia) is one organizational result that has ap-
peared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, for example.43 
It was still a seeding process, and the furnishing of 
high-quality Qa’idat al-Jihad’s recruits, but the open-
ings now presented by the tottering, falling, and de-
caying dictatorships called for a new way to approach 
the question of raising Allah’s Word supreme; as well 
as its timing, and alliance strategy.
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“WHAT IS QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD?” IN A  
NUTSHELL: FAZUL ABDULLAH AND ADAM 
GADAHN
Following bin Laden’s death, the non-linear course 
of an unanticipated Arab Spring and AQO’s role 
within it remained undefined. Some fresh beginnings 
were suggested, and organizational forms founded. 
What futures these hold remain to be seen in the com-
ing years. It is prudent, however, to conclude this 
historical account with a final summation of the clas-
sical AQO doctrine: that belief system, worldview, 
doctrine, and a set of assumptions at the heart of bin 
Laden’s declaration of a jihad against the Jews and 
Crusader America; that which anchored his terrorist 
campaign beginning in the early-1990s.44 
Fortunately, two such accounts exist: the first is 
a brief, telling excerpt from long-time AQO terrorist 
mastermind Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, appearing 
in the Spring 2013 10th Issue of AQAP online maga-
zine, Inspire;45 and the second excerpt is by long-time 
AQO member, senior AQO spokesman, and senior 
communications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn.46 
Let us consider in turn each answer to the question, 
“What is Qa’idat al-Jihad?” For Fazul Abdullah:
Al-Qaeda is an Islamic group which raises the flag of 
Jihad to espouse and support the Haqq (truth of Islam) 
wherever it is found. 
Al-Qaeda literally means ‘a firm foundation,’ this 
name is enough to clarify that it was found[ed] to 
remain fighting Jihad. Allah says, ‘And [remember; 
sic] when you, [O Muhammad; sic] left your family 
in the morning to post the believers at their stations 
(maqaa’ida—a derivation of Qa’idah) for the battle [of 
Uhud; sic]—and Allah is All-Hearer and All-Knower.’ 
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Thus it is military posts with equipments [sic] pre-
pared to fight the enemies of Allah among the com-
batant kuffar and their allies wherever they are by the 
Grace of Allah. Allah says about the mujahideen who 
fight His enemies, ‘You [believers; sic] are more terror-
izing within their breasts than Allah.’ We ask Allah to 
make us among those who terrorize the infidels. 
Al-Qaeda is not a separated [sic] party as many think, 
we do not believe in any party but one—The Glori-
ous Party of Allah. And this group is made up of [the] 
Ummah (nation) of Muhammad. We are against the 
concept of partisanship which lays down certain spe-
cial program [sic] and obliges the members to abide by 
their understandings. And whoever differs with them 
is counted [i.e., considered] to be on batil (the wrong 
path). There are many Islamic movements founded on 
these policies, and this opposes the principle of ‘It is 
He (Allah) who has named you Muslims’ and ‘Truly! 
This, your Ummah . . . is one religion.’ Therefore, we 
are Muslims of the vanguard of the Muslim Ummah  
who call not to partisanship.
Al-Qaeda’s main goal in this stage—at least—is to aid 
every oppressed Muslim in the world regardless of his 
madhhab [i.e., his jurisprudential orientation, whether 
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, or Hanbali] and race. As for 
its long-term goal, [it] is to reestablish the Islamic Ca-
liphate through Jihad in cause of Allah and to imple-
ment the Shari’a of Allah in the whole land of Allah, 
Bi’idhnillah. [sic; i.e., ‘God willing’]
We are proud that every Muslim believes in Islamic 
unity and waging jihad against kuffar who occupy our 
lands. And every Muslim has the same ideology as 
that of Al-Qaeda’s. 
Alhamdulillah [i.e., ‘Praise Allah’] we have conveyed 
the ideology to the people. It is up to them to stand 
and strive for the Islamic caliphate through different 
ways, and to implement the pure law of Allah.47
In a recently published extensive interview in the 
new online magazine Resurgence, Gadahn provides 
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an excellent precis of AQO’s doctrine.48 As the read-
er will soon detect, Gadahn’s account incorporates, 
though spun to magnify AQO’s truth and greatness, 
every key dimension examined earlier. According to 
Gadahn, AQO is distinguished by five key doctrines:
First, its global/international reach and membership, 
as opposed to some other groups which focused almost 
exclusively on particular countries or regions . . . [A]l-
Qa’eda from its inception has always been an ‘Islamic 
Internationale’ and has never limited itself to a particu-
lar country or region. Rather, it has always had a global 
outlook and a presence in dozens of countries around 
the region, and has [leadership and rank-and-file from] 
many different countries and origins: Hijazis, Najdis, 
Yemenis, Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, Libyans, 
Maghrebis, Tunisians, Europeans, Pakistanis, Indians, 
Bengalis, Balochis: you name it [emphasis in original]. 
The second thing which distinquishes al-Qa’eda—and 
still does is its focus on fighting America, the Crusader 
West, and the Jews (the far enemy/original unbelievers)
[emphasis in original].49 
It is worth pausing to focus on this second point 
for a moment as Gadahn feels it is necessary to defend 
it in a way that he does not the others. In this defense, 
he quotes from an actual captured Abbottabad letter 
written by bin Laden that employs the “base of the 
tree trunk” simile, and acknowledges that this “Far 
Enemy” doctrine is still resisted by many. Gadahn’s 
excerpt is taken from a letter from Qa’idat al-Jihad’s 
Emir Osama bin Laden to the AQAP emir and former 
bin Laden personal secretary, Shaykh Abu Baseer 
al-Wuhayshi: 
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I would like to remind you of the general policy of al-Qaida 
in the military and media spheres. Al Qaida has been distin-
guished by its concentration on the larger external enemy 
before the internal enemy, because while the internal enemy 
is greater in terms of unbelief, the external enemy’s unbelief 
is clearer, and is also more dangerous at the present time. 
[Today,] America is the head of unbelief. If Allah cuts it 
off, the wings will be weakened. . . . [T]he enemies of the 
Ummah are like a malignant tree, and America is its trunk 
with a diameter of 50cm . . . We want to topple this tree 
by sawing it down, but our power and energy is limited. 
Therefore the safest and most effective way to bring down 
the tree is for us to focus on the sawing at the American 
base of the tree . . . You have a practical example of that, 
which is how the Mujahideen in Afghanistan were able to 
cut the root of the Russian tree, after which all its branches 
fell one after the other, from South Yemen to Eastern Eu-
rope, without us expending any effort on these branches at 
that time. Therefore, any arrow and landmine which can be 
used to target Americans while other enemies are present 
should be spent on Americans instead of on other members 
of the NATO pact, to say nothing of lesser enemies. . . . The 
one who keeps abreast of events can see that it is our op-
erations and messages which have really exhausted and 
strained Americans, especially after September 11th. So we 
should increase pressure on them until the balance of terror 
is achieved and the cost of war, occupation, domination of 
our countries becomes more than its benefits for them and 
they reach a state of exhaustion which will motivate them to 
submit, withdraw from our countries and stop supporting 
the Jews [italics in original].50
Gadahn, admitting that this is a controversial posi-
tion, then attempts its defense: 
Regrettably, this strategic policy choice was—and still 
is—viewed by some other groups and movements as 
amounting to deviation from the path of Jihad and 
the ‘true methodology,’ and is used as a gateway for 
criticism and condemnation of al-Qa’eda, even though 
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the issue is essentially one of strategy, tactics, and pri-
orities and not a dispute over the obligatory nature of 
fighting the apostate regimes. In this regard, Shaykh 
Usama says in the recently released video entitled 
Bushriyaat (Glad Tidings), in reply to a question con-
cerning the groups which prefer to focus on the near 
enemy: “As I said, strike the head, and the legs, arms and 
everything else will come down. It’s an octopus, and its 
head is Crusader/Zionist America and Israel. Some people 
are of the opinion that it is beneficial to strike the tentacles 
of the octopus . . . [B]ut . . . as long as the number of [Muja-
hid] youth is few and our capabilities are limited, we should 
condense matters by striking the head. They [i.e., those who 
believe in striking the tentacles] deserve to be rewarded for 
their ijtihad [discretionary judgment] and their deeds, but 
according to our fiqh, we believe that we should strike the 
more important part, the head. This is what we believe, and 
in any case, these are matters of ijtihad (discretion); do you 
strike America first or Hosni Mubarak first, or second, or 
third. These are matters of discretion, and our ijtihad has led 
us to take the position that we should first strike the head of 
Unbelief and the leaders of Unbelief, in accordance with the 
texts [italics in original].51 
Gadahn concludes his attempted “Islamic” case by 
citing a case from Islamic history where the first two 
caliphs succeeding Prophet Muhammad (Umar and 
Abu Bakr) launched attacks against the Byzantines, 
despite the fact that they were fighting internal wars 
against rebels and early seceders, and cites Quran 9:12, 
“Then fight the leaders of disbelief—for they have no 
binding oaths—in order that they may desist.”52 
A third distinctive feature, Gadahn claims, is 
Qa’idat al-Jihad’s: “lack of a written ‘aqeedah (doc-
trine/creed) or manhaj (methodology) which every 
prospective member has to agree to before joining 
[emphasis in original].”53 He continues that this is:
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in contrast to some groups which have strict condi-
tions for membership which may lead to many people 
being excluded for not being up to the mark, as if Jihad 
is the exclusive domain of an elite few. Al Qa’eda, on 
the other hand, tends to be much more open in accept-
ing members even if they may not agree with all the 
positions of the leadership, so long as they are Mus-
lims who have been vetted security-wise and are not 
known for major bid’a, or outright criminality. I for 
one think this approach is the best suited for making 
use of the capabilities of the Ummah and rallying the 
Muslims to fight their enemies, and restore the Islamic 
system. On the other hand, when you limit member-
ship of your group to those who agree with you in ev-
ery minutae of fiqh and ‘aqeedah, I think you may be 
guilty of closing doors which Allah has left open and 
isolating your self, the Jihad, and the Mujahideen from 
the wider Ummah. Allah has not limited Jihad to people 
who follow a certain fiqh or madhhab; on the contrary, 
Allah has ordained Jihad for the entire Ummah, even 
sinful Muslims, so what about those who follow a dif-
ferent madhhab from ours or even the same madhhab 
except that they differ with you on a few minor points 
of fiqh or ‘aqeedah? How can you turn them away un-
less they change their views and positions which are 
open to debate and discussion and—more often than 
not—have little bearing on day-to-day operations? As 
long as someone agrees with the practical approach 
and policies of your group and is prepared to listen 
and obey the ameer except in disobedience to Allah, 
then why should they be prevented from joining you? 
I would like to point out that I am not talking here in 
terms of permissibility or impermissibility, but rather 
in terms of appropriateness and what is in the best  
interest of the Ummah.54 
Fourth, for Gadahn, AQO’s distinctiveness is in:
its recognition of the importance of public relations 
for the Mujahideen and of winning and preserving 
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popular support of the Muslim masses (while always 
relying on Allah alone), as opposed to some groups 
which reject or belittle the concept of maintaining a 
popular support base and consider it be a ‘sophism’ 
or even an ‘idol’ (we seek refuge in Allah) [emphasis 
in original]. 55
The fifth and final distinct AQO doctrine is “its 
particularly close ties with the Islamic Emirate of Af-
ghanistan.”56 At this point, Gadahn begins a discus-
sion of various groups that denounced the Taliban on 
grounds of party, or:
due to their deviant understanding of Islam and ex-
treme application of the principle of takfeer (excom-
munication). The irony was that when these Takfeeri 
types came to Afghanistan for training—or were 
forced to come to Afghanistan after being chased out 
of their homes in Peshawar and Khyber . . . they were 
warmly welcomed by the Emirate . . . But . . . these 
extremists have always been relatively few in this part 
of the world and never very well organized.57
Having identified this “takfiri” extremism, the in-
terviewer then asks Gadahn for his own definition of 
that phenomenon. Gadahn responds: 
A Takfeeri is someone who has gone beyond the lim-
its of the Shari’ah in terms of his application of the 
principle of Takfeer and has adopted excessiveness 
and extremism as his methodology, thus making it 
his defining characteristic. In other words, we’re not 
talking about someone who has made a few mistakes 
in this regard; we’re talking about a person who lives 
and breathes unregulated Takfeer. . . . [W]hat is impor-
tant for us to know [is] that both Takfeerism and Khari-
jism are deviant ideologies which we must never tire 
of warning against and combating, due to the danger 
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they pose to Islam and Muslims in general and the  
Jihad and Mujahideen in particular.58 
Toward the very end of the interview, Gadahn 
again lists what he believes is, in essence, that upon 
which Qa’idat al-Jihad as a distinct organization is 
founded. Again, we shall see a distinction drawn 
between an open church and a closed sect; between 
softness, mercy, and leniency, and hardness, brutality, 
and severity.
let us . . . make sure our intentions are sound and our 
actions correct . . . we are fighting for . . . Allah, not for 
[the] sake of ameer, group, temporal power or worldly 
gain . . . let us show mercy and kindness toward the 
weak and helpless; let us display tolerance of our fel-
low Muslims and Mujahideen [even if] . . . they have 
let us down; let us beware of the deviant Takfeeri meth-
odology which continues to rear its ugly head every 
now and again in some of the theatres of jihad;  let us 
beware of making Takfeer of Muslims or Mujahideen 
or deeming their blood, wealth and honor to be per-
missible without right; let us beware of turning into 
‘Jihadi supremacists’ (if you get my drift); let us show 
respect for our ‘Ulama, leaders and elders and let us 
abide by their rulings, advice and instructions except 
in clear disobedience to Allah; let us adhere to and 
comply with the principles of Shari’ah and justice in all 
of our actions and dealings; and let us work towards 
unity on a sound basis of taqwa and Islamic precepts, 
because if we can’t unify our own ranks, how can we 
expect the Ummah to unify itself [italicis in original].59 
Having examined AQO’s worldview and doctrines 
from its origins to the present, Gadahn provides us 
with the perfect segue for transitioning from Qa’idat 
al-Jihad’s worldview, beliefs, and doctrine to that 
about which he warned, posed the greatest of dangers 
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to “Islam and Muslims in general and the Jihad and 
Mujahideen in particular”60—a second species of devi-
ant Sunni terrorist organization, Tanzim al-Dawla al-
Islamiyya, the ISO. It is to that terrorist entity that we 
now turn.
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III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION  
(TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)
To understand the uniqueness of ISO vis-à-vis 
AQO, we must first return to the place where their 
common ancestry diverges: the Salafi-Muwahhidun 
(Wahhabi) Call. We shall then more fully understand 
why the ISO and AQO, although Sunni and jihadist, 
are and have always been distinctly different at the 
level of core beliefs, worldview, and doctrine. It is a 
profound error to view AQO and ISO as disagreeing 
only about the path or strategy to the Caliphate. No, 
these organizations disagree on genuine religious fun-
damentals. ISO and AQO differ, for example, on such 
core questions as: What does it actually mean to be a 
“Muslim”? Who is a Muslim? What constitutes proof 
of one’s faith (Iman)? What constitutes proof of one’s 
lack of faith (Kufr)? What are the necessary legal req-
uisites for proof of another’s apostasy (ridda)?
While these disagreements are vital, four key 
creedal differences are perhaps the most distinctive 
and consequential, and most fully distinguish ISO 
from AQO. These, considered collectively, explain 
why ISO has engaged in a level of brutality, cruelty, 
and inhumane conduct so extreme that it has led Mus-
lims and non-Muslims alike to proclaim that “these 
are not men of religion” and that “no religion on 
Earth,” no matter how militant, engages in this type 
of “barbaric, cruel, and evil” behavior.61 These most 
distinguishing elements include: (1) an apocalyptic 
and eschatological belief in the “Imminence of the End 
Times”; (2) a belief in the necessity of immediately 
reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate; (3) a belief that 
the Shia represent an existential threat to Sunni Islam 
and must be completely exterminated; and, (4) that it 
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is the “Nearest Enemy” and not the “Far Enemy” that 
is the Ummah’s truest existential foe. Considered col-
lectively, these four core beliefs transform what was in 
the beginning, an extremely sectarian variant of Salafi-
Wahhabism into a kind of monstrous killing machine 
that seems devoid of a moral compass except for that 
required to secure absolute authority and absolute 
loyalty, through consent or coercion, through power 
and conquest, over those poor souls unlucky enough 
to be in their way, and which ISO truly believes is 
the only salvific path to be followed as precursor to 
Allah’s imminent “Divine Judgment” of souls. 
The ISO’s present status as a seemingly merciless 
killing machine now ensconced in a type of proto-
state did not occur in a vacuum, of course. The ISO 
would not exist, or at this level of severity at least, had 
the ruling Shia elements in Iraq following the USG oc-
cupation made the essential, painful choices required 
to pursue a new social compact with the nation’s Sun-
ni population. Or, had the USG not operationalized 
Ahmad Chalabi’s long-dreamt of goal of imposing 
a punitive de-Ba`athification.62 Or, had the USG not 
imposed the disastrous policy of dissolving the Iraqi 
armed forces and security forces, numbering in the 
hundreds of thousands;63 or had been prepared for a 
Sunni insurgency; or had developed a realistic post-
occupation, longer-term stabilization policy based in 
a keen and learned awareness that the USG’s decapi-
tation, occupation, and empowerment of Iraq’s Shia 
would profoundly destabilize an existing equilibrium 
in Iraq;64 or understood that the decapitation  of the 
Iraqi regime would profoundly alter the terms of the 
broader Sunni-Shia rivalry inaugurated by the emer-
gence of a Shia revolutionary State in 1979, and there-
by further energizing proponents and antagonists 
who view this schism as a difference so wide as that 
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between God and the Devil; or, finally, had the USG 
not first gone into Iraq the wrong way, and later re-
peated the error by disengaging from Iraq the wrong 
way. The pretext for decapitation was proved wrong, 
and the consequences of a premature exit, though un-
derstandable owing to Iraqi intransigence, bad faith, 
and an Iranian-backed political agenda, have proved 
enormously costly.
Another way to understand what the United States 
is now dealing with is the following: when the ISO’s 
previous incarnation as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) 
was hunted to practical extinction, the United States 
failed to completely douse the fire. It left a burning 
ember. It did not understand at the time the profound 
and unique nature of this distinct terrorist organiza-
tion. It had much too casually and erroneously viewed 
the ISI as AQO on steroids. And despite AQO’s genu-
ine concerns, they did not publicly denounce this or-
ganization’s penchant for extreme brutality and alien-
ating its Sunni base, though they did so in private. 
The USG possessed captured letters between se-
nior AQO and the Emir al-Zarqawi of what was then 
known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI; “The Base of Jihad in 
the Land of the Two Rivers [Tigris and Euphrates]”; 
Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn). It knew of 
a captured letter sent in January 2004, 10 months be-
fore al-Zarqawi’s official October 14, 2004, pledge of 
loyalty (bay’ah) to AQO Emir Osama bin Laden; one 
that strongly intimated the distinctly different priori-
ties of each organization.65 More recently we learned 
through captured documents that, by 2006, a profound 
disconnect had emerged between the former ISI and 
AQO, to the extent that senior spokesman and com-
munications operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn would 
request that AQO openly denounce and disavow any 
56
relation to ISI; this, in late-2010, a full 4 years before 
this was finally consummated by AQO’s current Emir 
al-Zawahiri on February  3, 2014.66 But since 9/11, and 
perhaps understandably, the world understood the 
words “al-Qaeda terrorism” and through ignorance, 
error, and good intentions, no public distinctions were 
made between what was obviously a level of unprec-
edented savagery and cruelty being meted out by the 
al-Zarqawi organization in Iraq, and AQO’s various 
plots directed primarily at the American homeland 
and American interests and embassies overseas. 
Through a combination of re-learned counterinsur-
gency, U.S. Special Forces, working with and empow-
ering the newly-emergent Anbar tribal resistance, as 
well as ultra-lethal counter-terrorism operations con-
ducted by the U.S. CIA, the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC), and Iraqi Special Forces, nearly 
eviscerated high-value leadership targets of the former 
ISI by 2008-2009, through killing and imprisonment. 
But, and this cannot be stressed too strongly, absence 
of evidence is not evidence of absence. Unbeknownst 
to the USG at the time, and only truly understood over 
the past few years, a hidden, smoldering, white-hot 
ember had been left behind. Its glow and smoke and 
other signs carefully hidden from view, in safe houses, 
sanctuary in cities and remote regions, or in plain sight 
in a major prison—Camp Bucca—later turned out to 
have been a virtual hatchery, incubator, and launching 
pad for the latest mutation of the original al-Zarqawi 
organization.
A systematic campaign that began with carefully 
orchestrated prison breaks, a talented and vicious 
leadership cadre, and the kindling, tinder, gasoline, 
and oxygen provided by those contextual factors cited 
previously—now also include the Syrian rebellion 
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and civil war, and the emergence of an unanticipated 
Syrian sanctuary beginning especially after March 
2011—transformed this ISI remnant into one that 
would explode on the world stage as a type of exotic 
and unexpected state-building killing machine which 
seemed, and to some still seems, unstoppable. Still 
thinking only in terms of Qa’idat al-Jihad, the ISO was 
misnamed, misrecognized, and its unique sameness, 
but also critical differences as a unique species—ultra-
sectarian, former Ba’athist-led, Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, 
apocalyptic global jihadism—remained, and still re-
mains, misunderstood. Let us now retrace the steps 
that must be understood to discover how this diver-
gent path from their last commonly shared ancestor 
within a renascent Sunni global jihadism occurred; 
and its consequences for creed, strategy, and intra-
jihadi civil war. It is to that journey we now turn.
“ZARQAWISM” VS. AQO: ABU MUSAB  
AL-ZARQAWI’S WORLDVIEW AND DOCTRINE: 
1989-JUNE 7, 2006
The phenomenon represents a series of continu-
ities and discontinuities commencing with the rise 
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the latter 1990s—origi-
nal progenitor of the doctrine and modus operandi 
now under investigation—to the June 29, 2014, self-
proclamation of a so-called Islamic State (al-Dawlat al-
Islamiyya, or al-Khalifa al-Islamiyya) of the Caliphate, to 
which the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) are 
now obligated to pledge obedience (bay’ah). 
History and doctrine intertwine, and we will dis-
cover that al-Zarqawi’s original notions are never 
negated, but are extended from “Zarqawism” to 
“Neo-Zarqawism,” to what might now be termed 
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“Baghdadism.” Because of our ignorance of certain 
details of this highly secretive terrorist entity, it is not 
yet possible to fully paint the differences between the 
original progenitor and his successors. 
As described previously, sectarian bloodbaths are 
always fierce—whether based in Islam, Communism, 
or Christianity, to take three faiths proclaiming a 
universal mission and followership. Everything is at 
stake in that smallest of smallest differences. It is as if 
a millimeter separates two men standing on the edge 
of a cliff, and the one just a thousandth of a millimeter 
closer to its edge must now, owing to an unpardon-
able error, face eternal death. In addition, this splin-
tering of splinters leads to ever more severe acid tests 
of what it means to be “true” to the genuine “Truth.” 
Who is a loyal adherent? Who, an enemy within? Who 
is the greater enemy to be fought? For splintered splin-
ters, it is invariably the one closest in creed that com-
mits the greatest of travesties endangering the path to 
Salvation. They took the road before the true road, or 
a left fork and not a right fork, and it is they who took 
the wrong path to eternal perdition and damnation. 
But this is not merely a matter for the damned. It is 
one that also, and especially for these ultra-sectarians, 
threatens to carry all others (including themselves) 
in their path. Obliterating the followers of the wrong 
path, then, translates into an obsessive demand to cre-
ate the “Truest Sect of the Pure,” all of this of course as 
a self-proclaimed vanguard speaking in the name of 
the entire multitude to be saved. For communism, the 
vanguard represents the proletariat. For the adherents 
of the ISO, the true Mujahidin professedly represents 
the worldwide Muslim Ummah. 
For these ultra-sectarians, the Muslim Ummah must 
first be cleansed of its greatest internal enemies—the 
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Shia—and nearly as close, of Sunnism’s own false 
and heretical, and even apostate elements. Then, and 
only then, should the final battles commence against 
the ultimate and final Enemy, the original Kufr or 
Worshippers of the Cross, and all other forms of sup-
posedly modern idolatry—nationalism, secularism, 
and democracy, the most often mentioned. And for 
these ultra-sectarians, Islam is to be understood not 
as an ethic of all times—proclaiming the necessity of 
righteous intention, praiseworthy deeds, mercy, and 
forgiveness—but as an ethic of the “End Times,” de-
manding a virtually unlimited relaxing of moral stric-
tures and unleashing of unprecedented vicious brutal-
ity, against Allah’s most determined final antagonists. 
ISO is not Qa’idat al-Jihad, the Church for all Sun-
nis, whose principal and immediate arch-enemy is 
the original external “Far Enemy” Kufr, demonically 
presented in AQO’s terrorist messaging as the Cross-
Worshipping, Muslim-hating “Crusader” America 
and the Cross-Worshippers’ true behind-the-scenes 
demonic master, “Zionism.” ISO is not Qa’idat al-Jihad, 
the Base for a Sunni Islamic International Organiza-
tion or for a “World Front for Jihad Against the Jews 
and Crusaders.” As a conglomerate organization, it is 
designed to welcome the maximum number of Sunnis 
willing to go to war with these original Kufr who have 
usurped Muslim lands, honor, power, and the right 
to rule; to maximize and synchronize the combined 
power of its parts; accommodate Salafis and non-
Salafis, Salafi-Wahhabis and non-Salafi-Wahhabis, 
Salafi-Jihadis and non-Salafi-Jihadis, and all Sunnis—
saints and sinners; and shall all remain, for all times, 
sinners that must constantly pray for Allah’s Divine 
mercy and compassion—who profess an intention to 
adhere to the empowerment of Ahl-us Sunnah, and 
60
work for the elimination of the “Crusader-Zionist” oc-
cupation of “Muslim” lands. 
A remarkable example of the AQO ecumenical 
conception of “Sunniness” and “Muslimness” is evi-
denced in two separate documents by Qa’idat al-Jihad 
senior spokesmen and senior communication repre-
sentative Adam Gadahn. First, Gadahn’s truly broad 
conception of Sunnism is evident in his biting criticism 
of the ultra-sectarian, exclusivist, and self-righteous 
nature of certain so-called jihadist online forums.67 
A second example is provided in that posthumously 
published interview earlier referenced, in which Ga-
dahn discusses his own conversion to Islam, and also 
his reflections on the essential requirements of faith.68 
Lumping not splitting, Church not sect, openness 
not closedness, patience not impatience; these are 
AQO’s signature attributes, declared by one at the 
apex of AQO since his bay’ah in the latter 1990s, and 
one trusted and actually charged with presentations 
of AQO’s creed and methods. It is important to un-
derstand how powerful this path emphasizing intra-
Sunni solidarity, unity, community, brotherhood, and 
the tolerance of differences may become if, as is pos-
sible, the AQO is in transition from its “Far Enemy” 
exclusive “Bin Ladenism,” to a revised “Qa’idat al-
Jihad” focused far more on becoming fully embedded 
as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances 
in a now-fermenting Arab Muslim world. Further re-
flections on strategy must wait; however, and will be 
taken up in subsequent chapters of this book.
Having introduced the ISO by way of a broader 
reflection on the genus to which it belongs—ultra-
sectarianism—and having drawn preliminary con-
trasts between a Churchly AQO and Sectarian ISO, we 
shall now begin with Zarqawism and end with self-
declared Caliph Ibrahim’s Caliphate of the End Times, 
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tracing the rise of this other markedly sectarian, and 
in other highly consequential ways unique, species of 
Sunni global jihadism. 
FROM NON-RELIGIOUS VIOLENT STREET 
TOUGH TO ULTRA-SECTARIAN SALAFI-WAH-
HABI JIHADIST PRISON TOUGH: 1980–1999 
If one attempts a composite based on standard 
sources and known writings, “Zarqawism” appears to 
be a novel synthesis derived from several elements.69 
First, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (b. 1966, birth name: Ah-
mad Fadil Nazal-Khalayah) in his youth and youngest 
adulthood appears as a sinner among sinners, born in 
and roaming the urban, industrial, gritty Jordanian 
city Zarqa’s streets, and sharing a profile that is not 
dissimilar from that of a particular demographic now 
finding its way into the global jihad: petty thieves and 
criminals engaged in violent assault, including sexual 
battery, and spending time imprisoned. We may add 
to this al-Zarqawi’s loss of his father when he was 17. 
The portrait presented is of a street tough, known for 
petty criminality and a kind of fearless toughness. He 
was known to do drugs, imbibe alcohol, engage in 
non-marital sex, and other activities anathema to the 
trends to which he would later declare unconditional 
fidelity. 
Al-Zarqawi at some point “found” or reverted 
to Islam, having been drawn in and convinced of its 
truth. Again, not unlike others similarly disposed, al-
Zarqawi’s reversion to a variant of Salafist Islam led 
him to abandon his criminal activities and commit to 
a strict behavioral regimen prohibiting drugs, alcohol, 
tobacco, pre- or non-marital sex, and a strict sex–seg-
regation and expectation of female sexual modesty in 
demeanor and dress. 
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Al-Zarqawi sojourned to Afghanistan to partake 
in the jihad against the Soviet occupation, but by the 
time he arrived in 1989, the Soviets were in the process 
of exiting the theater and the jihad had entered a post-
Soviet occupation phase characterized by an emerging 
civil war among the various armed organizations, and 
uncertainty regarding the fate and future of the Arab 
Afghan emigrants, and also the many “Near Enemy” 
insurgents from Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and 
elsewhere now caught between a homeland to which 
they could not return, and a jihad with an ill-defined 
future. Al-Zarqawi’s role was that of an amateur jour-
nalist writing for the periodical Al-Bonian al Marsous, 
but more fateful for his future was his introduction 
and later discipleship to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
(b. 1959, Asim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi).70 
Al-Maqdisi is deemed one of the most influential 
and consequential major scholarly authorities to which 
AQO and others refer.71 His creedal orientation is based 
in a specific strand of Salafi-Wahhabism originating in 
a particular ultra-conservative 19th-century Wahhabi 
movement of scholars from the Najd region of Saudi 
Arabia (the Najd Scholars Movement [NSM]).72 Its 
form is a variant of “Rejectionist” Salafi-Wahhabism 
represented by Juhayman al-Otaybi and those of his 
circle, who, building their case on the NSM and the 
authority of an earlier incarnation known as the Ikh-
wan73 (Brotherhood),—a fierce, uncompromising ji-
hadist army deployed against perceived adversaries 
including what was deemed Ottoman usurpation of 
Salafi-Wahhabism—called into question the Islamic 
nature of the existing Saudi State.74 Unlike al-Otaybi, 
who did not call for the actual overthrow of the Saudi 
State, despite its demonstrable infidelity on important 
matters, al-Maqdisi, in a series of key works, did. 
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Despite al-Maqdisi’s critique of the Saudi state, 
however, it was Jordan, Jerusalem, and the more im-
mediate Levantine environs that provided the basis of 
his focus. Organizing semi-underground, and preach-
ing and recruiting for their secretive ultra-conservative 
Salafi-Wahhabi Call, an organization informally called 
Jama’at al-Muwahhidin (Society for the Upholders of 
Absolute Monotheism) would capture this mission.75 
The group’s activities consisted of vigilante-style ac-
tivities, a kind of privatized hisbah or policing of pro-
hibited or reprehensible conduct, and was directed at 
what they considered secular debauchery: bars, red-
light districts, and co-mingling of the sexes. It was al-
Maqdisi’s decision to smuggle in hand grenades, and 
their mutual decision to oppose the recently conduct-
ed Oslo accords and Jordanian treaty-in-the-making 
with the Israeli state, declared in 1994, that led later 
to their imprisonment on terrorism-related charges. 
Al-Zarqawi’s transition from street tough to Salafist 
to Maqdisian-inspired ultra-conservative Salafi-Wah-
habi Jihadism was on display in his trial as he denied 
the legitimacy of the court and its laws. Sentenced to 
15 years in prison, a decisive phase had begun.
Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were imprisoned from 
1994 to 1999, their sentences cut short by the accession 
and royal pardon of Jordanian King Abdullah II. Ac-
counts of this period agree that the al-Zarqawi and al-
Maqdisi relationship underwent a fundamental trans-
formation. Initially, his student-disciple al-Zarqawi 
proved to be a determined, fearless, loyal enforcer. 
He developed a reputation as a tough, charismatic, 
dominating leader, imposing exacting demands from 
inmates regarding their Islam and decorum. He was 
also noted for a type of fearless loyalty, and known 
for unusually overt displays of emotion, for example, 
64
while memorizing the Quran, one of the achievements 
of this period. With regard to the latter, al-Zarqawi 
was also known for a juvenile-like effusive and almost 
romantic affection directed toward his mother and 
sisters. 
The net result of these prison years together (1994-
1999) was a transformation in the authority relations 
between emir-scholar-teacher al-Maqdisi and pupil-
disciple al-Zarqawi. Al-Maqdisi eventually conceded 
emirship to al-Zarqawi, and continued in his studies 
and fastidious commitment to produce an exacting 
scholarship using classical sources to support a maxi-
malist position calling for the overthrow of existing 
Arab states that did not rule by the Sharia. Al-Zarqawi, 
transforming himself into a muscular and tough per-
son through daily routines of bench-lifting rock-laden 
buckets, developed a reputation as a fearless leader, 
defender of inmates, and was no longer in a subordi-
nate relation to the man who had taught him the ul-
timate meaning of “The Community of Abraham,” as 
al-Maqdisi professed it. 
AL-ZARQAWI’S PRIVATE JIHADIST ARMIES  
OF THE LEVANT: 1999-2004 
Al-Zarqawi’s second and most consequential jour-
ney to Afghanistan occurred upon his release. Two 
years before 9/11, and equipped with a basically 
Maqdisian ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihad-
ism, al-Zarqawi traveled to the land ruled by then-
emir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Muhammad bin 
Omar, to build an army designed to overthrow the 
Jordanian state, and more broadly, to target regimes 
throughout the Levant. Though supplied a letter of 
introduction vouching for his character, the senior 
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leadership of AQO was not impressed. Bin Laden and 
others expressed disdain and genuine concern over 
his brashness, arrogance, and extremist and sectarian 
tendencies. Senior AQO operative Sayf al-Adl indi-
cates in an important recollection how AQO initially 
placed al-Zarqawi under surveillance not only to en-
sure his trustworthiness, but also to determine his 
character and creed. Evidence is cited of a genuine dis-
tance between Osama bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, and 
al-Zarqawi’s repeated refusals to pledge allegiance/
obedience (bay’ah) to bin Laden, the undisputed emir 
of AQO. 
Though al-Maqdisi was a key mentor from the 
latter 1980s through their mutual imprisonment, and 
during this second Afghan sojourn, he does not fur-
nish al-Zarqawi’s Nazi-like anti-Shi’ism. Another key 
influence, Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir (born, 
Abdul Rahman al-Ali), appears to provide the key to 
al-Zarqawi’s signature vitriolic, ultra-sectarian anti-
Shi’ism, and his doctrine calling for the mass annihila-
tion of the Shia, laypersons included.76 Without this, 
al-Zarqawi would have been another Salafi-Jihadist 
waging war on “apostate” Arab regimes, Jordan es-
pecially; with this, Zarqawism was unleashed in a 
manner the jihadi currents had neither witnessed, nor 
condoned. Let us examine this more closely.
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ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR’S ULTRA- 
EXTREMISM IN TAKFIR, AND TAKFIR  
OF THE SHIA
An Egyptian national, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir 
graduated from the Islamic University in Islamabad, 
participated in jihad in Afghanistan, and taught at 
jihadi camps in Kabul. He was later recruited by al-
Zarqawi to become the senior Sharia instructor for his 
camp in Herat.77 Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s extrem-
ism in takfir was well known. According to al-Kha-
teeb, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s “book on the dogma 
of jihad greatly influenced al-Zarqawi, who actually 
studied the book under [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir.”78 
Al-Khateeb summarizes Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 
book in the following manner:
More a book about the dogma of blood, [Abu Abdal-
lah al-] Muhajir posits that any country deferring to 
the rule of positive law is a land of infidelity that Mus-
lims are obligated to leave. He also wrote that there 
is absolute consensus on the unconditional bloodshed 
of an infidel unless he or she is under the protection 
of circumstances stipulated by Shariah. He adds that 
siding with apostates against Muslims is the greatest 
infidelity of all, and that Islam does not differentiate 
between military and civilians. He wrote that ‘the bru-
tality of beheading is intended, even delightful to God 
and His Prophet.’79
A document posted anonymously online in 2012, 
supposing it is accurate, offers far greater detail on 
Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s pivotal role in Afghani-
stan, and also his unique influences on al-Zarqawi’s 
doctrine, than any others of which the present author 
is aware. The following claims are made therein. First, 
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a shorthand summation of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 
doctrine is made: extremes in takfir, sectarianism, and 
anti-Shi’ism, and with reference to the latter, legaliz-
ing the categorical annihilation of the Shia laity; and 
finally, on these takfiri grounds, he opposed both the 
Afghan Taliban’s and Osama bin Laden’s doctrines. 
Second, that other analysts have overestimated Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s influence on al-Zarqawi and 
that in fact his mentorship was restricted to a specific 
time of al-Zarqawi’s life, and was only one of several 
potential influences. Third, despite a fairly lackluster 
online presence, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s influ-
ence at the camps in Afghanistan was very signifi-
cant. Fourth, he was an Egyptian who traveled to Af-
ghanistan in the 1980s, received his master’s degree in 
Sharia from the Islamic University of Islamabad, and 
remained in Afghanistan. Fifth, he was a major figure 
whose primary mission was to recruit and indoctrinate 
those takfiri factions, mostly Arabs from the Maghreb, 
to return home to overthrow their respective regimes. 
Sixth, within this capacity, he held court in Khalden 
camp in Khost, Afghanistan, becoming its senior Shar-
ia official (mas’ul shara’i), thus overseeing Sharia mat-
ters, and theological sessions dealing with governance 
and creed. He further institutionalized his takfirism 
through the creation of an Institute for Faith Brigades 
(ma’had kata’ib al iman). This Institute was an annex to 
Khalden camp, and consisted of a dormitory, lecture 
hall, and a small room for Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 
workspace and library. It was there that he delivered 
a series of seven lectures, whose primary focus was to 
provide the Sharia foundations of takfirist operations 
and create groups of various nationalities to fight 
their respective “apostate” governments. In sum, an 
anonymous blog entry concludes that Abu Abdallah 
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al-Muhajir essentially represented the takfiri faction in 
Afghanistan, and embodied a hardline, doctrinaire, 
and extremely inflexible takfiri line, one that led him 
to accuse bin Laden of deviance; and to actually takfir 
the Taliban, owing to their willingness to permit tra-
ditional prohibited intercessory practices among the 
populace.80 
ABU MUSA’B AL-ZARQAWI’S EMBRACE OF 
ABU ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR’S EXTREMISM 
IN TAKFIR 
The anonymous blog entry provides essential 
insight into al-Zarqawi’s transformation from one 
who, though a Salafi-Jihadi committed to overthrow-
ing “apostate” regimes, did not engage in actions for 
which he would later be widely condemned through-
out his own Salafi-Jihadi community. 
[H]e [Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir] passed on his doc-
trinal legs in Herat [al-Zarqawi’s own training camp] 
to al Zarqawi and his Levantine group [Jund al-Sham; 
Soldiers of the Levant]. It is here worthwhile remem-
bering that before getting along [i.e., agreeing] with 
[Abu Abdallah] al-Muhajir, al Zarqawi had always 
been against suicide operations. That was his position 
both during his first stay in Afghanistan and when he 
went back to Jordan. Given how later al Qa’ida in Iraq 
heavily reflected this method, it is safe to say that this 
encounter has been a major step in his radicalization 
trajectory. Al Zarqawi explained that he changed his 
mind after having ‘discussed the matter of martyrdom’ 
and listened to several tapes of the Shaykh (he also 
said that he read what he deemed ‘an excellent paper’ 
by Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir on the issue). He further 
remembered that ‘Allah has expanded my breast to ac-
cept his position on martyrdom operations. Not only 
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did I see that they (martyrdom operations) are permit-
ted but I was convinced that they were desirable. I 
proceeded then to arrange for Sheikh [Abu Abdallah] 
Al-Muhajir to give a 10-days [sic] work shop in Hirat 
[sic] Camp to explain the legality of these operations 
to the brothers there—this had a very positive impact 
on the brothers.’ According to a takfiri militant, the 
suicide operations issue was one of the various topics 
which have been dealt with during the Institute hey-
day, during a course on jihad.81 
The anonymous blog entry further reveals that 
Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s Pioneers of Spreading the 
Sunnah and the Landmarks of the Victorious Sect, and The 
Jurisprudence of Jihad, were the works most extensively 
taught in the camps. In addition, it was Abu Abdallah 
al-Muhajir who provided to al-Zarqawi the justifica-
tions he would use in his refutations of al-Maqdisi’s 
refusals to legitimate the blood, honor, and wealth of 
the Shia in jihad. Finally, the anonymous blog entry 
reports that al-Zarqawi reportedly said, according to a 
senior Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn figure 
(the late Abu Azzam al-Iraqi): 
I was not influenced by anyone I met among the seek-
ers of knowledge in my whole life like (as I was by) 
Shaykh Abu Anas al-Shami (may Allah accept him) 
and Shaykh Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir (may Allah pro-
tect him).82
Nibras Kazimi also offers critical insight into al-
Zarqawi’s embrace of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s 
extremeness in takfir.83 Kazimi here reproduces an ex-
cerpt from a speech in which al-Zarqawi upbraids his 
former mentor al-Maqdisi, and in so doing, identifies 
Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s doctrinal significance for 
the takfir of all Shia. Al-Zarqawi asserts to al-Maqdisi: 
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He who knows their [the Shia] situation in Iraq would 
surely realize that they are no longer laypeople in the sense 
you [al-Maqdisi] put, for they have become soldiers for 
the unbeliever occupiers, and the eyes that watch the true 
mujahedeen, and would Ja’afari and Hakim and other 
reprobates have come into power had it not been for the 
votes of these laypeople?! And it is unjust to cite a fatwa 
from Ibn Taymiyyeh’s era and have it apply to the repro-
bates today without judging the differences between the 
two eras, and then there are scholars who have spoken 
of lay Shias as unbelievers like Sheikh Hmoud Al-‘Aqla’ 
may he rest in peace, and Sheikh Suleiman Al-‘Alwan 
and Sheikh Ali Al-Khudhair (may God set them free) and 
Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir and Sheikh Al-Rashoud 
may he rest in peace, and others [emphasis added].84 
Despite al-Zarqawi’s penchant for extremism, 
AQO ultimately decided that its dearth of Levantine 
connections and al-Zarqawi’s success as an inspira-
tional leader warranted the expenditure of “$5,000 
or so in ‘seed money’” to establish his own training 
camp outside the western Afghan city of Herat, near 
the Iranian border. Then-Qa’idat  al-Jihad chief of secu-
rity Saif al-Adl—a former Egyptian Army colonel who 
had trained in special operations—perceived merit in 
al-Zarqawi’s focus on “apostate” Arab regimes, and 
was designated the middleman.85
His newly named group, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of 
the Levant), starting with a few dozen recruits from 
Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon would eventual-
ly grow to hundreds, and then to the low thousands.86 
Soon Jund al-Sham, under the influence of another key 
Salafi-Jihadi religious influence and his chief spiritual 
advisor, Abu Anas al-Shami (killed September 17, 
2004), would take on its new name Jama’at al-Tawhid 
wal-Jihad (Group for Monotheism and Jihad), one it 
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would only abandon upon finally making bay’ah to 
Osama bin Laden 5 years later, on October 17, 2004. 
Al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad operated 
on two distinct fronts. One privileged the overthrow of 
the Jordanian monarchy and focused on terrorist op-
erations in the Levant.87 This included the attempted 
1999 Millennium bombing, 2002 assassination of the 
U.S. Diplomat Lawrence Foley, a disrupted massive 
bombing plot in 2004 targeting the headquarters of the 
Jordanian intelligence services, and the November 9, 
2005, hotel bombing in Amman, Jordan.88 
The second front is the one that would soon open 
up in Iraq. The American attack on the Afghan Taliban 
and AQO following 9/11 led to al-Zarqawi’s depar-
ture, first into Iran along with many AQO senior level 
operatives, and soon thereafter into a region a few 
miles from the Iranian border in northern Kurdistan, 
then controlled by a virtual mini-statelet run by the 
ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Sunni Kurdish or-
ganization, Ansar al-Islam. It was from this camp that 
al-Zarqawi departed in the run-up to the U.S. inva-
sion—something becoming increasingly imminent—
following 9/11 and the disastrously inaccurate argu-
ment linking weapons of mass destruction (flawed 
premise no. 1), and an al-Qaeda terrorist presence 
(flawed premise no. 2), with a rogue regime (correct 
premise no. 3). Al-Zarqawi began carefully preparing 
for a future assault by building networks, establishing 
safe houses, and storing weapons and munitions. 
The American invasion, occupation, and failed 
stabilization of Iraq, commencing in March 2003, pro-
vided the context in which al-Zarqawi’s ultra-conser-
vative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-
Jihad would soon introduce the world to a particularly 
brutal and savage type of jihad, one that owing to the 
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utter dominance of AQO and wildly inaccurate official 
claims that directly linked 9/11 and bin Laden to Sad-
dam Hussein, and also to al-Zarqawi, failed to do jus-
tice to the phenomenon that in fact existed. What was 
occurring in Iraq under al-Zarqawi was not Qa’idat 
al-Jihad 2.0, or Qa’idat al-Jihad’s “Second Generation.” 
It was not Qa’idat al-Jihad at all. In an important sense, 
it was everything Qa’idat al-Jihad was not. This was 
al-Zarqawi’s ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi 
Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad launching its own war, in 
its own name, for its own goals. It is the very type of 
Islam silenced or expelled from Qa’idat al-Jihad’s fold, 
owing to its penchant for intra-Sunni division, extrem-
ism, and takfiri nature.
ZARQAWISM UNVEILED AS DOCTRINE AND 
STRATEGY: AL-ZARQAWI’S NEGOTIATION 
AND BAY’AH TO OSAMA BIN LADEN
Al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism is on full display in its 
earliest documents, particularly those involved in 
the negotiations that unfolded over the course of 10 
months as al-Zarqawi considered Qa’idat al-Jihad’s 
offer to become an official AQO affiliate.89
The January 2004 Letter to Osama bin Laden. 
[T]he only solution is for us to strike the religious, 
military, and other cadres among the Shi`a with blow 
after blow until they bend to the Sunnis. Someone may 
say that, in this matter, we are being hasty and rash 
and leading the [Islamic] nation into a battle for which 
it is not ready, [a battle] that will be revolting and in 
which blood will be spilled. This is exactly what we 
want, since right and wrong no longer have any place 
in our current situation. The Shi`a have destroyed all 
those balances. God’s religion is more precious than 
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lives and souls. When the overwhelming [Sunni] ma-
jority stands in the ranks of truth, there has to be sacri-
fice for this religion. Let blood be spilled, and we will 
soothe and speed those who are good to their para-
dise. [As for] those who, unlike them, are evil, we will 
be delivered from them, since, by God, God’s religion 
is more precious than anything and has priority over 
lives, wealth, and children.90
This letter from al-Zarqawi to al-Qaeda’s most 
senior leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, discloses his theory of victory, including 
discussion of key target audiences and groups, and 
valuable insight into potentially fatal strategic chal-
lenges. It also offers a window into the mind of a 
fanatically self-righteous killer. Al-Zarqawi reveals 
himself as “Sheikh of the slaughterers,” whose con-
science is clear, owing to the satanization of various 
“others” dehumanized beyond the pale of empathy or 
sympathy.  
In this letter, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are pre-
sented with an offer: either to endorse al-Zarqawi’s 
doctrine and strategy, and thereby earn al-Zarqawi’s 
oath of fealty (bay’ah), or to stand aside offering their 
“brotherly” advice and support. Al-Qaeda Emir bin 
Laden and second-in-command al-Zawahiri are re-
ferred to as “gracious brothers, . . . the leaders, guides, 
and symbolic figures of jihad and battle,” and al-Zar-
qawi stated that he does not see himself as one that is 
“fit to challenge you,” but only to be “the spearhead, 
the enabling vanguard, and the bridge on which the 
[Islamic] nation crosses over to the victory that is 
promised and the tomorrow to which we aspire.”91 
Al-Zarqawi, having taken the time to explain his “vi-
sion” and “path,” then issued what amounted to be an 
ultimatum.
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If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program 
and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fight-
ing the sects of apostasy, [then] we will be your readied 
soldiers, working under your banner, complying with 
your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you public-
ly and in the news media . . . If things appear otherwise to 
you, [then] we are brothers, and the disagreement will 
not spoil [our] friendship. [This is] a cause [in which] 
we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad. 
Awaiting your response . . . [emphasis added].92
Zarqawi’s primary political objective is sectarian: 
to empower Sunni Islam and violently attack, sup-
press, and uproot Shia Islam. While anti-Shi’ism is a 
long-standing orthodox Sunnite policy, one enhanced 
since the 1979 Iranian Khomeinist revolutionary Shia 
revival and self-conscious Salafist and Wahhabi-Salafi 
Sunni-led opposition to this revival,93 Al-Zarqawi’s 
anti-Shi’ism is fanatical, obsessive, and characterized 
by satanization/demonization.94 The language he 
uses to describe the Shia is identical to that used in 
precursors to mass atrocities committed by a variety 
of violent hate-based movements,95 and represents the 
furthest extremes of dehumanization required to mor-
ally disengage and justify wholesale slaughter. Con-
sider for example, the terms used to characterize, in 
toto, the Shia of Iraq and the Levant:
[T]he Shi`a, have declared a secret war against the 
people of Islam. They are the proximate, dangerous 
enemy of the Sunnis, even if the Americans are also 
an archenemy. The danger from the Shi`a, however, is 
greater and their damage is worse and more destruc-
tive to the [Islamic] nation than the Americans, on 
whom you find a quasi-consensus about killing them 
as an assailing enemy.
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[They are] the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking 
snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying 
enemy, and the penetrating venom.
[They are] a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a 
friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comrade-
ship, but harbors ill will.
Shi`ism is the looming danger and the true challenge. 
They are the enemy. Beware of them. Fight them. By 
God, they lie.
These [have been] a sect of treachery and betrayal 
throughout history and throughout the ages. It is a 
creed that aims to combat the Sunnis.
They are infiltrating like snakes to reign over the army 
and police apparatus, which is the strike force and iron 
fist in our Third World, and to take complete control 
over the economy like their tutors the Jews.
The Qur’an has told us that the machinations of the 
hypocrites, the deceit of the fifth column, and the cun-
ning of those of our fellow countrymen whose tongues 
speak honeyed words but whose hearts are those of 
devils in the bodies of men-these are where the disease 
lies, these are the secret of our distress, these are the 
rat of the dike. They are the enemy.
[T]hey are a bone in the throats of the mujahidin and 
a dagger in [the backs of] their leading personalities. 
People without exception know that most of the muja-
hidin who have fallen in war have done so at the hands 
of these people. The wounds are still spreading, and 
they are working the daggers of hatred and cunning 
in them assiduously, Night or day, they do not let up.
I mean that targeting and hitting them in [their] reli-
gious, political, and military depth will provoke them 
to show the Sunnis their rabies . . . and bare the teeth of 
the hidden rancor working in their breasts.96
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The October 17, 2004, Bay’ah by Emir al-Zarqawi 
(Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad) to Emir Osama bin 
Laden (Qa’idat al-Jihad).97
Al-Zarqawi’s bay’ah to bin Laden does not substan-
tially compromise in any recognizable way the path 
he charts in this letter. First, it indicates that it is bin 
Laden who has “seen the light” and come to accept 
al-Zarqawi’s vision for Iraq. Consider al-Zarqawi’s ac-
count of these “past 8 months,” roughly the date sepa-
rating the previous letter from this one. 
Numerous messages were passed between ‘Abu Mus-
ab’ (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood 
over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue 
between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off 
than God chose to restore them, and our most gener-
ous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of 
the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the 
two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed 
to its methods and overall mission [emphasis added].98
It is on this basis, then, that al-Zarqawi’s organi-
zation Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad assumes a name 
change—but neither a doctrinal nor a strategic change. 
The new name, Tanzim Qai’dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafi-
dayn, which would in public commentary almost al-
ways be signified by the shorthand, al-Qaeda in Iraq 
or AQI, appeared to indicate a subordinate franchise 
in a superordinate conglomerate. Moreover, in pub-
lic, al-Zarqawi seemed to have fully subordinated his 
organization and placed its entire machinery at bin 
Laden’s disposal. Al-Zarqawi declared here that: 
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[A]l-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its 
soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh “Osama 
bin Laden” (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the 
sake of God until there is no more discord (Fitnah) and 
all of the religion turns toward God. . . . By God, O 
sheikh of the mujahideen [bin Laden], if you bid us 
plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you 
ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us some-
thing, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine 
commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the 
inveterate infidels and apostates! . . . Now then, peo-
ple of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of the 
mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry 
[‘there is no God but the one God’], as the flag waves, 
raised by our newest heroes. Let us cleanse all Muslim 
lands of every infidel and wicked apostate until Islam 
enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.99
ZARQAWISM: ITS THREE ESSENTIAL  
ELEMENTS
Zarqawism is defined through its ultra-sectarian-
ism, uncompromising ultra-violence, and focus on the 
immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the 
prophesied return of the Caliphate.100 Let us consider 
its three signature elements. 
First, al-Zarqawi declared that the Shia were the 
single greatest threat to the very existence of Ahl-us 
Sunnah. As an existential threat, the language he em-
ployed is calculated to inoculate persons from any 
form of empathy or recognition that the Shia are even 
human beings. As stated previously, it is virtually 
identical to that used by persons, groups, and orga-
nizations who have committed mass murder, wide-
spread atrocities, and even genocide against a cate-
gorical enemy declared the archenemy. For Hitler, for 
example, the singular greatest divide among humans 
was that between “the Aryan” and “the Jew”;  the lat-
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ter was not only subhuman, but also the pernicious, 
treacherous parasite that was the exclusive cause of 
Germany’s then-present humiliation, powerlessness, 
and subversion of its destined rulership of the Earth’s 
natural resources and inhabitants. For al-Zarqawi, the 
great world division was that between the “Ahl-us 
Sunnah,” and the “Shia.” This ultra-sectarian, geno-
cidal “Final Solution” doctrine toward the Shia, as we 
shall see, remains a fundamental ISO premise main-
tained to this day.101 
Second, Zarqawism expressed its will to power in 
a theretofore-unprecedented combination, in global 
jihadist circles of the commission of barbaric ultra-vi-
olence, and just as important, its transformation into 
a media-borne grotesque spectacle and weapon of 
terror-inducing coercion. Here, it was not the mass an-
nihilation of the Shia, declared as a fundamental first 
principle of policy, but the carefully-staged, carefully-
filmed, carefully-calculated horror inducing spectacle 
of a hooded executioner standing above a helpless, 
terrified, non-combatant captive, berating and blam-
ing the United States for the horror soon to unfold, 
climaxing as the executioner’s knife saws off this hap-
less victim’s head and then, in macabre fashion, later 
dropped into place and displayed on its lifeless torso. 
Unpublicized and unprecedented brutality in the 
name of Ahl-us Sunnah was also being committed as 
al-Zarqawi’s campaign pursued the systematic, cold-
blooded assassination of all opponents from all parties 
deemed apostate, owing to their capacity and willing-
ness to partake in a non-sectarian, non-Salafi-Wahhabi 
Jihadi Sunni political organization.102 These enemies 
were Sunni Muslims, but in al-Zarqawi’s eyes, they 
could be at best hypocrites, but more likely heretics, 
or apostates only worthy of death. 
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Finally, al-Zarqawi focused on the necessity of im-
mediately establishing the foundations of an Islamic 
State as a necessary precursor for the liberation of 
the entire Levant, and ultimately the future restora-
tion and final triumph of the historic Sunni Caliphate. 
This policy was originally pursued under the banner 
of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Following al-Zarqawi’s 
bay’ah to bin Laden on October 17, 2004, and under the 
banner of this new AQO “affiliate,” Tanzim Qa’idat al-
Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn (The Base of Jihad in the Land 
of the Two Rivers; AQI)—beginning on October 17, 
2004, until his demise June 7, 2006, since al-Zarqawi’s 
organization’s name was almost always translated as 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—these actions would appear 
to the world to be those sanctioned and perpetrated 
by AQO itself. And despite internal pleas to overtly 
distance AQO from these acts, in principle and ow-
ing to their damage to the AQO brand, AQO’s advice 
and counsel to al-Zarqawi occurred only in secret 
correspondence, while officially the AQO continued 
publicly to endorse the overall goal of mercilessly at-
tacking the Iraqi state and preventing the emergence 
of a democratic transition. This urgency to create an 
ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi state when manifest in 
its severest, most punitive, and least flexible forms, 
spawned Sunni resistance based in tribes and per-
sonages attacked and disprivileged in Iraq’s western 
Al-Anbar province. Later assisted by a USG uncon-
ventional warfare strategy and organized into a USG-
assisted full-blown tribal revolt, this was a proximate 
cause of the organization’s future marginalization, 
implosion, short-term defeat, and near-extinction.103 
It is important to note that though apocalypti-
cism can be found in al-Zarqawi’s speeches and writ-
ings, compared to their elevated status in current ISO 
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media operations, it appears far less pronounced. For 
example, the quote appearing at the top of the con-
tents page in each issue of the ISO’s flagship online 
English-language magazine Dabiq, is excerpted from a 
single sentence from a single speech, in which al-Zar-
qawi states: “Behold, the spark has been lit in Iraq and 
its flames will blaze, Allah willing, until they consume 
the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq.”104 Other instances 
have been noted, but they are relatively few.105 It is 
unlikely, then, that the apocalypticism animating the 
present ISO represents continuity from al-Zarqawi’s 
Zarqawism. Its existence, or at the very least its am-
plification and prominence, likely originates in the 
beliefs of other ISO progenitors. 
In the end, al-Zarqawi failed to foment a Sunni-
Shia civil war, prevent democratic participation in 
the new Iraqi government-in-the-making, establish 
abiding alliances with other insurgent groups, or de-
feat the tribal “Awakening” councils (Sahwat). In a 
despairing, semi-delusional letter written 5 months 
before his June 7, 2006, targeted killing, he speculated 
that possibly a new strategy might be required: fo-
menting a major war between the United States and 
Iran. He opined that a calculated deception campaign 
could be orchestrated to induce an offensive attack 
by the USG on Iran. Secretively manipulating these 
adversaries into the presumption that Iran possessed 
and was prepared to attack the United States with 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s), a war between 
these adversaries would neutralize each in the Iraqi 
theater, thus enabling his organization the possibility 
of regaining its positioning in this theater of war. Re-
signed to defeat, he would invoke the inevitability of 
fate that awaited those true bearers of the Prophet’s 
Religion, “Al-Ghuraba” (The Stranger): an often-cited 
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trope based in the Quran that basically states that Is-
lam entered the world as a stranger, and as a stranger, 
it shall depart. This truth shall be and remain in the 
end, unrecognized as Truth.106 
Had al-Zarqawi’s death ended his terrorist enter-
prise, a very different history would have been writ-
ten. That was not to be. Waiting in the wings were 
others ready and willing to continue Zarqawism as 
doctrine, and as strategy. It is to them we now turn. 
“NEO-ZARQAWISM”: THE BIRTH AND  
DECLARATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF 
IRAQ (DAWLAT AL ‘IRAQ AL-ISLAMIYYAH), 
AND RISE OF THE NEW EMIRS
“Neo-Zarqawism” refers to a phase following 
the killing of al-Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, character-
ized not only by definite doctrinal continuity, but also 
by the actual declaration and creation of an Islamic 
State, which remained in al-Zarqawi’s lifetime as a yet 
unrealized goal. Let us now consider some of its his-
torical landmarks, and then examine its key doctrinal 
elements. 
History. 
The process concluding in the declaration of the Is-
lamic State of Iraq occurred over a 10-month period in 
2006. To this point, al-Zarqawi’s original Army of the 
Levant had gone through several phases, from Jund al-
Sham, to Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al Jihad, to AQO-affiliat-
ed Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Three key 
phases awaited. First, on January 15, 2006, 6 months 
before al-Zarqawi’s death, his Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi 
Bilad al Rafidayn was folded into a newly formed larger 
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group of like-minded insurgent factions, the Mujahi-
din Shura Council (MSC; Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin). 
Al-Zarqawi remained emir of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad 
fi Bilad al Rafidayn, but was also a key member of MSC 
leadership. While putting on an “Iraqi face” and par-
tially heeding AQO’s advice from afar may partially 
explain this emergent organization, for al-Zarqawi it 
was a key milestone on the way to the Islamic State.
In an April 21, 2006, video posted to the Internet, 
he states: 
[W]e bring good tidings to the nation: The establishment 
of the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Iraq, which, Allah 
willing, will be the nucleus for the establishment of an Is-
lamic state in which the word of Allah will reign supreme  
. . . Allah willing, this council will serve as an umbrella 
for every loyal mujahid. I have the honor to be one 
of the members of this blessed council which has a 
blessed leadership. At the same time, I am the emir of 
Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, the servant 
of jihad and the mujihadeen, who derives his strength 
from Allah [emphasis added].107
Al-Zarqawi did not live to see the birth of his 
proto-caliphal Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was 
killed June 7, 2006, and during the next 6 months, an 
additional series of milestones were passed. First, a 
new emir, former Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Abu 
Hamza al-Muhajir (b. 1968, aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri), 
was selected 6 days later on June 13, 2006. Second, 4 
months later, for 3 days (October 12, 2006, to October 
15, 2006), an oath-bound group was formed. Their cul-
minating oath, known as the Hilf al-Mutayyabin (“Oath 
of Scented Ones”), spearheaded by the MSC, symboli-
cally re-enacts a ritual originating in the pre-Islamic era 
among several of the clans in the Prophet’s Quraysh 
tribe, later adopted into Islam by the Prophet. The 
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re-enacted ritual has each party to the pact—in this 
case, five white-robed representatives—assemble and 
dip their hands in a perfumed mix and later, placing 
their hands upon each other, and uttering an oath 
concluding a permanent pact of solidarity on “behalf 
of the oppressed and wronged.”108 The organizations 
committing to this oath reportedly include: the MSC 
itself, consisting of the Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad 
al Rafidayn and its seven other allied groups, includ-
ing among them four jihad groups in Iraq, the Shura 
Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq; Jaysh Al-Fatihin 
(“The Army of the Conquerors”); Jund Al-Sahaba 
(“The Army of the Companions”); and Kataib Ansar 
Al-Tawhid wal-Sunna (“The Monotheism and Sunna 
Brigades”), as well as tribal elements. 
On October 15, 2006, the long-awaited Islamic State 
of Iraq (ISI; Dawlat al ‘Iraq al-Islamiyyah) was officially 
declared. Owing to this pivotal moment in clarifying 
the fundamental distinction between ISO “stateness” 
and AQO “baseness” as paths to the resurrected Sunni 
global caliphate, and also signifying what in retrospect 
was the formal emergence of a formal independence 
from AQO, the complete announcement is reprinted 
below:109 
 The Mutayibeen Alliance [Hilf al-Mutayibeen] 
Brings You Good News of the Establishment of The 
Islamic State of Iraq [emphasis added].
 After the Kurds turned to the State of the North, and 
the Rafidah [Shiites] were granted the federation of the 
South and Central Province, and with aid from the Jews 
in the North and the Saffavids in the South, protected by 
black-minded, black-hearted and black-acting military 
militias, they turned to our brothers from Ahl-us-Sunnah 
and went far in spilling their blood and desecrating their 
honor, making them suffer the most ugly forms of kill-
ing, torture and explusion, until Ahl-As-Sunnah became 
like the orphans in the banquet of the wicked. It therefore 
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became necessary for the honorable and the free among 
Ahl-As-Sunnah, the Mujahideen, the working Ulema and 
the dignitaries to offer something to their brothers, their 
sons and families, especially under this façade called the 
State of Maliki, who regretfully carried out acts of [the] 
traitors of [better: ‘from’] Ahl-As-Sunnah, obscuring the 
religion of the people and willingly forfeiting the na-
tion’s rights.
 Therefore, your brothers in the Mutayibeen Alliance 
(Hilf al-Mutyibeen) bring you good news of the estab-
lishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, in Baghdad, An-
bar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahadeen, Naynawa [Ninawah] 
and parts of Babel and Waset province [emphasis add-
ed], in order to protect our religion and our people so 
that there is no Fitnah (Disbelief; [better: Strife, Disunity]) 
and so that the blood and sacrifices of your Mujahideen 
sons are not lost in vain.
 And why not since we are blessed with Allah’s 
Power and Assistance that is spread widely, our arms 
reaching farther, and our bases more secure than the 
government of Palestine whose legitimacy was accepted 
by many despite the fact that the occupying Zionist kills 
and captures whoever they will and frees whoever they 
will at any time and place, as is clear from the capture of 
more than 60 of their ministers and statesmen, while the 
American occupier doesn’t even reach one of our soldiers 
without us spilling their blood, and Allah is a witness to 
that many times over.
 And we, as we announce the establishment of this 
state [emphasis added], relying on the Sunnah of the 
Prophet . . . when he went from Mecca to Medina and 
established the State of Islam there, despite the fact that 
a coalition of polytheists and the people of the book were 
against him. Since the Jews had their separate areas and 
were at the very high levels [i.e., highly competent and 
organized] of administration, military training and or-
ganization and while the hypocrites and the polytheists 
who joined them headed by Ibn Sulul who craved to rule 
over Medina, challenged the young state, the Prophet 
 . . . was ready to give a third of Medina’s harvest [to those 
enemies]. Despite their limited numbers and equipment, 
it was necessary so that the state became a refuge to the 
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Muslims, where their rights were protected against those 
who sought to hurt them. And we, with Allah’s Might 
and Power, [now] have control over many parts (of Iraq) 
that [are] equal to the area of the first Medina state; a 
state where the enemies had no presence and the Mujahi-
deen established the Sharia Hudud (Punishments) at the 
earnest request of Ahl-us-Sunnah themselves.
 Let the invader aggressors [USG] and the spiteful 
Rafidah (Shiites) know that the blood of Ahl-As-Sunnah 
is dear and valuable and they will not be spilt apparently 
in vain after today. We will face any transgression from 
them with Allah’s Strength, with a harsher and more se-
vere retaliation that has no limits. And let them know 
that the Baghdad of Rasheed, the Land of the Khilafah, 
was built by our ancestors and it will not leave our hands 
except over our dead bodies and skulls, and we will con-
tinue to plant in it anew the Flag of Tawhid, the Flag of 
the State.
 And we call upon all the Mujahideen, the Scholars of 
Iraq, the Tribal Chiefs, and the masses among Ahl-us-
Sunnah to pledge allegiance [bay’ah] to the Emir of the 
Mu’mineem, [“Leader/Ruler of the Faithful”] the honor-
able Sheikh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi today, to listen and 
obey his orders whether favorable or not, and to work 
hard to strengthen the pillars of this state; to sacrifice for 
it our lives and what we hold valuable, and we promise 
you that we will be sincere and loyal, dealing with you in 
justice and kindness, pro[viding] you us[e] . . .the Book 
of Allah, and the Sunnah of the Prophet . . . not deviat-
ing from it a single inch. We will drive away invaders, 
and establish peace and security, an honorable life, not 
depriving you of your goods of your land, for it is yours, 
and we will extend our hands to our Muslim brothers 
around the world, especially, around our dear country, 
providing them our good[s] and experience, while we 
benefit from what they have that is good and knowledge.
 In addition, we call upon all Muslims from Ahl-
us-Sunnah around the world, to aid us in starting with 
words and ending with blood for you are the source of 
power and it is in you we extend our hope after Allah, so 
do not fail us, and stand with us. Defend us and burn the 
land under the one who wants to harm us.
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And we extend a special appeal to the learned, the people 
of Knowledge, asking them to fear Allah in us, and be a 
support for us, and incite the people to defend us and 
pray for us.
 Honor, power and glory belong to Allah, to his mes-
senger, and to the believers, but the hypocrites know not.
—Spokesman, Ministry of Information, The Islamic 
State of Iraq, 22 Ramadan 1427, October 15, 2006.110
As a formal public declaration, this document 
contains not only elements of deliberate agitational, 
motivational, and incitement propaganda, but also 
key evidence for ISI’s worldview. The latter is our pri-
mary interest. Two sets of observations are significant. 
First, two of three key elements deemed core to Zar-
qawism, and in opposition to AQO, are present—an 
ultra-conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism manifest 
in ultra-sectarian, genocidal anti-Shi’ism; and a focus 
on founding without delay an Islamic State. The third 
element—ultra-violence—is implicit in the dehuman-
izing language used to place the Shia not only beyond 
the pale of humanity, but also in several other catego-
ries of intolerable being—hypocrites, traitors, betray-
ers, back-stabbers—not possessed of the Truth of the 
Islamic State. Also implicit is not only the creation of 
a brand-new obligation for all persons now inhabit-
ing this self-declared Islamic State’s self-claimed geo-
graphic boundaries—the predominantly and partially 
Sunni provinces listed above—but also the predica-
ment now placed on the worldwide Ahl-us Sunnah 
to defend a state conceived on the model of Prophet 
Muhammad’s very own, with an analogy drawn to 
Prophet Muhammad’s Medinan phase (c. A.D. 622-
632), with the apparent intention of recreating Proph-
et Muhammad’s, and the later Sunni Caliphate’s, very 
own state in the heart of the earlier Abbasid empire 
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(c. 750-1258), Baghdad. It is not just that an Islamic 
State of Iraq has been proclaimed, but a state to which 
all occupants of its territory are either loyal or in re-
bellion, and an Islamic State, to which Iraq’s and the 
world’s Ahl-us Sunnah should now look to for leader-
ship of the renaissance of global Sunni supremacy.  
The second set of observations concerns the still-
unresolved question of whether, and if so how, the 
ISI-AQO relationship was altered by ISI’s formal dec-
laration of statehood. Upon al-Zarqawi’s death, Abu 
Hamza al-Muhajir was selected as emir of Tanzim 
Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Documents indi-
cate that AQO was not involved in this leadership 
choice, expressed deep reservations, and requested 
a detailed response to several questions. AQO states 
that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir pledged bay’ah to AQO, 
though this was kept secret. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir 
denied any formal bay’ah, though openly expressed a 
willingness to make available to AQO the forces at his 
disposal. Once the formal dissolution of AQO’s “af-
filiate” Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn was 
accomplished, and the ISI was declared, it appears 
that any formal connections between these two enti-
ties was dissolved. Al-Zarqawi’s October 17, 2004, 
bay’ah to bin Laden needed to be renewed, as it does 
not transfer as a hereditary artifact. Soon thereafter, 
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir stepped aside and pledged al-
legiance to the new Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. It 
clearly appears that it is Omar al-Baghdadi (not to be 
confused with the present Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and 
not AQO that receives the disposition of Abu Hamza 
al-Muhajir’s forces. As Kazimi states:
[Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir pledges allegiance to the 
hitherto unheard of ‘Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.’ The 
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glaring hint that he is indeed Al Qaeda’s [read: ISI’s] 
candidate for the job of caliph is [Abu Hamza] al-Mu-
hajir’s insistence on highlighting [Abu Omar] al-Bagh-
dadi’s Hashemite pedigree—a traditional must-have 
for any would-be caliph . . . [Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir 
also pledges the allegedly 12,000-strong ‘Army of 
Al Qaeda’ and their 10,000 reservists to fight under 
[Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi’s banner to the death. Oddly 
enough, there is no mention of Osama bin Laden, who 
is not a Hashemite. But probably [Abu Hamza] al-
Muhajir sees bin Laden as a relic of the past . . . and 
consequently he really doesn’t have a role to play in 
this current phase of the jihad.111
Beyond AQO being left out of the leadership loop, 
which would involve a fundamental breach of the 
terms of any binding bay’ah, we also learn through cap-
tured documents that AQO was not consulted in any 
way before the formal declaration of the ISI; and ac-
cording to Gadahn, relations between the two entities 
had been practically non-existent for several years.112 
AQO’s al-Zawahiri claimed that the new Emir Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi did in fact give bay’ah to AQO, but 
that by mutual agreement and for strategic reasons, 
this would remain unpublicized.113 Let us now exam-
ine the sources of continuity and discontinuity in key 
elements of the Zarqawist worldview and doctrine. 
Key Doctrinal/Creedal Elements. 
Senior military commander Abu Hamza al-Muh-
ajir and Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (born, Hamid 
Dawud Mohamed Khalil al-Zawi) were at the helm of 
the ISI from late-2006 until their April 18, 2010, kill-
ing in a joint U.S.-Iraqi military attack on their safe 
house, about 6 miles southwest of the Iraqi city of Ti-
krit. Abu Omar would, during that period, assume the 
caliphal-originated title “Commander of the Faithful” 
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(Emir al-Mu’minin), and his earlier pseudonym suit-
ably expanded to “Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi 
al-Baghdadi,” signifying his Qurayshite and therefore 
caliph-in-waiting genealogical pedigree. 
Known facts about Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s spe-
cific path to the ISI are few. A former Iraqi officer, after 
dismissal from the army he began actively preaching 
in mosques an extreme variant of Salafi-Jihadism. He 
first reportedly joined Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad 
al Rafidayn under al-Zarqawi, and later, the MSC and 
ISI.114 
Fortunately, a sufficient number of available 
speeches and writings exist, clarifying the essen-
tial core beliefs and doctrines of ISI’s first leaders.115 
What is essential is the ability to discern ISI’s relation 
to AQO on doctrinal grounds, seeking both common 
ground and that which marks each off as unique spe-
cies. It is both the sameness and difference within the 
Sunni global jihadist forces that is at issue. This is key 
for doctrine, but as we shall discover later, also for 
strategy.
Fundamentals of an Ultra-Conservative,  
Salafi-Wahhabi, Jihadi, and Anti-Shia Sectarianism. 
An excellent starting-point is provided in Abu 
Omar’s third speech as ISI emir/“Emir al-Mumin-
im”/proto-caliph.116 By March 13, 2007, the date of 
this speech, the combined forces of the USG’s coun-
terinsurgency, counterterrorist, and unconventional 
warfare strategies; and the self-defeating policies of 
the ISI had clearly reversed the ISI’s short-term for-
tunes. Kazimi asserts that this speech’s content ad-
dresses that context, and in it, Abu Omar has deter-
mined he must “clearly spell out the doctrine of his 
faction.” Determined to counter what he believed to 
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be an orchestrated smear campaign by venomous 
enemies, and also the need to reassure potential re-
cruits and donors that ISI’s path to the Caliphate re-
mained viable, he provided a summation of ISI doctri-
nal essentials. Abu Omar declares:
The people have libeled us with countless and un-
founded lies about our doctrine, saying that we have 
cast the accusation of ‘infidels’ against lay Muslims, 
and that we legitimize [the shedding of] their blood 
and [the looting of] their money, and that we force 
the people to enter into our State by the sword, and as 
such, here are a few of our tenets to answer those lies 
so that the liar would have no more excuse [to con-
tinue lying] and so that bewilderment is lifted from he 
who loves us.117
Of the 19 doctrinal elements soon to be listed, ac-
cording to Kazimi only two are “notable innovations,” 
namely: 
judging that Jews and Christians who live among 
Muslims are no longer protected as Dhimmis [see #12 
below], and that the Sunnis who participated in the 
political process, specifically Tariq al-Hashemi’s [Sun-
ni] Islamic Party, are apostates and infidels, who are 
marked for death [#7 below].118 
We have taken the liberty of providing subheadings, 
rearranging, and more succinctly stating these 19 
doctrinal points in order to facilitate a comparison of 
ISI and AQO. The original numbering is retained in 
square brackets. If we accept Abu Omar’s assertions 
at face value, 9 points of convergence and 10 points 
of divergence seem to exist. It is critical to remember, 
however, that AQO should not be understood as a 
compulsory ultra-conservative Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi 
ultra-sectarian organization, though in principle all 
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who accepted its overall doctrine and modus operan-
di, no matter how conservative, were welcomed. AQO 
provides a large tent and seeks maximal force to at-
tack the original Kufr. The very opposite is illustrated 
below, particularly in the 10 or so points of clearest 
divergence. 
CREEDAL/DOCTRINAL/POLICY COMPARISION 
OF ISO AND AQO
Most Likely Points of Divergence from AQO— 
Extremism in the Application of Takfir. 
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Anti-Shia Eliminationism/
Magic-Sorcery Eliminationism.
[1]  Annihilate all manifestations of shirk (idola-
try), including statues and raised graves; 
[2]  All Shia are idolatrous, apostates, inhibit 
Sunni rites, and must be eliminated;
[3] Execute sorcerers and magicians.
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Jihadism Applied to 
Fight Against Nearest Enemies.
[8]  Any support of any type, including medicine 
and food [provided by contractors], to Ameri-
can occupiers is unbelief and apostasy;
 [10]  The unbelief of all rulers and armies in all the 
lands of Islam require that they first be fought, 
and not the Crusader; unbelief does not ap-
ply to all inhabitants of the lands ruled by the 
Taghut: 
   We see that the lands where the laws of the infidel 
are prevalent over the laws of Islam as lands of 
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unbelief and this does not necessitate counting a 
resident of this land an infidel, but since the laws 
of the tyrant prevail over the laws of Islam in all 
the lands of Islam, then we see the apostasy and 
heresy of all the rulers of these lands [as well as] 
their armies, and fighting them is more pressing 
than fighting the crusading occupier [emphasis 
in original]. Thus we want to call to attention that 
we will fight any armies invading the State of Is-
lam in Iraq whether they be under any Arab or 
Islamic name, and we advise and warn them that 
this army should not be the scapegoat for the oc-
cupier, as is being suggested to end the crisis of 
the crusading occupier in Iraq.119
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Applied to “People of the 
Book” (Ahl al-Kitab).
[12]  People of the Book must renew their dhimmi 
contracts owing to treacherous violations they 
have committed:
We find that the sects of the people of the book 
[Jews, Christians] and other from the Sabians 
and so in the State of Islam today are people of 
war who qualify for no protection, for they have 
transgressed against whatever they agreed to in 
many countless ways, and if they want peace and 
security then they must start a new era with the 
State of Islam according to [the Caliph] Omar’s 
stipulations that they have annulled.120
Islamic State of Iraq is Exclusive Leader of Ahl-us 
Sunnah and the Mujahidin of Iraq.
[13]  All jihadis from other groups that do not 
subordinate to the ISI are neither infidels nor 
heretics, but they are rebels (bughat) and must 
unite behind the ISI banner; 
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[14]  All agreements between the occupier and oth-
er groups other than the Islamic State are null 
and void;
[15]  Defend “active and truthful ulama,” and op-
pose all who oppose us. 
Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Sexual Conservativism.
 [19]   Mandatory veiling of female face, and censor-
ing of media to prevent female public displays 
or any activities that violate strict sex segrega-
tion and mate-guarding. 
Most Likely Points of Convergence with AQO. 
Basic Privileging of the “Ahl-us-Sunnah” in Jihad.
[4]   Do not hereticize/takfir Sunnis who pray, be-
lieve, and observe Sunni rites; Sunni sinners 
are not heretics or apostates, and sins may vary 
in their severity; only the greatest of sins nul-
lify one’s Islam. Judgments of apostasy must 
be established in each individual case, and all 
conditions and factors considered; claim to 
represent the “middle way” between those 
who equate sin with infidelity (the Kharijites), 
and those who are negligent in judging even 
major sins (Murji’ites).121 
[6]   Necessity of revering and protecting the 
Prophet; 
[9]   Jihad to free all Muslim lands from the fall of 
Andalus [Spain] to the liberation of [all] Mus-
lim lands is an individual obligation second 
only to Belief;
[16] Honor predecessors in jihad;
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[17] Take care of prisoners and martyrs’ families; 
[18]  We engage in da’wa; encourage worldly knowl-
edge, as long as does not violate Tawhid.
Takfir of Existing “Apostate” Governments.
[5]   Only Allah’s Sharia is valid and Sharia courts 
shall rule.
[7]   Every leader of every political party that par-
ticipates in the democratic process, and ev-
ery other form of secularism or nationalism, 
is apostate, though this does not apply as a 
general rule to all who enter the process, i.e., 
individual voters:
    We believe that secularism, in all its different ban-
ners and varied sects such as nationalism or pa-
triotism or Communism or Ba’athism, is clearly 
faithless and in contradiction to Islam and it takes 
[one] outside the [bounds] of religion. We also see 
the apostasy and heresy of whoever participates 
in the political process like the party of Mutleg 
and Duleimi and Hashemi and others. Because 
this process seeks to replace the law of Allah and 
pave the way for the enemies of Allah such as 
the Crusaders and the rawafidh [Shia] and all the 
apostates to lean upon the necks of the believers. . . 
We also see that the program of the Islamic Party 
is one of apostasy and heresy that is no different 
from all the other infidel and apostate programs 
such as the parties of Ja’afari and Allawi. And 
as such, their leaders are apostates and there is 
no difference between a party branch head or an 
official in the government, but we do not see the 
heresy of all its members unless a judicial opin-
ion is reached [in individual cases].122
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[11]  All army, police, and security forces of these 
states are apostates.
The previous contrast suffices to illustrate key 
points of convergence and divergence between Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi’s ISI and AQO. The convergen-
ces belong to their genus—global Sunni jihadism in 
defense of Ahl-us Sunnah—and are most evident in 
those doctrines subsumed under “Basic Privileging 
of the Ahl-us-Sunnah in Jihad.” Next, we find a basic 
convergence arising in Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism for 
pronouncing “Takfir on Existing ‘Apostate’ Govern-
ments.” However, AQO would be more discriminant 
and determine whether those supporting the state 
were in positions of power or weakness, plenty or ne-
cessity, cooperating or coerced, and whether neutrality 
was also an option. Yet serious doctrinal divergences 
mark each organization off as a competitor rather than 
complementary global jihadist species. 
AQO’s focus on a “Crusader-Zionist” enemy is 
conspicuous by its complete neglect, or its repudiation 
and reversal (see, number 10 above). For Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi and the ISI, it is all about the internal pu-
rification of Nearest and Near Enemies that threaten 
the self-understanding of salvation provided in the 
narrowest passages of an ultra-conservative Salafi-
Wahhabi ultra-sectarianism. Internal enemies are tar-
geted ferociously, Sunnis who accede to the prescribed 
orthodoxy receive a warm and inviting welcome, and 
the Far Enemy that stays far away will be spared for 
now, as a relentless war is waged against their sup-
posed idolatrous lackeys. The pact with Jews and 
Christians, and many other religious minorities who 
adhere to a variant of monotheist worship, is consid-
ered abrogated and must therefore be renegotiated. 
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For AQO, the execution of magicians and sorcerers, 
blowing up of Shia graves and shrines, and the con-
demnation of all Shia, leaders and led, scholars and 
lay, is barred by the authority of a still-valid ruling 
by medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah, and in more proxi-
mate range, the very influential Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi 
Jihadi Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.
Yet, the species of Sunni global jihadist exempli-
fied in Abu Omar al-Baghdadi has placed these very 
Shia laity, whose blood is forbidden, at the very top of 
its hit list of Ahl-us Sunnah’s chief idolatrous enemies, 
and therefore of Allah’s chief enemies. Finally, the new 
ISI demand that all existing Mujahidin in Iraq must 
be subordinate, or be declared rebels, contrasts with 
AQO’s vision of political authority as a more distant 
aspirational objective, and supposes a broader process 
of affirmation and consultation. For ISI, however, the 
debate has ended, the Emir is chosen, the Jihad on the 
model of the Prophet’s Sunnah is in process, and all 
not ready to commit to this State, and this leadership, 
are forewarned that they stand as rebels and must re-
pent, or will be fought into submission or death.
APOCALYPTICISM AND MAHDISM IN ABU 
HAMZA AL-MUHAJIR AND ABU OMAR  
AL-BAGHDADI
The previous speech provides an excellent means 
for drawing key contrasts between ISI and AQO. Ab-
sent from that list of 19 elements, however, was men-
tion of a critical doctrinal belief maintained by both 
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi: 
belief in an End Times apocalypticism, and also in the 
imminent appearance of a Redeemer Messianic figure, 
the Mahdi. An element appearing only occasionally in 
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Zarqawism, it is manifest here to a far greater degree.123 
For example, William McCants reports that Abu 
Hamza al-Muhajir speedily dissolved Tanzim Qa’idat 
al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn and the MSC and “rushed to 
establish the State because he believed the Mahdi, the 
Muslim savior, would come within a year.”124 Further, 
both Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Bagh-
dadi maintained beliefs in the imminence of the End 
Times, leading them to privilege the Iraqi locus for the 
re-emergence of the historic Baghdad-based Abbasid 
Caliphate, and the northern Syrian town of Dabiq—
earlier mentioned by al-Zarqawi—as the prophesized 
theater for End Times battles involving the anti-Christ 
and eventually the Mahdi’s final return.125 McCants 
further notes that despite continuity in beliefs in the 
End Times and apocalyptic worldviews, the Mahdist 
focus of these earliest progenitors is later replaced by 
the ISO’s emphasis on the great battles, signs, and 
events prophesied before that culminating event.126 
THE HISTORY, DOCTRINES, AND WORLDVIEW 
OF ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI’S “CALIPHATE”: 
MAY 2010-PRESENT 
 
On April 18, 2010, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and ISI 
Emir and proto-Caliph Emir al-Muminin ‘Umar al-
Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, lie dead. A long 
manhunt had finally culminated in a joint Iraq-U.S. 
operation in the Tharthar area near Tikrit in Salahud-
din province. Subsequently, the USG and its Iraqi al-
lies exploited intelligence and captured documents 
to quickly decimate 34 of 42 known high value ISI 
targets.127 Despite profound doctrinal and strategic 
differences between AQO and ISI, then deputy-Emir 
Ayman al-Zawahiri would issue a public eulogy 
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praising these leaders’ efforts in jihad and against the 
Crusader-Zionist visions for the new Iraq.128 
The ISI was not decimated, however. Its “idea” 
was kept alive. Seasoned military intelligence analysts 
have described it as a deliberate, highly organized, 
brutally-executed systematic campaign—from prison 
breaks, to annihilating Iraqi security forces, to taking 
and holding ground.129 Evidence now also confirms 
that during imprisonment at Camp Bucca in Iraq, sev-
eral persons who would later fill the highest leader-
ship ranks of the organization were busily creating 
strategic blueprints, rebuilding its secret network, 
reconstituting its leadership, and forging new allianc-
es between highly competent Sunni-Salafist former 
Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and those 
already possessed of the Zarqawist and neo-Zarqa-
wist doctrine and worldview.130 Indeed, this actually 
continues a policy begun under Abu Omar al-Bagh-
dadi who reached out to those officers whose lives 
were likely shattered by the USG’s de-Ba`athification 
policies. He states in his inaugural address from 
December 22, 2006:
Initially, we call upon officers of the former Iraqi Army 
and that is from the rank of lieutenant to major to join 
the army of the Islamic State on condition that the ap-
plicant must know, at a minimum, three sections of 
the Holy Koran by rote and must pass an ideological 
examination by a clerical commission, that exists in ev-
ery region, to make sure that he is not beholden to the 
idolatry of the Ba’ath and its tyrant [Saddam]. And we 
will, Allah willing, provide him with transportation, 
housing and the appropriate salary that guarantees an 
honorable life for him as is provided to the mujahed-
din who fight under the banner of the Islamic State of 
Iraq. 131
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Any effort to accurately characterize this period 
must presume humility, and in former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s coinage, admit to varying 
degrees of knowledge from known knowns, some of 
which shall be discussed shortly; known unknowns, 
many to which we shall refer; unknown knowns, 
which the present author will humbly assume afflicts 
both his and others’ present accounts; and finally, un-
known unknowns, probably the greatest sum of what 
truly exists. The full story can only be told in retro-
spect, on the basis of now-classified data, and only 
after the dust finally settles—as hopefully it must—so 
that this particular species of terrorist entity can be 
fully dissected and understood for “its idea” and “its 
strategy.”
Fortunately, enough open source information ex-
ists to sketch a reasonably accurate account of some 
features of select key landmarks—organizationally, 
doctrinally, and strategically—of the ISI’s path to the 
self-proclaimed caliphate. We first begin with a very 
brief summation of the ISI’s organizational evolu-
tion; then we proceed to describe relevant biographi-
cal facts about the ISO’s current self-declared caliph, 
whose full and proper name has unmistakable paral-
lels to his immediate predecessor is Emir al-Muminin 
Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi; and 
we conclude with an analysis of the ISO’s worldview, 
creed, and doctrines.
FROM ISI TO THE CALIPHATE: BRIEF  
ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 
The ISO is the latest organizational incarnation 
of the “idea” that originated in al-Zarqawi’s Zarqa-
wism: transitioning into its embodiment as State, and 
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unequivocally and unambiguously declaring itself as 
the Caliphate of the world’s Sunni Muslims. Let us 
now retrace these steps. 
Zarqawi lived to create and bequeath four distinct 
organizational forms before his death on June 7, 2006. 
During his second Afghan sojourn (c. 1999–2001), 
he founded and was undisputed emir of an organi-
zation called Soldiers of the Levant (Jund al-Sham). 
Later changed to Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, this lat-
ter organization existed until al-Zarqawi’s October 14, 
2004, official bay’ah to Osama bin Laden. A few days 
later, the new organization, Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi 
Bilad al Rafidayn (The Base of Jihad in the Land of the 
Two Rivers), was declared. Careful examination of 
the 10-month “negotiation” between al-Zarqawi and 
AQO preceding his bay’ah, and the terms of the bay’ah 
itself, furnish evidence that this new organization 
retained full-throttle the Zarqawist “idea.” Its short-
hand media tag, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the failure of 
AQO to openly and publicly denounce and disavow 
this organization, and a more general ignorance about 
how fundamentally distinct these organizations were, 
led to a general misrecognizing of Zarqawism. It was 
viewed by many as merely a more brash, unrelenting, 
inflexible, and violent version of AQO. Except for an 
expert and largely unknown scholarly trickle continu-
ing to note this fact, most would rediscover this dif-
ference only in this most recent era (c. 2013-present) 
of a renascent organization whose brutal conquest of 
Sunni lands and re-introduction of unconscionable 
slaughter and advertised genocide as spectacle, has 
caused the world to again take notice. 
Al-Zarqawi’s Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafi-
dayn was later dissolved. This occurred in two stages. 
The first was in January 2006 when it was folded into 
a broader coalition of its own making, the MSC on 
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whose leadership council al-Zarqawi would serve. 
The next two organizational incarnations followed 
al-Zarqawi’s death. If McCants is correct, the prime 
mover behind the expedited timing for dissolving the 
MSC was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and he did so based 
on his belief that the long-prophesied Mahdi would 
imminently return. Whatever the motive for timing, 
however, the logic of the Zarqawist “idea” was to cre-
ate a separate entity—an actual State of Islam. To this 
end, the Hilf al-Mutayyibin or “Oath of Scented Ones,” 
was concluded on October 12, 2006, and 3 short days 
later, the organizational realization of the Zarqa-
wist idea—the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat al-‘Iraq 
al-Islamiyya)—was proclaimed.132 
The ISI existed from October 15, 2006, to April 7, 
2013. Upon that latter date, then Emir Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi transformed its nomenclature to reflect a 
dramatic expansion in its intended sovereign reign.133 
Its new name, Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (The 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), signified its newly 
extended self-proclaimed domain in both Iraq and 
al-Sham (i.e., the Levant, or Levantine states of Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine). The English acronym 
ISIS and ISIL reflect this alternation in referring to ei-
ther Syria (ISIS) or the Levant (ISIL); ISIL is the more 
accurate term. The word “Daesh” is an acronym fash-
ioned from its fuller Arabic name but is itself not an 
Arabic word, and its use among the opposition and 
USG officials—civilian and military—deliberately in-
tends to counter any associations to legitimate Islamic 
statehood when discussing this terrorist entity.134 
Despite AQO’s formal rejection of its April 7, 2013, 
expansion from the ISI to Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa 
al-Shaam,135 only further extensions and no reversal 
in scope have occurred. The final extension, and logi-
cally its last, is from Emirship of Ahl-us Sunnah in the 
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“apostate ruled” lands of Iraq and the Levant, to Ca-
liph, sovereign and supreme religio-political rulership 
of the Ahl-us Sunnah throughout the “apostate ruled 
lands” of the Earth. This was formally proclaimed 
June 28, 2014, by formerly incarcerated Camp Bucca 
inmate and now deceased chief spokesman Abu Mo-
hammed al-Adnani. On that day, for those self-pro-
claiming this event, the Islamic State (al-Dawla al Is-
lamiya) or Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa al-Islamiya) was 
born. The final symbolic moment was yet to come: the 
newly installed Caliph Ibrahim’s first speech on July 
2, 2014, a Friday sermon in Ramadan proclaiming the 
Caliphate from the grand mosque of newly conquered 
Mosul, to his worldwide flock, and to the infidels and 
apostates of the Earth.136 
SELF-PROCLAIMED EMIR AL-MUMININ ABU 
BAKR AL-HUSSAINI AL-QURAYSHI  
AL-BAGHDADI: A BRIEF HISTORY
“The journey was complete, and Ibrahim Awwad 
Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai [sic]—the local imam, 
academic, US-held prisoner and al-Qaeda officer—had 
become Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.”137 
Contained in the previous quote from Hashem is 
the journey we shall now briefly trace. We are pro-
vided his birth name—Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibra-
him al-Badri al-Samarrai—indicating his kinship to 
the Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his location, the Sunni An-
bar province containing the Iraqi city of Samarra. We 
learn that he was an imam and an academic, and as 
we shall soon learn, extremely devout and devoted to 
pursuing religious scholarship. We will also examine 
his time at Camp Bucca, and its consequences. Finally, 
we learn he was “an al-Qaeda officer”—soon to be 
specified with more detail—and that in the end, this 
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person is the same who is now the self-proclaimed 
Caliph of the world’s Sunni Muslims. His mission is 
to engage on multiple fronts those various agents of 
infidelity he and his organization perceive as warring 
against and subverting Allah’s chosen instrument 
for a final consummation of world history. For con-
venience, a few select sub-headings are employed to 
assist in navigating this journey.138 
Biography, Temperament, Early Primary Religious 
Influences, and Education. 
Self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim was born near the 
city of Samarra in 1971; his name of birth: Ibrahim bin 
Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Radawi al-Husseini 
al-Samarrai.139 He was raised in a deeply, or even 
ultra-conservative Sunni (possibly) Salafi religious 
family with some of these to include preachers and 
professors of Arabic language, rhetoric, and logic. 
His father, Sheikh Awwad, is among the elders of the 
Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his grandfather, Haj Ibrahim, 
passed on at nearly 95 years of age. Ibrahim bin Aw-
wad focused intensely, even in his youth, on  religious 
studies. In the mosque where his father taught, he was 
wholly committed to mastering techniques of Quranic 
recitation, and he engaged in a “fastidious devotion 
to master the subtleties of the art.”140 This fastidious-
ness was accompanied by other temperamental traits, 
for example, a tendency to be withdrawn, taciturn, 
of glowering intensity, quick to admonish, strict, and 
uncompromising, and barely audible in his personal 
interactions.141  
At 18, he moved with his family to Tobji, in north-
west Baghdad, where he later was a Sunni mosque 
imam.142 At the mosque, besides the call to prayer 
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over the mosque loudspeakers, Ibrahim bin Awwad 
taught Quranic recitation to the neighborhood’s chil-
dren. He also exhibited a deep sexual conservatism. 
His two wives were sequestered from public view as 
they shared a small apartment in a poor neighborhood 
near the mosque, and he openly forbade any public 
mixing of sexes, including dancing at weddings.143 
An exception to what otherwise appears to be a 
strict, ultra-conservative Salafi Sunnism was Ibra-
him bin Awwad’s passion for soccer (football). As a 
youth and young adult, he was widely regarded as an 
outstanding player and was the star of his mosque’s 
football club. However, he was also known for his 
competitiveness, obsession with scoring goals, and 
for getting extremely upset at losing. Other inmates 
also later noted his soccer expertise during his stint at 
Camp Bucca.  
Ibrahim bin Awwad earned both an M.A. (1999) 
and a Ph.D. (2007) from the College of Islamic Scienc-
es, University of Baghdad. His specialization across 
both was phonetics and recitation of the Quran. He 
produced for his Ph.D. project in Quranic Sciences a 
commentary on a medieval poem on Quran recitation. 
It was defended March 13, 2007, receiving the grade of 
“Very Good.”144 
Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative 
Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: Before the U.S. March 
2003 Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein 
and Occupation of Iraq. 
To this point, the “known knowns” of Ibrahim bin 
Awwad’s journey are relatively unambiguous. Docu-
ments, interviews, transcripts, and good investiga-
tive journalism turn up an archival trail that seems 
reasonably sound. We now enter a zone of greater 
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uncertainty and attempt to reconstruct the broad lines 
of what may be deemed his behavioral evolution from 
an ultra-conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, and a life 
characterized by a rigidly-maintained sexual conser-
vatism, intense immersion in religious scholarship, 
a vocational dedication to the mosque, and teaching 
the young Quran recitation, to that of a member and 
eventual leader in armed, violent Salafi-Jihadi organi-
zations. This journey of theological politics, or “theo-
political”145 engagement, is murkier, less defined, and 
by design, enveloped by that secrecy characterizing 
underground organizations. Nevertheless, some im-
portant facts have been reported and are useful as a 
starting point for the detailed history yet to be written. 
Ibrahim bin Awwad’s transition began well before 
the March 2003 U.S. decision to overthrow the regime 
of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. McCants’ conclu-
sion here seems well in line with other observations 
when he states: 
Although the American invasion fed the fire and en-
abled it to spread, in fact, his radicalization began 
much earlier, ignited by an unlikely but highly vola-
tile mixture of fundamentalism, Saddam Hussein’s 
secular totalitarianism, and his own need to control 
others.146 
McCants dates this to a period after 1999-2000, 3 years 
before the U.S. occupation, as Ibrahim bin Awwad 
“moved rapidly to the right” and went from being an 
ultra-conservative Salafist flirting with a Qutbi wing 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, to “embracing revolu-
tionary jihadist Salafism.”147 
One may begin with Ibrahim bin Awwad’s brother 
‘Jomaa. According to reports, ‘Jomaa, unlike Ibrahim 
bin Awwad at the time, was an “extreme Salafist” 
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well before the U.S. invasion and occupation. It is 
further reported that “[Abu Bakr] Baghdadi was not 
yet part of that circle, [and that it ended up] causing 
many problems between them.”148 ‘Jomaa is now his 
brother’s body guard and one of his closest aids. The 
period McCants describes as a transition (1999-2000) 
is characterized by a very significant shift in Ibrahim 
bin Awwad’s theo-political orientation. It was a Dr. 
Ismail al-Badri who directed him to membership in a 
“Qutbist” or “jihadist Ikhwan” (Brotherhood) tendency. 
However, at that point he was seeking what must be 
considered a violent alternative to that being offered, 
and concluded that action, and not mere talking, was 
required.
Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative 
Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: After the U.S. March 2003 
Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and 
Occupation of Iraq. 
The U.S. overthrow of the Saddam Hussein re-
gime, and subsequent occupation, inaugurated a 
new phase of Ibraham bin Awwad’s involvement in 
violent insurgent activities. Abu Muhammed al-Mufti 
al-Aali, a major “ideologue” on the Iraqi Salafi-Jihadi 
scene, seems to have been instrumental in Ibrahim bin 
Awwad’s transition into an actual armed insurgent. 
Muhammad al-Mufti al-al-Aali’s Salafi-Jihadi Ahlus 
Sunna wal-Jama’a movement had members based in 
Baghdad and Samarra, and it was only a short period 
afterwards that Ibrahim bin Awwad would co-found 
and become the head of the Sharia committee for a 
new Salafi-Jihadi insurgent organization, Jaysh Ahl al-
Sunnah wa’al-Gama’ah (Army of the Sunni Creed and 
Community), that would establish an active presence 
in Diyala province, Samarra, and Baghdad.149 
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Contrary to several published accounts, Ibrahim 
bin Awwad did not spend 5 years in Camp Bucca; 
he was arrested on January 31, 2004, and released on 
December 6, 2004, just under 1 year.150 His time there 
proved highly consequential, however, for what he 
himself became and the future operational linkages 
he would form, and as a virtual hatchery for elements 
that would, when freed through prison breaks, help 
reconstitute and repopulate in an even more brutal 
fashion the then-decimated ISI leadership cadre.151 
Accounts of his Bucca incarceration indicate that he 
led religious prayers and on many occasions Friday 
sermons; asserted himself as an intermediary and 
mediator in various disputes; and continued his soc-
cer stardom; but of greatest consequence, he acquired 
key ingredients essential to his future path. 
It was in Bucca that Ibrahim bin Awwad devel-
oped a “Rolodex” of contacts for future operational 
pursuits. There, he also developed a symbiotic rela-
tionship with former Ba’athist military and intelli-
gence officers, including: Haji Bakr (birth name: Samir 
Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi), Abu Mumammad 
al-Suedawi, and Abu Ahmed al-Alwani. They were 
impressed with his extensive religious background, 
especially Quranic expertise, and he was impressed 
with their military knowledge. It was at Bucca that he 
secretly pledged bay’ah to al-Zarqawi, and increasing-
ly absorbed Salafi-Jihadism. Though his sermons were 
noted for their lack of power and charisma, notice was 
taken by others deemed major heavy weights in the 
Salafi-Jihadi movement—for example, Abu Mutaz, 
Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, and IS spokesman Abu 
Muhammed al-Adnani.152
Ibrahim bin Awwad exited Camp Bucca on De-
cember 6, 2004. Immediately assuming the alias “Abu 
Dua,” he would begin a methodical climb beginning 
108
with the lowest rungs established in Camp Bucca to 
eventually occupy the very highest rung of the ISI. It 
is probably apt to conclude—as McCants has—that 
Ibrahim bin Awwad is “a cunning bureaucrat that 
rose through the cutthroat ranks of the Islamic State 
by building alliances among its factions and eliminat-
ing his rivals once he got to the top spot.” 153 Data is 
sparse for Abu Dua’s activities after his release, but 
facts are now known about several key developments 
in his organizational relationships. It is known that 
his organization Jaysh Ahl-us Sunnah wa’al Al-Gama’a 
pledged bay’ah and joined the Majlis Shura al-Mujahi-
din (MSC) 1 week after its January 15, 2006, declara-
tion. Abu Dua, through the influence of an important 
Shaykh Fawzi al-Jobouri, was granted permission by 
Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn’s Minister of 
Information Muharaib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri to travel 
to Syria in order to complete his doctoral studies. This 
permission was granted pending Abu Dua’s willing-
ness to assist in media-related functions if requested. 
Having completed his doctoral work after June 2006, 
Abu Dua traveled back to Syria as a key facilitator for 
foreign fighters entering Iraq. An airstrike killed his 
assistant Abu Ghadiya, and following this near miss 
on his own life, Abu Dua returned to Baghdad where 
his quick ascent began. 
Abu Dua’s former prison mate, Haji Samir, intro-
duced him to Abu Hamza al-Muhajir—second-in-
command and military chief of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad 
fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s highly 
favorable impressions led him to introduce Abu Dua 
to the Emir of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafi-
dayn, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir 
as well as others within the organization were very 
impressed and greatly assisted his vertical ascension, 
particularly on matters related to Sharia, but also in a 
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senior advisory capacity. Abu Dua was charged with 
such high-level tasks as drafting letters on behalf of 
Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi to AQO Emir Osama bin 
Laden; and, the highly selective and secretive task of 
ensuring coordinated communication among leaders 
and the Wilayat (provinces).
Abu Dua first joined the Sharia Committee of the 
MSC, and then became a member of its more restricted 
Majlis Al-Shura (Senior Advisory Council). After the 
October 15, 2006, declaration of Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Is-
lamiyya (ISI), as supervisor of the ISI Sharia Committee, 
he was given a general supervisory role over all Sharia 
committees operating in the ISI’s provinces (Wilayahs). 
He also became a member of the ISI’s 11-member Ma-
jlis Al-Shura. Abu Dua rose further and, it is strongly 
suggested, that he was appointed chief of the Islamic 
State’s powerful three-person Coordination Com-
mittee, a position reserved for persons deemed most 
worthy and trusted, whose task involved coordinat-
ing between ISI Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the 
governors of the ISI’s Wilayat (provinces).154
From Abu Dua, to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of 
ISI (Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya) and ISIS/ISIL 
(Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam), to Emir  
al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi  
al-Baghdadi of The Islamic State (al-Dawla al  
Islamiyya) of the Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa  
al-Islamiyya). 
The April 18, 2010, targeted killing of ISI second-
in-command Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and the ISI 
Emir and self-declared Emir al-Muminin Abu Umar 
al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi (Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi) proved to be a momentous event. Within 
the next 2 years, an organization that had appeared 
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beaten into dormancy would re-emerge and begin a 
carefully calculated strategy, later taking full advan-
tage of dramatic changes inaugurated by an “Arab 
Spring” and later Syrian civil war, and utterly trans-
forming the Sunni Salafi-Jihadi organizational land-
scape. The first steps lay, however, in selecting a new 
emir; and owing to the USG eliminating 34 out of 42 
key ISI leadership targets, that began in early January 
2006, replacing these leaders with a new, very distinct 
cadre as well.155 
Osama bin Laden’s choice for emir, Haji Iman, was 
not to be. Rather, a heretofore unknown shadowy in-
dividual Haji Bakr156—a former colonel, weapons de-
velopment expert, and military intelligence operative 
in Saddam Hussein’s Air Force—would lobby and 
manipulate the existing Shura to secure a 9-2 vote in 
favor of the 39-year old Abu Dua. The Sharia Coun-
cil reportedly abstained. The new emir, formerly Abu 
Dua, took on the new alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and 
his chief mission was revitalizing the ISI and reconsti-
tuting its leadership. Two scholarly accounts provide 
information on this phase. McCants claims: 
According to insiders, the first order of business [as 
the new senior Military Emir] for the prince of shad-
ows [Haji Bakr] was to purge the Islamic State of lead-
ers he suspected of disloyalty; those who didn’t leave 
their posts willingly were killed. He and his boss [Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi] replaced them with their Iraqi al-
lies, many of whom had served as officers in Saddam’s 
military and intelligence services.157 
Hasan Haniyeh, in a highly detailed and illumi-
nating analysis of the ISI’s organizational structure, 
adds additional clarity.158 First, though the post-Mosul 
(June 2014) conquest has led to a greater number of 
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non-native Arab and foreign-born leaders, “Iraqis still 
dominate the highest, most sensitive positions in IS’ 
upper echelons.”159 Second, a profound reorganiza-
tion and professionalization of the military and secu-
rity forces was carried out.160 He claims:
Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the [ISI] organisation 
[sic] entered a phase of extreme secrecy and paranoia. 
Once he took over, he restructured the organisation 
[sic], putting Salafis and former Iraqi Army officers 
in charge of the military, such as Haji Bakr and Ab-
dul Rahman al-Bilawi, turning the military corps into 
a more professional, cohesive entity . . . [Abu Bakr] 
Baghdadi put Turkmen from Tal Afar into key secu-
rity positions, most prominently Abu Ali al-Anbari [a 
former Iraqi Major General]; and put Arabs and for-
eigners in charge of his media machine, led by Abu 
Mohammed al-Adnani, the Syrian spokesman for IS.161
The final organizational metamorphoses occurred 
as described earlier: the August 7, 2013, official decla-
ration of the expansion from the ISI to Dawla Islamiya fi 
al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (ISIS/ISIL; The Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham). On June 28, 2014, based on Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi’s appointment as Caliph by only four 
persons—Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim 
al-Masri, Turki al-Binali, and Abu Suleiman al-Utay-
bi—the declaration of a self-proclaimed Islamic State 
(al-Dawla al Islamiya) or Islamic Caliphate (al-Khilafa 
al-Islamiya) had finally arrived. Claiming descent from 
Prophet Muhammad through the tenth Shia Imam,162 
and secretly declaring bay’ah to both Osama bin Laden, 
and later Ayman al-Zawahiri,163 this new entity would 
soon overtly clash with AQO on matters of doctrine 
and strategy. 
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CURRENT ISO WORLDVIEW, BELIEFS, CREED, 
AND DOCTRINE 
Despite their common genus as Sunni global jihad-
ist terrorist organizations, ISO and AQO profoundly 
differ in doctrine, creed, jurisprudence, and strategy. 
AQO’s has already been laid bare and, in the earlier 
discussion, key contrasts were drawn between the 
“AQO Sunni Jihadist Church” and the “ISO Ultra-
Conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Sect.” 
The historical journey we just examined began 
in the birth of al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism in the latter 
1980s, and continued through neo-Zarqawism and 
and its various metamorphoses, marking the rise of 
the self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate. ISO doctrine 
has been described, but not yet exclusively focused 
on. In this concluding section, we offer a succinct sum-
mary of ISO doctrine as we earlier did for AQO. These 
key doctrinal elements are “DNA-like” in that they 
practically define the precise mutation ISO represents. 
ISO’S DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA: FOUR  
ESSENTIAL CATEGORICAL DIVERGENCES 
FROM AQO
Four key beliefs account for the greatest source 
of ISO’s divergence from AQO: (1) the imminence 
of the End Times (apocalypticism and eschatology), 
(2) the immediate demand to re-establish the Islamic 
Caliphate, (3) the takfir and policy of extermination of 
all Shia, and (4) an absolute priority of jihad against 
the nearest enemies. These four, considered together, 
constitute the “essential ISO difference” from AQO. 
There is here no overlap with AQO as it is a matter of 
presence or absence, and not one of degree. 
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THE IMMINENCE OF THE END TIMES  
(APOCALYPTICISM AND ESCHATOLOGY)
ISO believes that humankind is approaching the 
End Times, and as the True Saved Sect, they must 
wage a series of prophesized battles that will soon 
lead to the final and greatest of battles (Al-Malahim). 
There is a voluminous, systematic, and persistent fo-
cus within ISO’s publicly available media production 
in support of this belief. These battles are essential 
before the truly culminating events involving the re-
turn of Jesus (Isa) to fight the anti-Christ (Dajjal), the 
return of the Redeemer (Mahdi), and the Final Day of 
Judgment (Yawm al-Qiyamah, literally, “Day of Resur-
rection”), when Allah shall, on the basis of true belief 
and righteous deeds, determine the eternal abode of 
all human souls.164 
The quantitative divergence in the attention given 
to this theme by the ISO versus that given by the AQO 
is dramatic. Consider these results arising from a com-
prehensive content analysis of their respective flagship 
publications.165 The total of articles or lift-out para-
graphs/graphics devoted to specifically apocalyptic 
(i.e., writings devoted to revealing the secret mean-
ings of the past, present, and future) and eschatologi-
cal End Times (i.e., writings concerned with the final 
culmination of all existence and its portents and signs) 
themes appearing in Inspire, Resurgence, and Al-Risala 
include the following: Over a period of 5 years—from 
summer 2010 to summer 2015—across 14 separate 
issues of Inspire, a single reference appears in Issue 
13 by Abu Saleh. However, in this single reference to 
the “fitnah of Masih Ad-Dajjal” (Anti-Christ), it is re-
contextualized as an anti-American diatribe. He asks: 
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“If you are weak and deceived by the fitnah of Amer-
ica, how will you be safe from the Dajjal?”166 Within 
the new AQIS online magazine, Resurgence, across its 
two issues, a single article appears—by Shaykh Mu-
hammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu Dujana 
al Pasha)—referring to the prophesied “End Times” 
battles.167 This is described in stock fashion in a long 
paragraph. Overall, however, the article emphasizes 
the need to privilege Syria for several reasons at this 
moment as a key field of jihad.168 Finally, AQO’s for-
mal Syrian affiliate’s new magazine, Al-Risala, contains 
not a single reference to any apocalyptic themes in its 
first two issues.169 In sum, three flagship AQO-based 
online magazines over the course of 5 years contain 
no more than one actual apocalyptic quote—and that 
along with several other reasons for jihad in Syria—
and one reference to the future Dajjal or anti-Christ. 
Now let us consider a comprehensive content 
analysis of the ISO’s flagship English-language on-
line publication, Dabiq, Issues 1-14, from July 5, 2014, 
to April 14, 2016.170 Apocalyptic and eschatological 
themes are evidenced in the following. First, each is-
sue is sandwiched by apocalypticism on its contents 
page and back cover. The contents page in every is-
sue, except Issue 7, brands the publication with a 
quote from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: “The spark has 
been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to in-
tensify—by Allah’s permission—until it burns the 
crusader armies in Dabiq.” This quote is excised from 
a September 11, 2004, audiotape issued 2 months be-
fore the historic and tactically decisive “second battle 
for Fallujah,” (November-December 2004); the first 
was April 2004—Operation al-Fajr (“The Dawn”) and 
“Operation Phantom Fury”—where he issues the fol-
lowing call:
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This is a call for help from the depths to the lions in 
Baghdad and Al-Anbar, and to the heroes in Diyala 
and Samarra, and to the tigers in Mosul and the north: 
prepare for battle . . . be alert to what is going on 
around you. . . . You are facing fierce civil strife, but 
then victory shall be yours, Allah willing. . . . Behold, 
the spark has been lit in Iraq and its flames will blaze, 
Allah willing, until they consume the Armies of the 
Cross in Dabiq.171 
Second, the back page of 10 out of 14 issues explic-
itly addresses apocalyptic themes. One quote in par-
ticular, a locus classicus for ISO apocalypticism, but by 
no means the only one, is found in one highly-cited 
apocalyptic tradition in particular (No. 6924), found 
in one of the most authoritative collections of ahadith 
in Sunni Islam, Sahih-Muslim.172 It appears on the back 
page of the first issue, and is frequently encountered 
in ISO writings. The full quote is:
Abu Hurayrah [Prophet Muhammad’s companion] 
reported that Allah’s Messenger [Prophet Muham-
mad] . . . said: “The hour will not be established until 
the Romans land at al-‘A’maq or Dabiq (two places 
near each other in the northern countryside of Halab). 
Then an army from al-Madinah of the best people on 
the earth at that time will leave for them. When they 
line up in ranks, the Romans will say, ‘Leave us and 
those who were taken as prisoners among us so we 
can fight them.’ The Muslims will say, ‘Nay, by Allah, 
we will not abandon our brothers to you.’ [So] they 
will fight them. Then one third of them will flee; Allah 
will never forgive them. One third will be killed; they 
will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will 
conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah 
[internal strife]. They will conquer Constantinople. 
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While they are dividing the war booty, having hung 
their swords on olive trees, Shaytan [Satan] will shout, 
‘The [false; sic] Messiah has followed after your fami-
lies [who were left behind.; sic] So they will leave [for 
their families; sic], but Shaytan’s claim is false. When 
they arrive to Sham he comes out. Then while they are 
preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer 
is called. So ‘Isa Ibn Maryam [Jesus, son of Mary], will 
descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees 
him, he will melt as salt melts in water. If he were to 
leave him, he would melt until he perished, but he 
[Jesus] kills him with his own hand, and then shows 
them his blood upon his spear.173
A consistent drumbeat of apocalypticism also ap-
pears between the contents and final page.174 These es-
tablish beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the very 
least, those charged with the production, distribution, 
and publication of this flagship online English lan-
guage magazine have determined that apocalypticism 
is an essential feature of ISO branding. This profound 
divergence between AQO and ISO, i.e., its virtual 
non-existence for the former versus its centrality as a 
foundational, doctrinal, and core belief for the latter 
is remarkable and highly consequential. Furthermore, 
the ISO or at least some elements in the ISO have 
published an enormous amount of online material be-
yond Dabiq, focusing on “End Times” prophetic ma-
terials celebrating, elaborating upon, and amplifying 
apocalypticism.175 
Why is it important to establish whether apoca-
lyptic and eschatological themes are present in Sunni 
global jihadist publications and writings, and why, 
one must assume, genuine beliefs and worldviews? 
First, to confirm, in fact, that a divergence exists be-
tween AQO and ISO. However, more important is to 
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establish the likelihood that a fundamentally different 
conception of historical time is operative for each or-
ganization. A highly instructive scholarly literature on 
apocalypticism exists.176 Apocalypticism is by no means 
an invention of Islam, and with respect to the specific 
traditions of greatest relevance to us—those ancient 
Near Eastern civilizations that gave birth to the Abra-
hamic salvation religions—apocalypticism has its ear-
liest known origins in Zoroastrianism and Judaism, 
and is later developed by Christianity and Islam. 
The greatest practical consequences arising from 
these beliefs are in the realm of human morality and 
practical action. If one believes one is actually and 
undoubtedly living in a time of imminent and cata-
strophic battles; an active, essential agent in catalyz-
ing these battles; fighting the final enemies of the 
One True God and the destination of one’s soul is 
critically—as in no other time before or after—in the 
balance; that the enemies of the Truth are presenting 
themselves deceptively as Friends of the Truth; that 
within one’s own lifetime events of a scale heretofore 
unimaginable will happen—these thoughts, these be-
liefs, must have consequences. What they create is an 
“Ethic of the End Times,” rather than an “Ethic for All 
Times.” They affect life choices. Acting as if one will 
not be living tomorrow is radically unlike believing 
that one’s life and circumstances will unfold similarly 
over the course of one’s natural life with no dramatic 
ruptures destined to occur in any near-term at the very 
least. Whether one believes tomorrow is the last day, 
or tomorrow is another day with thousands more to 
follow, is of profound consequence for how one will 
choose to act. It is conceivable then, if this apocalypti-
cism is something other than a bizarre side note with 
a tiny number of proponents within ISO, that some 
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portion of ISO’s impatience, brutality, and will to ab-
solute power finds explanation here.177 It is now time 
to turn to other themes that may also have dramatic 
consequences for ISO’s ways of thinking, being, and 
acting.  
THE CALIPHATE NOW! 
AQO and ISO also fundamentally differ not on 
whether the Sunni Caliphate should be re-instituted, 
but on how this is to be realized. This is not just a mat-
ter of strategy, prudence, and timing, but of funda-
mental divergences in worldview. AQO’s conception 
of the Caliphate is inspirational, aspirational, and a 
longer-term achievement that presumes several nec-
essary stages of building popular support, transform-
ing states, acquiring the necessary prerequisites for 
sustaining defense, education, welfare, and uphold-
ing the essential legal requisites of an Islamic State. 
It is conceived as resting in the Ummah’s ultimate 
consent to its legitimacy, not through unbridled force, 
but through legal means; it is an Islam that belongs to 
the Ummah, but is won and led by its “Mujahid van-
guard,” Qa’idat al-Jihad, charged with the long-term 
strategy for its culmination. For AQO, “right makes 
might” when it comes to Ahl-us Sunnah’s ultimate 
dream realized in the restored Caliphate. 
ISO’s “Caliphate Now!” is likely based first and 
foremost on its eschatological worldview. The Caliph-
ate is a necessary milestone that must be attained be-
fore the destined End Times battles consummate hu-
man history and all shall be judged. Its organizational 
imperative is therefore rooted in the same “Ethic of 
End Times” driving a variety of other—if viewed from 
the standpoint of normal, historical time—extremely 
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deviant behaviors: in particular, a heightened sense 
of a finalized cosmic duality of Good and Evil, Allah, 
and Shaytan (Satan). In Dabiq, though a few key ar-
ticles lay the doctrinal foundations of the necessity of 
the Khilafa Now,178 the Caliphate is treated far more 
as a practical fact, i.e., legitimized as delivering se-
curity, services, and enforcing the Sharia of a state 
to which it is now time to declare allegiance.179 The 
Caliphate’s fuller eschatological sense can be found 
in a series of “Black Flag” publications specific to the 
Caliphate;180 in self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim’s July 
2, 2014, Caliphal inaugural address;181 and in ISO’s 
now-deceased former senior spokesman al-Adnani’s 
Caliphate announcement.182 
A second basis for the ISO’s Caliphate declaration 
is its sense of election: that the ISO, and no other, is 
the destined sect—the Victorious Sect—chosen to es-
tablish Allah’s Khalifa, thereby accelerating momen-
tum toward End Times. A chief consequence of this 
self-proclaimed status as the Victorious Sect—of this 
arrogance regarding sovereign leadership—was that 
from that moment forward, all existing groups, or-
ganizations, and individuals not bound by bay’ah to 
the new sovereign were presented a stark choice: be-
tween bay’ah to Caliph Ibrahim, or being regarded as 
a rebel (bughat) at best or apostate (murtadd) at worst. 
This demand that all existing organizations, includ-
ing Qa’idat al-Jihad’s affiliate Al-Nusrah, dissolve and 
declare bay’ah to their new Caliph Ibrahim was at first 
met with confusion and consternation, but after ad-
vice, mediation, and legal remedies were categorically 
or surreptitiously refused by ISO, a state of outright 
rebellion and civil war recommenced. 
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THE “FINAL SOLUTION” TO THE  
“SHIA PROBLEM” 
There is little novelty in the current ISO’s ap-
proach to the Shia. ISO continues the policies of its 
founding father Abu Musab al-Zarqawi vis-à-vis the 
“Shia Question”: the Shia are considered unredeem-
able apostates, treacherous subverters of Allah’s Ahl-
us Sunnah, and must be decimated. Throughout ISO 
speeches and publications, the Shia are referred to pe-
joratively as Rafidah (rejectors, those who reject, those 
who refuse), based on the Shia doctrine that Prophet 
Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali was illegitimately denied 
his right to succeed the Prophet as Khalifa and lead the 
nascent Muslim community, and thus all successors 
after Muhammad except for Ali are denied (rejected). 
Within militant Shi’ism, indeed, there is a systematic 
disparagement and delegitimization of the first three 
successors after Muhammad (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn 
al-Khattab, and Uthman ibn ‘Affan). This also finds 
expression in Shia rituals of cursing those first succes-
sors, and all of those who illegitimately usurped the 
Prophet’s own family. Moreover, owing to the depth 
of this schism, Shi’ism and Sunnism (those claim-
ing successorship through the first three successors, 
but also Ali, for them, the fourth legitimate Caliph) 
have developed distinctly different theological, ju-
ridical, ritual, and canonical traditions. Disregarding 
Shi’ism’s further splintering—quite numerous—this 
primordial split has distinct parallels in the Christian 
faith to the bitter, bloody battles pitting defenders 
of the True Universal Church (Roman Catholicism) 
against Protestants, who from the point of view of 
Catholic orthodoxy were deemed heretics and apos-
tates to be converted or killed. For Protestants who 
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consider themselves the “True Universal Church,” it 
is Catholics who are accused of Romanism, Papism, 
and being agents of the Anti-Christ or Satan. We ear-
lier described, when examining Zarqawism and neo-
Zarqawism, the nature of this sectarianism. What is 
key here is to contextualize it within a broader revival 
of Sunni Salafi orthodoxy, the 1979 Iranian revolution, 
and finally, the cataclysmic effects for Sunnis in gen-
eral and Sunni Salafis in particular of the U.S. decision 
to decapitate the Saddam Hussein regime and thus by 
default, empower their greatest earthly foes, the Shia 
and Iran.
The ISO’s uniqueness, again earlier described, is 
not their demonization of Shi’ism as heresy or their 
doctrine calling for the conversion or killing of their 
leadership. It is ISO’s extension of that charge and the 
actions it sanctions against the Shia laity itself. Every 
Shi’ite is to be killed, regardless of how learned, pow-
erful, or likely to be responsible for systematic policies 
dis-privileging Sunnism that they may be. The reasons 
are two-fold. First, they are accused of an unpardon-
able idolatry and are therefore guilty of the greatest 
sin a Muslim can commit: shirk, i.e., associating oth-
ers worthy of worship, with Allah. This is manifest, 
ISO and many militant Sunni Salafis would claim, in 
various rituals of veneration and adoration directed 
toward persons deemed in possession of intercessory 
spiritual powers, and has its most common ritual ex-
pression in the visitation of tombs and shrines; there-
fore, for ISO, there was the necessity of destroying 
them.183 This destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and 
attack on all forms of ritual associated with interces-
sory means is not an ISO invention, but rather a Salafi-
Wahhabi trademark, as earlier described. Yet, even 
Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), the esteemed neo-Hanbali 
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scholar-mujahid and Salafi-Wahhabi exemplar for or-
thodoxy and orthopraxy, did not takfir the Shia laity. 
Their ignorance, lack of proximate responsibility, and 
their proximity to Allah led to a policy of immunity 
from those punishments required for genuine idolatry 
and shirk. Al-Zarqawi’s rejection of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
fatwa legalizing Shia lay immunity has been contin-
ued by the ISO. Recall also Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s 
clarification, in 19 principles of the ISI’s core creed, 
and the priority placed on the Shia as the first two of 
these. Its more brutal execution lay not in the intent 
but in ISO’s dramatically increased means for realiz-
ing their intended “final solution.”   
Despite their common ancestry in Sunnism and 
Salafism, and to a lesser extent Salafi-Wahhabism, 
AQO’s divergence from ISO on the “Shia question” 
is enormous. A comprehensive examination of Inspire, 
Resurgence, and Al-Risala turns up merely two articles 
that discuss the “Rafida.” The first is by former founder 
and editor Samir Khan, though even here, he excludes 
a particular Shia offshoot, the Zaydi, from criticism 
altogether.184 The second is in the earlier-mentioned 
single instance of an apocalypticism in the article by 
Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti.185 His 
comment does not takfir the Shia, but he accuses them 
in the context of the Syrian civil war and their support 
of the regime of Bashar Assad, and of revealing their 
“true colors” as hypocrites. He states: “[T]he war in 
Syria has uncovered the true nature of the Rawafid 
[i.e., “Rafidah”] and their deep loathing for Islam 
and the Muslims. The hollow slogans with which the 
Rawafid have tried to deceive the Ummah for so long 
have now lost their efficacy. The veneer they had coat-
ed their hypocrisy with has finally worn out.” Hardly 
a call to arms, and certainly a vast distance from the 
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policy of systematic extermination currently being 
prosecuted by the ISO.186 
THE NEAREST ENEMY IS THE UMMAH’S  
TRUEST ENEMY! 
The prioritizing of the “Nearest Enemy” rather 
than the “Far Enemy” is a final point of furthest diver-
gence. This is not strategic but instead a fundamental 
disagreement rooted in creed and ultimate beliefs. 
AQO’s “Far Enemy” focus is derived from its ori-
enting principle: “The Sunni Church of the United 
Ummah and Its Mujahidin versus The Craven Origi-
nal Kufr and Their Apostate Lackeys Who Oppress 
and Exploit the Muslim World.” For ISO, the world 
is quite different. The original sin is not the original 
Kufr, but the nearest of my former Muslim brothers 
who treacherously left Allah for shirk, and in so do-
ing, split Allah’s true faith and true warriors with 
the ultimate consequence that the original Kufr now 
dominate the Ummah. Internal treason, subversion, 
and treachery must first be exorcised; then, Allah’s 
true army is organized from those remnants who sur-
vive these battles; and finally assembled on the fields 
of Dabiq, they fight the final battles of the End Times. 
The ISI’s first proto-caliph, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, 
clarifies this worldview in a form that only the blind 
could fail to recognize:
And know this well: the malicious rafidah [Shiites] and 
the infidel occupiers will never forget that only yester-
day you were their enemies, and they have begun to 
stab you already, so return to us and we will not forget 
that yesterday you were our friends. . . . If you refuse 
to repent before we get a hold of you then, by Allah, 
to kill an apostate is more preferable to me than a hundred 
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Crusader heads, and you know all about our vigor and 
our reach, and the mantle of the [Shias] and the wood 
of the Crusader occupiers will do you no good [italics 
supplied].187 
This speech was delivered in the midst of the ISI’s 
precipitous decline and the fundamental threat now 
posed to its Caliphal ambitions by the “apostate” Sunni 
elements that had “abandoned” the ISI. Three primary 
enemies are identified—“the malicious rafidah,” “the 
infidel occupiers,” and “unrepentant apostate[s].” “If 
you refuse to repent before we get hold of you then, 
by Allah, to kill an apostate is more preferable than 
a hundred Crusader heads” refers to the Sunni “Sah-
wat” or “Tribal Awakening,” as well as other insur-
gent Sunni formations that ultimately doomed any 
pretense that the ISI represented the heart and soul of 
Ahl-us Sunnah. Note, takfir has been declared against 
Sunnis who refuse ISI rule. Since ISI is Allah’s chosen 
instrument for the realization of the End Time, they 
are guilty of shirk. Second in priority is “the malicious 
rafidah,” and a distant third, “the infidel occupiers.” 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s ISI, which has alienated the 
Ahl-us Sunnah beyond any possible reconciliation, at-
tempts to persuade these Ahl-us Sunnah that they are 
not your friends or your future—“never forget that 
only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have 
begun [again] to stab you already, so return to us 
and we will not forget that yesterday you were our 
friends.”188
ISO RELATIVE DIVERGENCES FROM AQO
ISO’s less definitive divergences from AQO, 
though highly consequential, are more finely nu-
anced, require extensive elaboration, and suppose a 
specialized knowledge of Islamic theology and juris-
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prudence (Fiqh) exceeding that possessed by the pres-
ent author.189 These debates concern such fundamental 
concepts as faith and its opposite, infidelity (Iman ver-
sus Kufr); and based on one’s answer to the questions, 
“What is faith? What is infidelity?” How one deter-
mines, in fact, whether one has veered too far from the 
“middle path”—claimed to be Prophet Muhammad’s 
true path—and instead has become either negligent 
and guilty of postponing (irja) essential acts of faith 
and thereby accused of belonging to the negligent 
postponers (Murj’ites); or on the other extreme, judge 
sinning  itself as Kufr, and thereby exhibit an extremist 
ultra-radicalism like the early sect of Kharijites (Kha-
warij).190 Still other debates deal with key theological 
and theopolitical concepts such as: the doctrine of al 
Wala wa’l bara—the notion that a true Muslim must 
openly disavow, disassociate from, and hate idola-
ters—and on the other hand, exclusively avow, asso-
ciate with, and love the advocates of monotheism; the 
doctrine of tawhid, or the absolute Oneness of Allah 
as Creator, Lord, and in His Names, and its opposite, 
shirk or idolatry, and what in fact counts as idolatry 
particularly in the modern world; the doctrine of Ha-
kimiyyah, and the notion that a state can only be gov-
erned by the “Rulings that Allah Sent Down,” i.e., the 
Sharia, and how that is to be operationalized; and, the 
question of when and how the obligatory prescribed 
criminal punishments (Hudud) of lashing, permanent 
dismemberment, and stoning are to be enforced for 
the crimes of fornication, theft, adultery, and inten-
tional homicide. 
The point of greatest convergence and with which 
we conclude this section, is the genus “global Sunni 
jihadism” to which each of these deviant species sub-
scribe. The definitive quality that marks these orga-
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nizations off from every other form of Islamic activ-
ism is their claim that jihad fi sabil Allah—fighting and 
striving in the path of Allah to Raise Allah’s Word—is 
until the Day of Final Judgment, an immediate and 
unconditional obligation that is at the same time, 
the superlative means of worshipping Allah, expiat-
ing one’s sins, and purchasing (through sacrifices of 
blood and treasure) those superlative privileges only 
attained by those killing and being killed on this path 
(Shuhada) (re: Quran 9:111).191 
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CHAPTER 2
TERRORIST MODUS OPERANDI
I. INTRODUCTION
Having systematically examined AQO’s and ISO’s 
core beliefs, worldviews, doctrine, and creed, let us 
now examine the governing dynamics of their ter-
rorist strategies: their terrorist modus operandi. The 
author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA), a heu-
ristic for modeling the dynamics of terrorist organiza-
tions, is employed to facilitate this task. This heuristic 
is first briefly described, and subsequently applied to 
AQO (part one) and ISO (part two). 
TERRORIST QUADRANGLE ANALYSIS (TQA) 
The Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) is a tool 
created by the present author for conceptualizing the 
four key intrinsically-related dynamic elements of a 
terrorist organization—(1) religio-political objectives, 
(2) media warfare, (3) terrorist operations (other than 
media), and (4) proximate strategic objectives.192 A 
brief discussion of each element and their interrela-
tion follows (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  The Terrorist Quadrangle: Relations of 
Religio-Political Objectives, Media Operations, 
Terror Operations (Non-Media) and Strategic 
 Objectives.
“Religio-Political Objectives” refers to the proximate 
and ultimate “end state” sought by the terrorist entity: 
its declared ideal ultimate objective and those proxi-
mate to it. “Media Operations” refers to the deliber-
ate use of all available media to facilitate the achieve-
ment of terrorist organizational objectives. “Terrorist 
Operations (Non-Media)” are all actions, operations, 
and campaigns designed and executed for attaining 
proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. 
“Strategic Objectives” are key proximate end states 
necessary for the full realization of the terrorist en-
tity’s ultimate religio-political objectives. They main-
tain a direct causal relation to proximate and ultimate 
religio-political objectives. For example, if an ultimate 
religio-political objective were the creation of a state 
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ruled exclusively by Sharia, a key strategic objective 
would be the successful elimination of a non-Sharia-
based legal system, and the successful creation of an 
alternative juridical system. 
Terrorism as strategy is motive-independent. It is 
in its essence, reducible to a stick of dynamite, a film 
crew, an immediate target that serves as a sign vehi-
cle, and a broader indirect target audience whose will, 
resolve, and psychological state is deemed essential 
to the realization of the terrorist’s ultimate objectives. 
Though ultimate objectives, means of destruction, me-
dia, direct targets, and indirect targets are variables, 
terrorism as strategy remains identical to what it has 
always been: the deliberate use of terrorism directed 
at direct and indirect targets (the way), using me-
dia and non-media instruments of power/influence 
(the means), to achieve ends (in this case, religio-
political ends).193 Let us now examine the terrorist 
modus operandi of AQO and ISO. 
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II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION  
(TANZIM QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)
Despite the previous chapter’s focus on core 
beliefs, worldviews, creed, and doctrine, we also 
learned about AQO’s basic terrorist modus operandi. 
The AQO doctrine as we observed sought to galva-
nize and mobilize Sunni Muslims to deploy as part of 
bin Ladenism’s “Sunni Internationale,” to systemati-
cally attrite the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance through 
persistent, economically damaging attacks on “Far 
Enemy” targets. Let us now briefly describe the TQA 
of the “classical” AQO “Far Enemy” bin Ladenism 
strategy.194 
TQA, I: THE “CLASSICAL” BASE FIRST BIN 
LADENIST “FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY
Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political  
Objectives. 
AQO’s ongoing transnational terrorist campaign is 
directed at attaining an ultimate religio-political ob-
ject: Islamic supremacy, global worship of Allah, and 
the reign of an Islamic super-state. This objective is 
to be attained in stages.195 First, the United States and 
its principal allies are to be territorially and militarily 
removed from the Arab Muslim world, thus under-
mining U.S. military presence, power projection, and 
access to energy reserves. Second, is the overthrowing 
of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replac-
ing these with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments, 
which are adherent to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy. 
Third, is uniting Muslim states into a supra-state 
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caliphate that shall serve as a religio-political base for 
further amassing Muslim power and conducting of-
fensive jihad to confront the remaining world of infi-
delity (dar al-Kufr). This supra-state caliphal Sovereign 
is envisioned as an alternative international order that 
eschews, denies, and is at war with the present United 
Nations-based system of territorially independent, 
equal, sovereign nation-states. Fourth, mobilized 
within this caliphal block of militant Muslim states, 
a sustained, permanent offensive jihad is to be fought 
until all other forms of worship and polity are over-
thrown. It is at that point that Allah’s worship will be 
universal throughout the Earth and the reign of justice, 
peace, and Allah’s absolute sovereignty fully realized. 
The Instrumental Role of Media Warfare, Terrorist 
Attacks, and the Strategic Object. 
Media warfare is viewed by AQO as an essential 
dimension of their strategy.196 Media warfare, terror-
ist attacks, and strategic objectives are conceived by 
AQO as strictly subordinate to AQO’s religio-political 
objectives. Phases one and two of the religio-political 
object are paramount at the present time, i.e., removal 
of the United States and its principal allies territorially 
and militarily from the Arab Muslim world, and over-
throwing so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and 
replacing these with Sunni Muslim governments that 
adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy. 
A central task of media warfare during these ini-
tial phases is to reinforce an essential Manichaean 
dichotomy between the “Crusader” United States 
of America and the “Defender” AQO. The Crusader 
must be portrayed as the Satanic other: a mortal foe 
of Godly forces mobilized to vanquish evil personi-
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fied. Designed to galvanize, incite, and morally out-
rage, this process of “satanization” has, since Harold 
D. Lasswell’s early study,197  been well-documented 
as a key strategic dimension of wartime propaganda. 
This first key strategic media warfare task—mobilize 
animosity/hatred by the Muslim Nation (Ummah) of 
the enemy—is complemented by three other strate-
gic media warfare tasks that correlate with key target 
audiences: securing and preserving the friendship of 
allies; preserving and if possible, securing, the coop-
eration of neutrals or even arousing neutrals‘ oppo-
sition to one’s own enemies; and, demoralizing and 
disintegrating the enemy’s will to persevere.198 
The terrorist attacks AQO conceptualized, orga-
nized, executed, and endorsed are strictly subordinate 
to the attainment of the proximate religio-political 
object; and, the rationale and subsequent justification 
for these terrorist attacks is provided in AQO media 
warfare. They aim, again, at specific target audiences 
whose function is deemed essential at this stage of 
the campaign. The enemy’s determination, resolve, 
and willingness to pay the price of military power 
projection and support of regional allies must be un-
dermined. Potential AQO allies and neutrals are ex-
cluded from these carefully selected, highly symbolic 
terrorist targets and thus, appealed and recruited to 
the AQO cause. Inciting, catalyzing, and galvanizing 
the Ummah is also key. 
Finally, AQO’s key strategic objectives directly 
correlate with its strategic media warfare and terrorist 
attacks. Given this present phase focused on remov-
ing the U.S. presence in the Arab Muslim world and 
installing strictly adherent Sunni Muslim states, these 
four objectives are realized if AQO is successfully un-
dermining “Crusader” enemy motivation, means, and 
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opportunity to remain militarily, economically, and 
politically engaged in the Arab Middle East; expand-
ing AQO’s terrorist enterprise, base of support, and 
unity among potential allies; securing neutrality or 
even cooperation among neutrals; and further galva-
nizing AQO’s fighting forces and broader base within 
the Muslim Ummah. In Figure 2, we present AQO’s 
five-stage theory of realizing the Khilafa, along with 
the TQA model used to analyze each stage. 
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Figure 2.  From Qa’idat al-Jihad to Khilafah:  
A TQA Analysis of AQO.
However, a calculated USG policy during nearly 
15 years following 9/11 to degrade, disrupt, and ul-
timately defeat AQO has successfully accomplished 
two of three key strategic objectives: relentlessly at-
tacking AQO’s leadership and network, and success-
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fully protecting the U.S. homeland from mass casualty 
terrorist attacks. The third objective—countering radi-
calization and recruitment to AQO—remains a work 
in progress.199 Fortunately, AQO’s marginalization 
from the vast majority of Ahl-us Sunnah, and Sunni re-
jection of AQO’s terrorist modus operandi, has assist-
ed where less successful counter-radicalization efforts 
have not.200 We shall return in Chapter 3 to examine 
USG efforts along that line of effort. 
It is possible, as suggested in Chapter 1, that AQO 
is now reorienting in the direction of a type of uncon-
ventional warfare strategy—embedding, training, and 
acting as force multipliers among an auxiliary training 
to overthrow an existing state, as well as establishing 
essentially political fronts—Ansar al-Sharia organiza-
tions (i.e., supporters/helpers of the Sharia)—as was 
noted in relation to its present Syrian affiliate Jabhat 
al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat 
al-Jihad (“Protection Front for the People of the Levant 
by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of 
Jihad”; hereafter, Jabhat al-Nusrah), and the broader 
Islamist coalitions within which it operates.201 This is 
actually closer to the original al-Qaeda idea—a mobile 
Islamic foreign legion assisting embattled Brothers 
on various fronts—before it morphed via bin Laden’s 
post-1990s obsession with anti-American mass casu-
alty terrorism.202
“Classical” AQO still requires USG attention. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that AQO’s 
Yemeni-based affiliate AQAP now poses the great-
est present threat to the U.S. homeland. This is par-
ticularly true of its external operations branch. AQAP 
has practically amended the “classical” AQO model 
of top-down, long-range, high-quality, mass casualty, 
anti-American terrorism to pioneer a very different 
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terrorist modus operandi centered on an individual-
ized “lone mujahid” model of decentralized direct 
terrorist action. The emergence of homegrown and 
home-based terrorism as a direct result of this “lone 
mujahid” strategy represents a fundamental strate-
gic shift. Let us now examine this most lethal AQO 
affiliate of greatest concern to the West and USG in 
particular. 
TQA, II: THE AQAP “LONE MUJAHID”  
“FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY
AQAP’s “lone mujahid” strategy represents a ma-
jor development in AQO’s strategic evolution.203 It has 
recently been suggested that because bin Laden often 
questioned AQAP’s strategic acumen and registered 
criticisms of its target selection, that it should not re-
ally be characterized as the “real” AQO, at least not 
as bin Laden’s “classical,” “Far Enemy” strategy is 
concerned.204 Futhermore, bin Laden maintained “a 
seeming distrust of AQAP’s competence as a jihadi 
entity, not least its lack of a sound understanding of 
politics.”205 This observation is accurate, but practi-
cally irrelevant. For one, it is possible to lodge the 
same criticism of bin Laden whose knowledge of re-
ality, politics included, was based in a profound ig-
norance, conspiracism, delusion, and hubris, enough 
so that key members of his own inner circle accused 
him of destroying in months what it had taken years, 
even decades, to build. Second, classical bin Laden-
ism has been hammered into oblivion by a sustained 
U.S. campaign that has attrited its leadership, gutted 
its finances, and overcome initial sanctuary-based 
AQO advantages through a lethal and relentless poli-
cy of drone-based targeting206 of high value targets.207 
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Third, AQAP remains a clear and present danger to 
the U.S. homeland, and its “lone mujahid” strategy 
currently poses the single greatest ongoing threat to 
law enforcement, the intelligence community, and all 
who are charged with preventing lone-wolf-style ter-
rorist attacks on American soil. We believe it is highly 
likely that this phase of AQAP’s evolution represents 
not just a strategic evolution but also a strategic dead 
end. One way terrorist groups finally end, Audrey 
Cronin points out, is by reorienting into pure crimi-
nality.208 As we will soon see, AQAP’s terrorist mo-
dus operandi appears not only to promote this kind of 
conduct, but also to elevate those who engage in this 
truly reprehensible and forbidden (haram) conduct to 
the highest levels of Paradise as Shuhada.
It is highly unlikely that Ahl-us Sunnah will recog-
nize this conduct as anything other than what it actu-
ally is: sinful, ghastly, evil, and wrong; and more to 
the point, not the Islam that embodies those ideals and 
religious principles upon which the world’s 1.6 billion 
Muslims—Sunni and Shia—stand. These objections 
will be more fully discussed in our final chapter. For 
now, let us take a brief and telling tour of AQAP’s self-
professed path to the highest of seven levels of Jannah 
(Paradise).
The online magazine Inspire provides the master 
key to AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi. The objec-
tive of our earlier tour through each of its fourteen 
issues published between summer 2010 and summer 
2015 (see Chapter 1) was to document certain sources 
of major divergence from ISO. We discovered that 
ISO’s four signature creedal/doctrinal themes most 
divergent from AQO—apocalypticism, ultra-sectari-
an anti-Shi’ism, Caliphate Now! and Nearest Enemy 
Now!—were virtually non-existent in AQAP’s Inspire. 
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Doctrinally, a comprehensive analysis reveals that 
AQAP embraces AQO’s “party line” privileging, at-
tacking the “Far Enemy” and, importantly, a longer-
term, stage-theory for eventually restoring the rightful 
Caliphate.209 What we seek to document in this second 
tour of Inspire is not doctrine, but its “lone mujahid” 
strategy for attaining its declared proximate and ul-
timate religio-political objectives. To do so, we will 
again attempt to use the TQA to capture the dynamics 
of a terrorist modus operandi which links religio-po-
litical objectives with its media operations, non-media 
terrorist operations, and strategic objectives. 
AQAP Media Operations. 
AQAP’s media operations are single-mindedly 
and unabashedly devoted to promoting the strat-
egy of “lone mujahid” terrorism. First, the works and 
speeches of key strategists, advocates, and theorists 
of individualized jihad, such as Abu Musab al-Suri’s 
Global Islamic Resistance Call210 and Anwar al-Awlaki’s 
Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?211 extolling individual-
ized jihadi terrorism, are made accessible in serialized 
form. Second, Sharia scholars produce a legal ratio-
nale in defense of individualized jihadi terrorism.212 
Third, knowledge of terror craft tactics, techniques, 
and procedures is made available through publica-
tion of the “Open Source Jihad” section in Inspire.213 
Fourth, major “special operations,” particularly those 
envisioning the “lone mujahid” or lone wolf type ter-
rorist attack are celebrated.214 Fifth, encrypted com-
munication links are routinely advertised that permit 
anonymized, individualized terrorist communication 
links with AQAP.215 
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Finally, the lion’s share of AQAP’s focus, if mea-
sured by sheer column inches, is its obsessive advo-
cacy of “martyrdom” (Shuhada). 216 This involves ex-
tolling, celebrating, honoring, inspiring, inciting, and 
lionizing martyrdom in general, and individualized 
“lone mujahid,” “martyrdom operations,” and “mar-
tyrs” in particular. 
“Jihadism” by its very nature has reduced Islam 
to fighting and dying in the process of killing others. 
As the singular path advanced for the raising of Al-
lah’s Word, empowering individuals to sacrifice all 
that is dear on this Earth, and in this life, is essential. 
Individualized jihadism (the “lone mujahid”) is the 
true “center of gravity” for AQAP’s media operations, 
because it focuses directly on the critical requirement 
and the potential critical vulnerability of this terror-
ist modus operandi: generating, motivating, and de-
ploying an ample supply of persons willing to kill 
fellow human beings and citizens in the process of 
killing themselves. Such an unnatural, aberrant, truly 
reprehensible, and morally condemnable act requires 
the most careful attention—to emotive manipulation, 
addressing fears and doubts, providing assurances 
for loved ones left behind, sowing doubt about one’s 
manliness and courage, exacerbating alienation and 
identity crises—should Shahada not be pursued to the 
end. 
Non-Media Terrorist Operations and Strategic 
Objectives. 
A comprehensive analysis of Inspire’s media op-
erations also discloses the types of non-media ter-
rorist operations pursued, and their relation to stra-
tegic objectives. First and foremost are “Far Enemy” 
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operations designed to attack predominantly eco-
nomic targets—institutions, infrastructure, energy 
corridors, global shipping, commercial aviation—and 
personalities, including world-renowned entrepre-
neurs, scholars, intellectuals, and philanthropists. 
Second, is the emergent focus on a type of radically 
individualistic violence comprised of a hybridization 
of ultra-anarchism and gangsterism.217 Possessed of 
the knowledge, motivation, opportunities, and tools, 
every Muslim is urged to murder any non-Muslim, 
destroy their honor, steal their wealth, and wreak 
havoc on their lives. The ideal Muslim is portrayed as 
a treacherous, murderous, criminal psychopath who 
spills oil on highways to ambush and later murder his 
hapless victims; sets fire to forests and burns every life 
form and residence that would lie in its path; and who 
would assassinate the creators, inventors, and intel-
lects responsible for pioneering institutions and run-
ning global enterprises. This appears to be AQAP’s 
most considered answer to the question, “What would 
Prophet Muhammad Do?” It  does not take much 
imagination to predict the probable trajectory of an 
entity whose highest ideals for contemporary Islam 
are the greatest sins after apostasy: homicide, suicide, 
treachery, deceit, and attacking the lives, honor, pos-
terity, and wealth, of Allah’s creation.  
AQAP’s primary strategic objective is captured in 
its simplified formula: If we Remove the United States 
from Muslim Lands + If we Preach the Call (Da’wa) + 
If we Defend the Ummah’s State and Lands = Then we 
will realize Caliphate.218 The first (If we Remove the 
United States from Muslim Lands) of this Caliphate 
syllogism presumes knowledge of the United States. 
However, like Osama bin Laden, AQAP appears pro-
foundly and dangerously ignorant and maintains 
delusions about its chief “Crusader” nemesis. It has 
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mistaken its hollowed out, demonized, conspiracy-
riddled, anti-semitic caricature for the real thing. Based 
on its own published record, along with the virtual 
decimation of its first-tier leadership cadre, one might 
conclude that AQAP lacks knowledge of the adver-
sary it insists on terrorizing. This includes its apparent 
ignorance of U.S. values, institutions, motivations, and 
the sustained commitment of its residents and citizens 
who identify with America’s promise, opportunities, 
and freedoms—including genuine religious freedoms 
cherished and celebrated by its Muslim citizens and 
residents. 
It is likely, as suggested earlier, that AQAP is 
transforming from an AQO-based “Far Enemy” ter-
rorist organization possessed of a leadership, resourc-
es, sanctuary, finances, logistics, and recruits, to little 
more than an inspirer of anarchistic-like individual-
ized terrorism, parasitizing the electromagnetic and 
cyber dimensions to promote what has become noth-
ing more—to persons less ignorant and deluded—
than sinful and criminal conduct. The strategic impli-
cations for USG efforts to counter this organization 
are straightforward, and shall be taken up in our final 
chapter. It is now time to take up our second terrorist 
entity: the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya).
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III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION  
(TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)
Let us now examine the ISO’s strategy and ter-
rorist modus operandi. We anchor our analysis in 
the ISO’s own selective, apologetic history of its own 
beginnings in al-Zarqawi and Zarqawism, the pithi-
est formulation of which is ISO’s proposed five-stage 
strategy for realizing the Caliphate in Dabiq’s inau-
gural issue.219 We will learn in ISO’s re-telling of its 
self-understanding of Zarqawism’s distinct differ-
ences from every other jihadist tendency, and why it 
is deemed the exclusive “bridge” to Khilafa. However, 
instead of parroting ISO’s self-presentation, where 
necessary and practicable, we supply known facts in 
place of ISO distortions and myths. We shall also fur-
ther substantiate ISO’s self-presentation by drawing 
on the fuller range of materials made available across 
11 issues of Dabiq. As we shall soon see, the ISO has in 
practice significantly departed from its idealized five-
stage strategy. The reasons for this shall be obvious in 
the course of our presentation. 
TQA: THE ISO “STATE/CALIPHATE-FIRST” 
STRATEGY
ISO declares five necessary stages (see Figure 
3) marking the path to the restoration of the Sunni 
Islamic Caliphate:
1. Emigrating  to an ideal locale (Hijrah);
2. Establishing the jihadist state-building nuclei 
(Jama’ah); 
3. Using terrorist “vexation and exhaustion” op-
erations to attack, collapse, and destroy existing 
state authority (Nikayah), to create mayhem/
chaos (Tawahhush);
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4. Controlling  territory, persons, resources, and 
consolidating an alternative Islamic State struc-
ture (Tamkin); and finally,
5. Declaring, consolidating, and expanding the 
Islamic State/Caliphate (Khilafa). These may be 
visually represented using the TQA heuristic.
Figure 3.  From Hijra to Khilafah: A TQA  
Analysis.220
ISO Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political  
Objectives.  
ISO declares very clearly its ultimate religio-
political objective. It is stated thrice: “[e]stablishing 
Khilafah”; “reviving the Khilafah”; and “The goal of 
Khilafah without hesitation.”221 What ISO meant pre-
cisely by “without hesitation” is unclear, since this 
could mean: “We must begin now to work toward the 
Caliphate” or “We must now without hesitation de-
clare The Islamic State of the Caliphate.” In practice, 
it appears the latter course was taken, and if so, this 
contradicts ISO’s own self-declared stage strategy by 
placing the Caliphate far ahead of the other necessary 
stages it posits are essential to its effective “remaining 
and expanding.” We shall leave this for now, as it will 
soon reappear as an essential ingredient of ongoing 
Fitnah and ISO’s civil war with other Islamic, Salafi, 
and Salafi-Jihadist organizations.
ISO Terrorist Operations (Non-Media), and  
Accompanying Media Operations. 
The ISO lays out a very brief and telling summary 
of its grand strategy. It clarifies for us exactly how it 
envisions strategy, and the essential phases for real-
izing its end state. This description is based on its re-
capitulation of the stages it claims al-Zarqawi’s initial 
organization followed: 
In short, these phases consist of [1] immigrating [hi-
jra] to a land with a weak central authority to use as a 
base where a [2] jama’ah can form, recruit members, 
and train them. (If such a land does not exist or hi-
jrah is not possible, the place can be formed through 
long campaigns of nikayah [vexation and exhaustion]  
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attacks carried out by underground mujahid cells . . . 
These attacks will compel apostate forces to partially 
withdraw from rural territory and regroup in major 
urban regions.) The jama’ah would then take advan-
tage of the situation by [3] increasing the chaos to 
the point of leading to the complete collapse of the 
taghut regime in entire areas, a situation some refer 
to as ‘tawahhush’ (‘mayhem’). The next step would 
be to fill the vaccuum by managing the state of affairs 
to the point of [4] developing into a full-fledged state 
[tamkin], and continuing expansion into territory still 
under control of the taghut [emphasis added].222 
A concluding sentence, in boldface type and a larger 
font size, supplies our final stage. “This has always 
been the roadmap towards [stage 5] Khilafah for the 
mujahidin.”223 Let us now attempt to follow this path.
Phase 1: Emigration (Hijra). 
In the beginning is Emigration (Hijra). Conceived 
on the model of Prophet Muhammad, ISO envisions 
its origins in emigration from a land of persecution to 
one where the rudiments of a new organization may 
be planted and defended. For al-Zarqawi, this new 
land is “a place where they could operate without 
the threat of a powerful police state,” and ISO asserts 
that this led him from Afghanistan (recall his Jund 
al-Sham based in Herat), to Kurdistan, “as a base to 
form Jama’atut-Tawhidi wal-Jihad [italics added].”224
Phase 2: Group Formation (Jama’ah). 
Interestingly, Dabiq asserts that the creedal core of 
Zarqawism is the way of moderation, or the middle 
way, and that the ISO is based on Quran, Sunnah, and 
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a Salafism “free from the extremities,” i.e., neither neg-
ligent (murji’ite) nor equating sin with disbelief (kha-
warij). Further, it is based in the doctrines of tawhid, 
al-wala wa’l bara, and the demand that all governance 
be based in Sharia. It views “jihad as its fundamental 
means for change” (citing, Quran 8:39), and that jihad 
be based upon “hijrah [emigration], bay’ah [an oath 
of loyalty to the emir], sam’ [listening], ta’ah [obedi-
ence], and i’dad [training], leading to ribat [manning 
frontiers] and qital [fighting], then Khilafah or shaha-
dah [martyrdom], [italics added].”225 Having claimed 
to adhere to what seems like a mainline Salafi-Jihadi 
creed, however, we soon learn otherwise. Zarqawism 
is presented instead as the exclusive “bridge” to the 
Caliphate, with all others accused of varying degrees 
of intolerable deviance.
The story begins in the Afghanistan camps, the era 
of united fronts, anti-Communist coalitions, and Az-
zamist defensive jihad. Because of the overwhelming 
emphasis placed on fighting a “common enemy,” it 
is claimed this led to “ignoring all matters that dis-
tinguished them from each other, even if those mat-
ters were an obstacle in the pursuit of Khilafah,” with 
the most significant of these being “nationalism” and 
other “serious innovations that destroyed the creed 
and healthy body of the Muslim jama’ah required for 
reviving the Khalifah.”226 Note here ISO’s declared 
opposition to Azzamism and AQO-based Church-like 
“lumping” strategies. Those ecumenical conceptions 
of “Muslimness” were vehemently opposed to sectar-
ian splitting and internecine warfare at the expense of 
the “apostate” government installed by the “original 
Kufr,” in this case the former Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics (USSR). For al-Zarqawi and the ISO, 
however, what is decisive is “all matters that distin-
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guished them [each fighting group] from each other.” 
In other words, it is only the purity of the Pure Sect 
that ensures the True Muslimness of the Muslim, and 
therefore it is in the process of winnowing wheat from 
chaff and True Believers from hypocrites, negligence, 
heresy, and outright apostasy, that Khilafa can and 
should be restored. The Caliphate can only be built 
from steel. It is “the creed and healthy body of the 
Jama’ah” cleansed of “serious innovations” that will 
be the instrument for the restoration. Moreover, many 
“would become the bridges upon which jihad would 
pass over toward the awaited Khilafah,” the one of 
greatest consequence “was that of the mujaddid (re-
viver) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”227 
It is essential to pause for a moment to see that this 
second stage of—Jama’ah—Zarqawism, by  its very na-
ture, views itself as operating on two key battle fronts. 
The least important is the front that fights “the occu-
pier” in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and 
involves a number of Islamic, nationalist, Ba’athist, 
and other opponents;228 the most important was the al-
Zarqawi-incited civil war against other Islamic groups 
for their alleged failure to rigidly adhere to his par-
ticular variant of ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian 
Wahhabi-Salafi jihadism. This second front is the front 
against the nearer (Shia) and nearest enemies (insuf-
ficiently Muslim Sunnis); and as we have already 
learned, is the essential, obsessive front that sectarians 
must first—and forever—fight. It is only in this purg-
ing, cleansing, and destruction of opponents (i.e., the 
tribulations that are the oven that separates the pure 
and impure) that Allah opens the way for Allah’s True 
Soldiers and exposes and destroys hypocrites, sinners, 
heretics, and apostates, to create the State of the Ca-
liphate. The moment al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid 
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wal-Jihad is born (Jama’ah), Fitnah is also born. We shall 
treat this more extensively in the following section, 
but for now “Fitnah,” defined as intra-Muslim “tribu-
lation,” “trial,” or “conflict,” refers to a state of civil 
war or conflict among jihadist groups based on a state 
of enmity, fundamental disagreement, and is charac-
terized by the outbreak of overt hostilities. Its deeper 
meaning for ISO is that it is Allah’s method for refin-
ing and distilling through trials, tribulations, conflict, 
and fighting, that steel from which the true bridge to 
Khalifa shall be built. 
Phase 3: Injury, Vexation, Exhaustion (Nikayah), and 
Collapse, Chaos, Mayhem (Tawahhush). 
By using methods that led to maximum chaos and tar-
geting apostates of all different backgrounds, the mu-
jahidin were able to keep Iraq in constant instability 
and war, never allowing any apostate group to enjoy a 
moment of security [emphasis added].229
Phase 3 commences as al-Zarqawi’s organization Jund 
al-Sham, and later Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, destroy 
all that is not him, and leaves chaos in his wake: “In 
short,” Dabiq claims:
he strived to create as much chaos as possible with the 
means permitted by the Shari’ah using attacks some-
times referred to as operations of ‘nikayah’ (injury) 
that focus on causing the enemy death, injury, and 
damage . . . [And] [w]ith chaos, he intended to prevent 
any taghut [idolatrous] regime from ever achieving a 
degree of stability that would enable it to reach a sta-
tus quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands 
ruled for decades by tawaghit. . . . To achieve maxi-
mum chaos, the Shaykh focused on the most effective 
weapons in the arsenal of the mujahidin for creat-
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ing chaos—vehicle bombs, IEDs, and istishhadiyyin  
[specialized suicide ops brigades].230 
What truly distinguished al-Zarqawi’s organiza-
tion, however—and not adequately captured in the 
previous quote—was not his attacks on regime targets 
or American forces, or even on those in the highest 
levels of leadership who could be reasonably accused 
of voluntarily aiding and abetting the occupation. In-
stead, virtually all Islamic insurgents could agree on 
the objective of launching “daily operations against 
the crusader forces in Iraq whose main goal was to 
set up an apostate puppet regime loyal to them.”231 
Zarqawism as Zarqawism was defined rather by its 
legitimation of targets deemed by the vast majority of 
these insurgents as forbidden on Islamic grounds or 
detrimental to the insurgency on practical grounds. It 
is through al-Zarqawi’s use of ultra-takfiri epithets and 
euphemistic language that this dramatic expansion of 
theretofore forbidden targets is condoned. 
For example, it is stated that: “He [al-Zarqawi] 
would order [persons] to carry out nikayah opera-
tions dozens of times in a dozen areas daily, targeting 
and killing sometimes hundreds of apostates from the 
police forces and Rafidah.”232 However, “hundreds 
of apostates from the police forces” refer not just to 
leadership and collaborators, but everyday persons, 
Sunni and Shia, who are far from a chain of command 
and are the sons of the Iraqi masses. “The Rafidah,” of 
course, refers to al-Zarqawi’s wholesale slaughter of 
the Shia, leaders and led; this is deemed reprehensible 
and indeed forbidden (haram), even among deeply 
conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabis. This panoply of 
prohibited targets and forbidden conduct is further 
celebrated as Zarqawism’s fodder in this phase whose 
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proximate objectives are maximum injury, chaos, and 
collapse. But the list of al-Zarqawi’s permissible tar-
gets is further clarified, and extended. “In addition,” 
Dabiq declares:
he tried to force every apostate group present in Iraq 
into an all-out war with Ahlus-Sunnah. So he target-
ed the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intel-
ligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and 
militias), and the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and 
Talabani partisans). . . . In his speech titled ‘Hadha 
Bayanullin-Nasi wa li Yundharu Bih’ (This is a Declara-
tion for the People That They May Be Warned by It), 
he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assem-
bly that would support the crusaders. . . . Then when 
some so-called ‘Islamists’ entered into the democratic 
political process—ignoring what it entails of clear-cut 
major shirk—he officially declared war on them in his 
speech titled ‘Wa li Tastabina Sabilul-Mujrimin’ (And 
Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident).233
Let us consider these now licit targets, i.e., Iraqi “apos-
tate” forces, the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and 
militias, Kurdish secularists, any Sunni tribe, party, 
or assembly that would support the Crusaders, and 
so-called Islamists [that] entered into the democratic 
political process. Count the bodies, count the souls. 
Recall that these were the days (2004-2006) of doz-
ens of bombs and bombers, in dozens of cities, lead-
ing to hundreds and hundreds of dead, mangled, 
wounded, shocked, displaced, and horrified. This is 
the precise moment (see Chapter 1) that al-Zawahiri, 
al-Maqdisi, and Atiyatullah al-Libi, among others, 
privately registered their deep reservations on legal-
moral and prudential grounds. Moreover, following 
the October 17, 2004, bay’ah to bin Laden, this would 
all be publicly attributed to AQO’s Tanzim Qa’idat 
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al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Those darkest days marked 
by violence, injury, chaos, and mayhem were precise-
ly the days sought during this third phase, suppos-
edly marking the path to the Caliphate. Moreover, in 
Dabiq’s telling, no sacred blood had ever been targeted 
or spilled in this strategic phase. “Obviously,” Dabiq 
asserts:
their operations never targeted Sunni public places 
and gatherings—contrary to the claims of the crusader 
and apostate media. Those crimes were carried out by 
rafidi militia seeking revenge against Ahlus-Sunnah, 
and by crusader mercenaries trying to blemish the 
true image of the mujahidin.234 
Supposing facts do matter, this is a blatant false-
hood. Based on a detailed study of open source 
data on reported terrorist incidents in Iraq—using 
exclusively the Arabic language press to enhance 
credibility—from 2004-2008 a very different con- 
clusion is revealed:
The results show that non-Westerners are much more 
likely to be killed in an al-Qa’ida [in Iraq] attack. From 
2004 to 2008, only 15% of the 3,010 victims were West-
ern. During the most recent period studied the num-
bers skewed even further. From 2006-2008, only 2% 
(12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remain-
ing 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim ma-
jorities. During this period, a person of non-Western 
origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al-Qa’ida 
[in Iraq] attack than an individual from the West. The 
overwhelming majority of al-Qa’ida [in Iraq’s] victims 
are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are 
citizens of Iraq, which suffered more al-Qa’ida attacks 
than any other country courtesy of the al-Qa’ida in 
Iraq (AQI) affiliate.235
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Of course, al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
could easily retort on the basis of their creed, which 
essentially states: We do not distinguish between 
Westerners and non-Westerners, but only between be-
lievers and apostates, and we have killed only those, 
regardless of residence or nationality, who have for-
saken Allah for idolatry.
That claim though, in the end, did not prove very 
persuasive to Ahl-us Sunnah. The fact that the great-
est fear an Iraqi would face—whether man, woman, 
child, elderly, Sunni, Shia, secular, religious, sinner, 
or pious—was from a fanatical, blood-thirsty, violent, 
ultra-sectarian organization committed to inflicting 
massive injury, chaos, and mayhem on persons who 
worship Allah, and not on the “Crusader” occupier, 
did not require circuitous reasoning, dubitable as-
sumptions, or questionable facts. The facts, by design 
(Nikayah and Tawahhush, Phase 3), were laid bare for 
all to see: bodies blown to bits, families torn apart, 
worshippers turned into flying body parts, and “mar-
tyrdom seekers” turned into human shrapnel. The re-
newal of these attacks subsequent to ISO’s post-2010 
reorganization and reconstitution is well-attested and 
fully celebrated in Dabiq’s own pages.236
Phase 4: Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State 
of Islam (Tamkin). 
“The State” (Tamkin) stage is the next “signa-
ture” moment of Zarqawism. So far, all other stages 
traversed—Hijra, Jama’ah, and Nikayah/Tawahhush—
are mere preface. Again, this is claimed to be “the 
Prophetic methodology,” i.e., a recapitulation of 
Prophet Muhammad’s earliest Medinan state, and 
later that tiny statelet of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd 
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al-Wahhab. Every state has its founding myths, and 
those surrounding Dabiq’s portrayal of ISI’s birth are 
no exception. In Chapter 1, we carefully traced the 
evolution of the ISI from al-Zarqawi’s Zarqawism in 
the latter 1980s to its official declaration on October 
15, 2006. Its chief characteristics are the urgency with 
which the State’s declaration was sought, the paltry 
number of persons involved in its declaration, and the 
complete surprise with which AQO and every other 
organization was taken. It was also discovered, if Mc-
Cants is correct, that a decisive reason for its early 
proclamation was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s belief in 
the imminent return of the Mahdi.237 We also learned 
from al-Zarqawi’s final letter that he despaired, owing 
to his failure to foment a Sunni-Shia civil war, turn 
back the tide of the emergent “Sahwat,” or success-
fully obstruct the nascent Iraqi democratic process. 
He was reduced to either contriving a war between 
the two great Satans, “Rafidi” Iran and the “Crusader” 
United States—on the basis of fabricated evidence—or 
ending up again al-Ghuraba (a stranger) in a strange 
land, pushed to again roam to find a land of possibil-
ity for Allah’s Truest Soldiers. The tide had turned by 
the time of al-Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006. His or-
ganization was in disarray. It was losing ground, los-
ing battles, and losing recruits. Myths rarely do full, 
if any, justice to facts, yet such founding myths are 
presented in Dabiq. 
Shaykh Abu Mus’ab planned [before his June 7, 2006, 
death] to later execute more complex attacks of a larger 
scale sometimes referred to as operations of ‘tamkin’ 
(consolidation), which were meant to pave the way for 
the claiming of territory [for a State]. All this [eventu-
ally?] led to the gradual collapse of any authority in 
the areas the crusaders would refer to as ‘the Sunni 
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Triangle’. . . The collapse was followed by the mujahi-
din quickly entering the vacuum left, to announce and 
establish the Islamic State of Iraq, [October 15, 2006] 
under the leadership of Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar 
al-Husayni al-Baghdadi [Abu Omar al-Baghdadi]  
. . . a monumental event in the history of the Ummah. 
It was the first state in ‘modern’ times set up exclu-
sively by the mujahidin—the active participants in the 
jihad—in the heart of the Muslim world just a stone’s 
throw away from Makkah, al-Madinah, and Bayt al-
Maqdis.238
The ISO alleges here that the “State” had arisen as a 
necessity—now that territory had been cleared in “the 
Sunni Triangle.” But there is a problem. If that were 
the case, why would it “enter quickly into the vacuum 
left” if it had, in fact, actually consolidated anything 
like a defended territory, with persons, resources, and 
power? An obvious answer recommends itself; the 
declaration of the State occurred despite the absence 
of these conditions and despite a lack of consultation 
beyond the narrowest groups associated with its own 
self-created Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), and 
later Hilf al-Mutayyibeen. 
Moreover, this event is declared a first in the mod-
ern history of the Ummah since it was declared and 
established “exclusively by the mujahidin—the active 
participants in the jihad.” Sunni concepts of state gen-
erally regard consultation on a far broader scale—in-
cluding persons of reputation and authority entrusted 
with the power to loosen and bind (ahl al-hall  waal’aqd), 
as well as Shura or an advisory council. It may be that 
these alleged requirements describe the ideal Caliph-
ate more than the real. 239 Nevertheless, the idea that 
“The Islamic State” would be declared “exclusively 
by the mujahidin” (read: members of the Hilf al-Muy-
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tayybeen) was  a startling innovation indeed. It is also 
critical to understand that the title then conferred on 
its emir—“Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni 
al-Baghdadi”240—was one reserved throughout Sunni 
history beginning with Sunni Islam’s second caliph 
Umar, to refer to the Caliph of all the Muslims. This 
“monumental event in the history of the Ummah” 
would not, however, be met with anything but per-
plexity and predictable resistance. Thus, the ongoing 
Fitnah recommences with even more ferocity now that 
a tiny self-chosen takfiri group regards itself in exclu-
sive possession of the exclusive authority to rule what 
it deems “The Islamic State of All Muslims.” 
Even presuming ISO’s own strategy of Khilafa, the 
following objections can be raised. Does the declara-
tion of the ISI make sense at this phase of consolida-
tion (tamkin)? Was not the ISI, having not established 
any recognizable consolidated territory and no means 
of defending it, actually hanging by a mere thread? 
This questionable and imprudent declaration of 
Khilafa is further obfuscated by the ambiguity of the 
expression, “The goal of Khilafah without hesita-
tion [emphasis added].” Does this mean: “Once we 
announce it, then it will exist, and they will come, 
and they will obey!” But should not prudence and 
reality have instead led to a contrary conclusion? For 
example, “Once we have created and defended the 
rudiments of a genuine state, and once others are suf-
ficiently convinced of our right to obedience, then we 
may possibly declare a restricted emirate—though 
there are definite liabilities even to this, but certainly 
not for a very long time should we imagine ourselves 
declaring let alone ruling a Caliphate of the world-
wide Ummah!” 
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A re-sequencing of stages was carried out, in fact 
and in defiance, of ISO’s very own blueprint for Khila-
fa. The final, Caliphate, stage (Stage 5) was announced 
simultaneously with the consolidation (Stage 4, tam-
kin) declaration of the ISI, and as we have noted, was 
based in the myth and not reality of territorial con-
solidation. An emir of an emirate at most, if even this 
was to be granted, was instead declared “Amirul-
Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi . . . a 
monumental event in the history of the Ummah.” 
Dabiq’s Missing Phase: The Fitnah. 
As earlier stated, Fitnah was born in the very womb 
of al-Zarqawi’s conception of Jama’ah. Al-Zarqawi’s 
ruthlessness and takfiri terrorism led to his self-de-
clared and self-initiated war on all those whose blood, 
honor, property, and security he deemed it lawful to 
shed, steal, and destroy. With the birth of “The State,” 
a further intensification of fitnah occurred. It was not 
now a question of intra-organizational civil war, but 
a new “either/or” from the “The State’s/Caliphate’s” 
point of view: either repentance, renunciation of all 
other loyalty ties and pledging bay’ah to the new Ca-
liph; or, rebellion and capital punishment by behead-
ing, crucifixion, or other murderous means.
Let us now return to Dabiq’s account and pick up 
the story immediately after the October 15, 2006, dec-
laration of the ISI. We shall break this up into distinct 
milestones: the initial ISI declaration and intensifica-
tion of Fitnah; the ISI’s exodus following its near de-
feat; the post-Caliphate Umar regrouping; the Syrian 
civil war as opportunity for rebirth; the Caliphate de-
clared; and finally, the present demand that all pledge 
bay’ah to their Caliph Ibrahim. The listed statements 
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below represent the present author’s sense for ISO’s 
declared imperative accompanying each milestone.  
1. Curses, Fighting, and Death for Those Who 
Reject Allah’s Chosen!
When the Islamic State of Iraq was announced [Oc-
tober 15, 2006]—after going through these phases of 
war—it had the effect of exposing all the jihad claim-
ants in Iraq, splitting them into two camps. Every 
group and individual with iman [faith] and ikhlas [fidel-
ity, sincerity] quickly pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State’s leader, for none had ever selflessly taken a step in 
the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state as their 
ultimate goal. Those that resisted the newborn state 
[i.e., did not pledge allegiance] did so for two reasons: 
deviant methodologies and corrupt desires for fame, 
wealth, and power. Consequently, the announcement 
caused some of the hidden deviance to surface. The 
suppressed corruption waiting irritably to arise finally 
did so as well. Some of those carrying corruption in 
their hearts quickly allowed their pride and envy to 
possess them, pushing them to enter into both hidden 
and open alliances with the crusaders, the new apos-
tate regime, and the neighboring tawaghit, against the 
newborn Islamic State, thereby forming the ‘sahwah’ 
(‘awakening’), a term coined by the American pawns 
to beautify their apostasy and treachery. The sahwah 
received financial, political, and ‘scholarly’ support 
from Al-Sa’ud, the Ikhwan, and even America [italics 
added].241
An extreme takfiri logic runs through this account, 
which explains its expansive enemies list. It occurs in 
the phrase “for none had ever selflessly taken a step 
in the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state 
as their ultimate goal.” It is inarguable that all or 
mostly all of the Islamic fighting factions held a com-
mitment to “an Islamic state as their ultimate goal.” 
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But ISI made “the Islamic State” an immediately im-
posed reality; and that, by persons mostly unknown 
except to a handful of self-selected insiders. For most, 
the creation of an actual Islamic State required a great 
deal more preparation, considering it was not to be 
imposed by ruthless terrorism from above, but with 
significant support from a considerable section of Ahl-
us Sunnah. But Dabiq views things otherwise. Those 
unconvinced and resisting the ISI are not legitimately 
disagreeing based on acceptable differences of inter-
pretation (ijtihad); instead, they are accused of moral 
turpitude or viciousness. All who opposed the state 
are dastardly, not just disagreeable. All who fail to 
pledge loyalty shall be killed. One is now not a Sunni 
Muslim respected, admired, and consulted on mat-
ters as grave as declaring the rulership over all Mus-
lims. No, one is evil with “corruption in their hearts,” 
motivated by “pride and envy” and their attempts 
“to beautify their apostasy,” and are driven by either 
“deviant methodologies” or “corrupt desires for fame, 
wealth, and power.” 
Is there not a simpler explanation for opposition 
and resistance to the ISI’s declaration of the Islamic 
State? For example, ISI’s violence, coercion, treachery, 
and terror; of its sectarian bloodbath targeting the lay 
Shia; of intolerant and arrogant usurping of leader-
ship prerogatives; of committing forbidden acts, and 
prohibiting commanded acts; of the killing of sons and 
the forced marriage of Sunni daughters; of the killing 
of elders, scholars, women, children, worshippers in 
mosques, passersby on streets; of the killing of nation-
alist insurgents, Islamist insurgents; or of slaughtering 
innocent hostages like bleating sheep. None of these 
reasons is cited in Dabiq for the emergence of revulsion, 
and the eventual rejection and ejection of the ISI from 
the lands of Ahl-us Sunnah. Instead, a likely projection 
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by ISI onto others has occurred. And if one were to 
impute this projection back onto the projectors—char-
acterize the ISI itself using all of the pejoratives it has 
used to describe others—perhaps one might be closer 
to understanding how mythic projection can, in the 
minds of the projector, trump self-evident facts. 
2. Oh How Allah Tries His True Mujahidin! 
The period from approximately late-2006 to 2010 
was ISI’s self-created nadir. Marginalized, imploding, 
hunted to extinction, evacuated from strongholds ow-
ing to its own will to power through terror and vio-
lence and ultra-sectarian brutality, this burning ember 
would seek refuge from this storm.242 But for mythic 
thinking, again, reality is otherwise:
Then Allah . . . tried the mujahidin as He had done 
with His slaves before in Makkah (prior to the Hijrah), 
Uhud (when the archer disobediently left their posts), 
Hunayn (when the new Muslims were amazed by 
their own numbers), and the Arabian Peninsula (dur-
ing the Wars of Apostasy).
This is a test decreed by Allah . . . so He would see the 
patient mujahidin and expel the weak-hearted from 
their ranks, and thereby solidify the newborn Islamic 
State and prepare it for greater responsibilities. As ash-
Shafi’i [i.e., founder of classical Shafi’i school of Sunni 
jurisprudence] . . . once said, ‘One’s authority will not 
be consolidated except after overcoming tribulation. 
[Fitnah]’ . . . During this period, the Islamic State was 
forced to withdraw mostly into the desert regions of 
al-Anbar, where its soldiers regrouped, planned and 
trained. From the desert, they continued to carry out 
attacks against the crusaders and the treacherous 
apostates in coordination with operations, executed 
by the underground units in urban areas.243
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3. Behold How All Pledged Bay’ah to Our New 
Khalifa!
In Chapter 1, we learned that following the April 
18, 2010, killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi (aka: Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar 
al-Husayni al-Baghdadi), a secretive cabal led by 
former Ba’athist Colonel Haji Bakr lobbied strenu-
ously and also manipulated the vote for Abu Bakr al- 
Baghdadi’s selection as new emir. The vote on the 
Shura Council was 9 for, 2 against; and the Sharia 
Council abstained. These are the facts. This lack of 
consensus is passed over in Dabiq and only the final 
result is described:
when Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Baghadadi . . . 
gained shahadah alongside Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir  
. . . the Islamic State did not waver, rather its leadership 
unanimously pledged allegiance to Amirul-Mu’minin 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi . . . continuing upon the path 
for a single Khilafah that unites the Ummah.244
4. Behold the Khilafa of Iraq and Al-Sham! 
The Syrian opposition inspired by the “Arab 
Spring” began peaceful protests against the 40-year 
rule of the autocratic Assad dynasty beginning Feb-
ruary-March 2011. On March 18, 2011, the regime’s 
first shots were fired into crowds of unarmed protest-
ers. Within 5 months, over 2000 had been killed or 
wounded; nevertheless, the protests remained peace-
ful, gaining inspiration from the quickly unraveling 
regime of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.245 By 
summer 2011, a then-unknown organization, Jabhat 
al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat 
al-Jihad (Protection Front for the People of the Levant 
by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of 
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Jihad; heretofore, Jabhat al-Nusrah), had been sent to 
Syria by ISI’s Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. On April 
7, 2013, ISI Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Dawla Islamiya fi 
al-Iraq wa al-Shaam (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). Like the origi-
nal ISI declaration, this ISIS declaration ferociously 
recommenced the long-simmering Fitnah between ISI 
and every other group, organization, and tendency. 
In Dabiq’s inaugural issue, a very brief account of this 
period between entry into Syria and the declaration of 
ISIS is offered. 
Then the event of Sham began to unfold [c. February-
March 2011] and the Islamic State quickly got involved, 
answering the cries of the weak and oppressed Mus-
lims by sending a mission from Iraq [c. Summer-2011], 
to activate its units in Sham and later make the an-
nouncement of its official expansion [April 7, 2013]. 
Again, pride, envy, nationalism, and innovation, led to 
events similar to those of Iraq [post-October 15, 2006]. 
New sahwat were formed with the exact same finan-
cial, political, and ‘scholarly’ support. They repeated 
the mistakes of their predecessors in Iraq and decided 
to enter into war with the Islamic State, but here Al-
lah . . . blessed the mujahidin in a manner unique to 
the lands of Sham, so that quickly Sahwah treachery 
was exposed and destroyed. Then, by Allah’s grace, 
the mujahidin gained control over territory larger than 
many states claiming ‘legality’ today, lands formerly 
under control of the historical Umawi khulafa’ of 
Sham and ‘Abbasi khulafa’ of Iraq.246
Zarqawism again is here on full display. Again, we 
are treated to the ISO’s sense of entitlement as Al-
lah’s chosen to monopolize religio-political authority. 
Again, it is the near enemy that is the focus of attack: 
those Sunni Muslims considered insufficiently loyal 
and subordinate to its command. 
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Much had transformed that smoldering ember into 
a terrorist juggernaut, however. Recall the reconstitut-
ing of its cadre by highly professional former Ba’athist 
military and intelligence officers now in key leader-
ship roles. Recall its successful suicide operations 
freeing hundreds of high value detainees that would 
later fill its ranks. Also, recall the opportunities that 
were provided by dramatic developments in strategic 
context, including the Syrian uprising and then-Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-
Maliki’s Iranian-backed sectarian persecution of Iraq’s 
highly marginalized Sunnis.247 Also notable is the gen-
eralization of the word “Sahwah,”—initially wholly 
referring to the Iraqi Sunni tribal “Awakening” coun-
cils—now used to refer to any and all opposition to 
ISO, regardless of context. 
Vitriolic, hyperbolic, deeply disrespectful denun-
ciations by ISO of these various tendencies—in par-
ticular of AQO’s senior leadership and its appointed 
emissaries charged with attempting to arbitrate these 
differences on the basis of long-established Sunni ju-
ridical precedent—is characteristic of this period.248 
However, the ISO’s vitriol goes beyond mere words, 
as senior-level leaders in AQO-related organizations 
were subjected to a murderous assassination cam-
paign. Consider just the most notable examples: the 
January 1, 2014, kidnapping and gruesome torture 
and murder of Dr. Hussein al-Suleiman, a senior com-
mander under Ahrar al-Sham Emir Hassan Abboud; 
the February 23, 2014, assassination of AQO mediator 
Abu Khalid al-Suri; the April 15, 2014, murders of al-
Nusrah Sheikh Abu Muhammad Fatih, his wife, broth-
er, and children; and the September 9, 2014, murders 
of dozens of Ahrar al-Sham Leaders in a mass suicide 
bombing, including Emir Abboud.249 This targeted 
assassination was also accompanied by intra-jihadist 
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warfare leading to hundreds and eventually thou-
sands killed, and key territorial shifts and displace-
ment.250 This raging fitnah would gather even greater 
intensity with ISIS’s declaration of the Khilafa.
5. The Khalifa Has Returned!
We finally arrive at the time when Dabiq’s inaugu-
ral issue appears (July 4, 2014). It is on the heels of the 
ISO’s blitzkrieg, resulting in its conquest of Iraq’s sec-
ond most populous city, Mosul. With apparently un-
stoppable momentum, forces that had been hollowed 
out by cronyism and corruption, and completely out-
gunned, rather than stand and fight, collapsed, cut, 
and run. Sunni populations that were overrun had 
to determine whether Maliki’s vindictive, revengeful 
Shia rule was a lesser or greater evil than these charg-
ing fighters apparently committed to defending the 
lives, honor, property, and security of Ahl-us Sunnah. It 
is upon these victories sealed in blood, power, and ter-
ror, which in reality involved a systematic campaign 
of subversion, assassination, and counter-intelligence, 
i.e., “shaping operations” and “preparation of the bat-
tlefield,” that ISIS would proclaim its final phase, the 
return of Khilafa: 
Thereafter, the hopes of Khilafah became an unde-
niable reality, one that allowed no room for anyone 
claiming any excuse to resist the authority of the 
imam except to be dealt with by the decisive law of 
Allah. The victories in Ninawa, al-Anbar, Salahuudin, 
al-Khayr, al-Barakah, and elsewhere, all aided the 
declaration made by the Islamic State on the first of 
Ramadan 1435H [June 28, 2014], in which the Khilafah 
was officially announced. This new condition opens 
the path for the complete unification of all Muslim 
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peoples and lands under the single authority of the 
Khalifah [emphasis in original].251
Predictably, this would further intensify the fitnah, and 
is evidenced by yet another round of ISO’s viciously 
acrimonious charges, and those seeking to rebut them 
but notably resisting the ISO’s takfiri arsenal and de-
monization techniques.252 It is also here that Dabiq por-
trays in its pages the fruits of consolidation (tamkin), 
as it chronicles the transition it claims is occurring 
from the ashes of terror, injury, chaos, collapse, and 
mayhem, to the fruit of its own Islamic State.253
6. Long Live Khalifa Ibrahim! Pledge Bay’ah, or 
Death!
There remains only a single act required of every 
Muslim on Earth: an oath of loyalty pledged to their 
new master. This act is also due from all who consider 
themselves fighters in the path of Allah (Mujahidin). 
But to give Caliph Ibrahim his moment in the sun, we 
shall allow Dabiq to present Islam’s new self-appoint-
ed master in all of his glory.
It [This new condition] also emphasizes the necessity 
for obeying the Messenger . . . in his order, ‘Whoever 
comes to you while your condition is united behind 
a single man, and intends to break your solidarity or 
disrupt your unity, then kill him.’254 The obligation is 
now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to raise 
their voices and pledge their allegiance to Imam ul-
Muslimin and Amirul-Mu’minin—the Khalifah—Abu 
Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi (may Allah raise his al-
lies and humiliate his enemies) . . . May Allah protect 
this Khalifah state and continue guiding it until its le-
gions fight the crusader armies who will gather near 
Dabiq.255
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Appearing beneath this prophecy is a stylized pic-
ture of a stupendous army amassed on the plains of 
Dabiq—that promised locale for the End Times mother 
of all battles (Al-Malahim). And on an accompanying 
page, three boys about 12 years old appear wearing 
Maoist-type uniforms with IS patches on their sleeves, 
with their index fingers pointed skyward in yet an-
other IS media operation designed to inspire the love 
of death, martyrdom, and paradise, in defense of 
Allah’s chosen Khilafa. 
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT 
POLICY AND STRATEGY
This book concludes by reporting its central find-
ings and discerning their implications for current 
USG counterterrorism policy and strategy.256 For the 
purposes of clarity and brevity, the focus here shall 
be on warranted conclusions based in previously dis-
cussed findings, unless deemed necessary or practi-
cable for expository purposes. The present writer’s 
central thesis is first reiterated. We then present chief 
findings vis-à-vis two core areas of greatest present 
interest: doctrine and strategy/terrorist modus ope-
randi. We conclude by deducing their implications for 
USG counterterrorism policy and strategy, and leader 
development and education. 
I. KEY FINDINGS
MACRO-LEVEL CONCLUSION
The present author’s primary thesis presented in 
this book’s Introduction section appears supported by 
the data presented herein. For convenience, this thesis 
is reproduced below:
AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding 
interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us-Sun-
nah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. It is the 
argument of this book, however, that grounds exist 
for why this need not be the case. AQO and ISO may 
be conceived in the theology they themselves profess, 
as two deviant organizations guilty of committing  
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major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call.257 I believe 
a more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction 
of each entity is warranted. It will be for the world’s 
Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) to make that deter-
mination; to define for themselves where the bounds 
of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa), and righteous 
conduct begin and end; and who may or may not le-
gitimately claim to speak in their name [emphasis in 
original].258 
Our focus here is on substantiating the primary claim 
of greatest interest to delegitimizing AQO and ISO in 
the eyes of not just Muslims and non-Muslims gener-
ally, but also deeply observant Islamist, Salafist, and 
Salafi-Jihadi adherents, namely from the previous 
quote: “AQO and ISO may be conceived as . . . two de-
viant organizations guilty of committing major sins 
and besmirching the Islamic Call [emphasis added].” 
It is essential, we believe, to view AQO and ISO 
as deviant organizations, rather than as some have 
charged, in relation to ISO in particular for example, 
as “non-Muslim” or “having nothing to do with Is-
lam.” That is understandable, but it is an error. It is 
like saying that a human being, guilty of committing 
reprehensible and truly repugnant acts—say viciously 
attacking an innocent bystander, or intentionally mur-
dering or raping or pillaging or violently assaulting 
others—is no longer a human being. They are human 
and that is not at issue. What is at issue is that they 
have egregiously violated basic moral codes that gov-
ern human life, society, and interpersonal interaction 
to such an extent that we deem them extremely ab-
errant, deviant individuals. If religiously conceived, 
these deviant acts are sins. Within Judaism, Christian-
ity, and Islam, and arguably every genuine contem-
porary faith, acts that intentionally violate the funda-
mental integrity of innocent human lives and souls 
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are deemed the greatest of all sins, excepting idolatry. 
If non-religiously conceived, these are deemed egre-
gious moral deviations whose commission justifies 
punishment using our harshest methods. No human 
society could last long that would not view ISO’s acts 
and perpetrators as enemies of a civilized human 
existence. Our sensibilities, customs, and laws—reli-
gious and secular—regard such deviant behavior as 
unacceptable. The only question remaining is in what 
proportions justice and mercy shall be applied to their 
punishment. 
A second reason to avoid the label “non-Muslim,” 
no matter how laudable the motive, is that unlike the 
ISO, the United States should never equate sinning, 
no matter how grave, with disbelief. This is the core 
equation underlying virtually every takfiri terrorist 
modus operandi. A sinner is not a disbeliever; how-
ever, they are believers in violation of their own moral 
code.259 Even the greatest of sins, excepting disbelief 
itself, does not remove one from a faith community. 
Its secular counterpart is the commission of a grave, 
felonious, and even heinous act. Certain liberties and 
privileges may be revoked; for example, the franchise. 
But even the felon remains a citizen, and that is be-
cause he did not forfeit citizenship but only those 
liberties and privileges a citizens enjoys. On the other 
hand, treason is to citizenship what infidelity is to 
faith: the ultimate act of disavowal and that single 
act of disloyalty for which one cannot, and will not, 
be permitted to remain a member of a community—
whether a community of God fearers or of loyal and 
patriotic citizens. 
AQO and ISO stand condemned of extreme devi-
ance from Ahl-us Sunnah’s own self-understanding 
and expectations regarding the rudiments of religi-
osity, morality, legality, and humanity.260 This is less 
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true of the ultimate end state they seek—the Righ-
teous Caliphate—though for the vast majority this re-
mains a distant ideal—than for their terrorist methods 
and means. AQO’s and ISO’s most important judge is 
ironically, yet predictably, the Sunni creed and com-
munity (Ahl-us Sunnah) they now stand of having 
warred against, and besmirched. Let us now sum-
marize the chief findings supporting this macro-level 
thesis/conclusion. 
BELIEF-SYSTEMS, WORLDVIEWS, DOCTRINES, 
CREEDS
The Al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat  
al-Jihad). 
The mature AQO doctrine is exemplified in bin 
Ladenism, and is characterized by a unique mixture 
of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and 
hubris, which from the early-1990s innovated an un-
precedented “Far Enemy” doctrine manifest in an ac-
tual declaration of war against Americans, both mili-
tary and civilian, calling for their murder wherever 
they could be found. Bin Ladenism rests on a deeply 
flawed analogy—that of the United States and the 
former USSR—leading its followers to believe, with-
out evidence, that sustained direct terrorist attacks 
against U.S. citizens and government entities would 
generate economic exhaustion leading either to col-
lapse or at least withdraw from the Arab Middle East. 
This false analogy was rooted in bin Laden’s deeply 
misinformed conception of American society, culture, 
economics, government, and most consequentially, 
the civil society foundations of enduring American 
power. 
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The AQO’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine has no 
precedent in Islam. It was never embraced by “Near 
Enemy” advocates: the vast majority of existing Is-
lamist insurgent activities. Attacking the “original 
Kufr” in this way was roundly criticized even by bona-
fide unrepentant Salafi-Jihadists as illegal, criminal, 
and imprudent. 9/11 was itself AQO’s first and last 
great “one-off” based in treachery, criminality, and the 
USG’s unpreparedness for that plot’s unprecedented 
use of American civil aviation as a weapon of mass 
destruction. Bin Laden was deeply criticized from 
within his own ranks for having caused the practical 
extinction of a decade’s long effort to recruit, train, 
deploy, and create a global Sunni jihadist movement. 
AQO’s most lethal affiliate, AQAP, has amended 
but not ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no dis-
cernible difference from classical bin Ladenism as doc-
trine, and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic 
attrition conception of collapsing the American econ-
omy and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.  
The Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla 
al-Islamiyya). 
The ISO doctrine is based in an apocalyptic, ul-
tra-conservative, ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Ji-
hadism. Four doctrines uniquely characterize this 
deviance generally and in relation to AQO’s species 
of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and escha-
tological beliefs informing its sense of temporality 
and morality; proclaiming the mass annihilation of 
all Shia Muslims, including lay Shia; prioritizing the 
“Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement 
of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief 
in its right to monopolize and immediately declare 
the Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of 
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ISO’s worldview and doctrine place it on the remote 
fringes, not just within Sunni Islam generally, but 
also among the vast majority of Sunni global jihadist 
organizations.261 
STRATEGIES AND TERRORIST MODUS  
OPERANDI. 
The al-Qaeda Organization (Tanzim Qa’idat al-
Jihad). 
Bin Ladenism is based in a sequenced strategy that 
eventually culminates in the restoration of a Sunni Ca-
liphate over historic Sunni lands. Strategy begins with 
the formation of a military base organization (Tanzim 
Qa’idat al-Jihad) or “base organization of the jihad.” 
With this, AQO carefully orchestrates simultaneous 
mass-casualty terrorist attacks directed at “the head of 
the snake” or the “base of the tree,” two of bin Laden’s 
favorite metaphors. Though earlier attacks presaged 
this phase, its spectacular debut was the 1998 mass ca-
sualty terrorist attacks on the American embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar as-Salaam, Tanzania. Subse-
quent attacks, culminating in and subsequent to 9/11, 
were also orchestrated.
Before bin Ladenism, the classical Qa’idat al-Jihad 
was conceived as an Islamic foreign legion or “Islamic 
Internationale,” designed to transform local insurgen-
cies into globalized transnational insurgencies. The 
“Crusader-Zionist” enemy had not yet emerged as the 
demonized “other,” and AQO viewed itself as a kind 
of central command and headquarters for recruiting, 
indoctrinating, training, and deploying its own opera-
tives throughout various emergent theaters of jihad. It 
is possible that with the practical demise of bin Laden-
ism, the AQO original conception will be undergoing 
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a revival in such places as Syria, Yemen, Libya, and 
Tunisia. 
AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep 
doctrinal affinities to AQO Central, has substantially 
departed in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-
down model for carefully planned, long-term, high-
visibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” target-
ing. AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what 
it calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In 
its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist 
operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and de-
ploy individual persons—glorified in its media opera-
tions as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada) 
destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise—to 
commit for what the vast majority of Muslims con-
sider forbidden terrorist acts: sabotage, targeted as-
sassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, 
and a vast array of highly deviant, abominable acts 
generally classified within religious law as major sins 
and crimes, and within secular law, intentional acts of 
malicious, felonious criminal conduct. 
Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla  
al-Islamiyya). 
The ISO’s terrorist modus operandi is carefully 
outlined in its inaugural online publication Dabiq, and 
comprises five key stages: 
1. Emigration from a hostile milieu to one where 
sanctuary exists or can be created through ter-
rorist acts (Hijra); 
2. Creation of the nucleus jihadist organization 
(Jama’ah); 
3. Destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime 
through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah) even-
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tuating in the collapse of existing authority, 
and thereby fomenting chaos, and mayhem 
(Tawahhush); 
4. Creation and consolidation of a territory, 
resources, and base accompanied with the 
immediate declaration of the Islamic State 
(Tamkin); and, 
5. Further consolidation expansion of the Islamic 
State with the immediate declaration of the 
Caliphate (Khilafa). 
This ideal five-stage blueprint for restoring the Ca-
liphate (Khilafa) was not followed in practice, howev-
er. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-conservative, 
ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi organization 
led it to hereticize (takfir) virtually all other organiza-
tions, tendencies, groups, and movements. As a result, 
a stage not specified in their ideal model—the stage 
of Fitnah (conflict, strife)—has accompanied ISO from 
its beginnings in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through each 
of its metamorphoses. The ISO’s extremism in takfir 
is considered extremely deviant within Sunni Islam, 
and also again, among virtually every armed Sunni 
Islamic organization.262  
The ISO’s apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination, 
“Nearest Enemy” and “Near Enemy,” and “Caliph-
ate Now!” doctrines would be little more than a hin-
drance were these not combined with two additional 
factors. First, its creation of a fearsome, highly profes-
sional, military leadership cadre comprised of former 
Ba’athist military and intelligence officers whose tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of to-
talitarian Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, 
the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former 
Prime Minister al-Maliki, in the context of a dramati-
cally changed regional dynamic enervated by the 
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“Arab Spring,” precipitating deep alienation among 
Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sunnis, and thus 
enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as their res-
cuers and defenders.
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT 
POLICY AND STRATEGIES
Let us now consider the implications of AQO’s 
and ISO’s history, doctrine, and modus operandi for 
current USG policies and strategies designed to per-
manently defeat these terrorist entities. As in previ-
ous chapters, we shall treat each organization in 
succession.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY 
AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT 
AQO AND ITS AFFILIATES
The present USG policy is to disrupt, dismantle, 
and ultimately defeat AQO, its affiliates, associated 
movements, and those inspired by its doctrine.263 This 
policy was first declared soon after the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks, and has been reiterated and sharpened in 
subsequent years.264 The strategy designed to real-
ize that policy has also been clearly established and 
is centered on the achievement of three key strategic 
objectives: attacking and destroying the existing AQO 
network, countering radicalization and recruitment 
to that network, and protecting the U.S. homeland 
against terrorist attacks.265 As earlier stated, the first 
and third of these objectives has been largely attained, 
while the second continues to present formidable 
challenges. Let us briefly describe the implications of 
our chief findings for policy and these three strategic 
objectives, and also describe the chief instruments of 
national power required to realize these.
Existing U.S. policy has been largely effective in 
disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating 
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the AQO terrorist entity and accomplishing its three 
key strategic objectives. This applies especially to ef-
fectively countering the mature Bin Ladenist doctrine 
and strategy of executing highly symbolic, simultane-
ous mass-casualty terrorist attacks on American soil. 
Let us consider how the chief instruments of national 
power—diplomatic, informational, cyber, economic, 
financial, intelligence, legal, and military (DICE-
FILM)—have been wielded to accomplish this.266 
Following bin Laden’s mid-1990s debut as self-
professed enemy of the United States—evidenced in 
his 1996 declaration of war, series of high-profile in-
terviews, and formal issuance of the 1998 fatwa—his 
status changed from that of a little-known wealthy 
Saudi associated with the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, to 
a high-profile clear and present danger to American 
citizens and interests. The 1998 East Africa embassy 
bombings clarified any doubts that USG analysts may 
have had about bin Laden’s intentions and lethality. 
Diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, 
and to a much lesser extent military instruments, were 
used from 1998 to the 9/11 attacks to attempt to per-
suade then ruling emir of the Afghan Taliban Mullah 
Omar, on the basis of extensive and incontrovertible 
evidence, to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United 
States to stand trial for the embassy bombings.267 Mul-
lah Omar’s stubborn refusal to do so—whether on 
grounds of affinity with a brother Muslim, duty owed 
a person granted sanctuary and hospitality under the 
Pashtun code, or idiosyncratic motives—led former 
President George W. Bush to issue his final ultimatum 
in his September 20, 2001, Address to the Joint Ses-
sion of Congress: that Omar’s failure to extradite bin 
Laden would lead him and the Taliban to share bin 
Laden’s fate. 
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9/11 dramatically changed the mix of instruments 
of national power that would be used to disrupt, dis-
mantle, and ultimately defeat AQO. While those ear-
lier instruments remained significant, others central 
to an invasion to overthrow the Taliban regime and 
to destroy AQO’s terrorist capabilities were soon in 
play. Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and un-
conventional warfare, using all necessary means, were 
pursued across the relevant theaters of operation. The 
legal instrument (through the United Nations Security 
Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 
and U.S. legal codes) was employed to classify and 
thereby outlaw foreign terrorist organizations, foreign 
terrorists, terrorist travel, finances, weapons flows, 
and terrorist sanctuaries. The USG employed diplo-
matic, economic, and military instruments to create 
international coalitions, create incentives for coopera-
tion and disincentives for non-cooperation, and hunt 
down high value targets in a lethal and systematic 
campaign employing elite Special Operations Com-
mand forces and the Intelligence Community (IC). 
On the American home front, the intelligence and 
legal instruments, most notably the Department of 
Justice (DoJ) and its Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), along with key partners such as the New York 
Police Department (NYPD) and later the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), would protect against 
and prepare for possible mass casualty attacks. Hard-
ening civil aviation and transportation more broadly; 
creating tamper-proof identification; developing in-
telligence assets and informants that could monitor 
potential terrorist organizations; and restricting and 
preventing terrorist travel all had profound effects.268 
It is our belief that our findings have few impli-
cations for existing USG policy vis-à-vis classic bin 
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Ladenism. The net result of this sustained assault on 
AQO was the practical decimation of that organiza-
tion and that classic terrorist modus operandi respon-
sible for organizing and executing bin Ladenism’s 
classic “Far Enemy” spectacular mass-casualty terror-
ist attacks. What arose in its wake, however—though 
AQO’s classic “Far Enemy” attacks must still be coun-
tered269—was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist 
modus operandi currently employed by AQO’s most 
lethal affiliate, AQAP. 
As noted earlier, AQAP’s central strategic focus 
at present is inciting and recruiting random “home-
based” and “home-grown” persons willing to plan, 
train for, and successfully execute felonious criminal 
terrorist acts on American soil. Delusionally believed 
to affect actual American economic activity or power, 
its principal consequence lay rather in successfully in-
spiring a paltry number of loners and sometimes clus-
ters to carry out murderous attacks.270 
The USG has, over the past 5 years or so, rebal-
anced its strategy and chosen instruments of national 
power to address this AQAP “lone jihad” strategy. 
This involves a far greater emphasis on intelligence 
and legal instruments. It also has led to the need to 
more forcefully respond to and counter AQAP’s me-
dia operations, now deemed a critical medium for 
connecting AQAP media operatives in the cyber and 
electromagnetic spectrums, with potential individual 
recruits apprised of AQAP’s encryption software, 
downloading incitement media, terror craft, and the 
broader doctrinal beliefs espoused. The lethal target-
ing of senior AQAP communications operatives such 
as Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan is key. The inter-
agency initiative, Center for Strategic Counterterrorist 
Communications (CSCC), begun in 2011, pioneered 
counter-AQO media warfare; and through its “Think 
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Again Turn Away” campaign, deliberately focused its 
messengers, messages, and media to target key audi-
ences believed to be most susceptible to AQO’s and 
AQAP’s inspirational terrorist media operations. A 
more sustained emphasis on bottom-up buy-in, self-
monitoring and policing, and enhancing community 
trust and resilience, now compliments the cyber, in-
formational, and legal instruments most critical to ef-
fective domestic counterterrorist operations.271 
It is advisable that the USG continue this present 
line of effort, i.e., encouraging individual behavioral 
dissuasion, discouragement, and disengagement from 
terrorism,272 using these existing instruments of na-
tional power. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY 
AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT 
THE ISO
The current declared USG policy is to degrade and 
permanently defeat the ISO.273 USG officials believe 
this can only be achieved through accomplishing de-
fined tasks across key lines of effort (LOEs). Secretary 
of Defense Ashton Carter, and former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General (Retired) Martin E. 
Dempsey, identified nine key LOEs: 
1. Inclusive effective governance;
2. Military-led denial of sanctuary; 
3. Military-led building of partner capacity;
4. Enhancing intelligence collection;
5. Disrupting finances; 
6. Countering messaging;
7. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters; 
8. Providing humanitarian support to displaced 
and vulnerable persons; and, 
182
9. Disruption of terrorist threats to the home-
land.274 
General Ret. John Allen, former special Presidential 
Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, identi-
fies five LOEs:
1. Denial of sanctuary and security force assis-
tance; 
2. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters; 
3. Disrupting local and international financial 
channels; 
4. Providing humanitarian relief and stabilization 
support; and, 
5. Counter-messaging or defeating Daesch as an 
idea.275 
Whether described as five or nine LOEs, each proposal 
envisions a holistic long-term Coalition effort charac-
terized by deep awareness of the political essence of 
insurgency and the demand that the military instru-
ment be carefully integrated as one vital but insuffi-
cient instrument/means of national power wielded to 
defeat the ISO. Each also envisions a strong and effec-
tive role for a counterterrorist communications strat-
egy designed in particular not only to exploit a critical 
requirement/vulnerability of the ISO—foreign fighter 
recruitment—but also for delegitimizing home-based 
terrorist activities. Recent comprehensive reviews of 
USG and Coalition efforts to date have further iterated 
the vital importance of fully sourcing, expediting, and 
more aggressively countering ISO along these LOEs.276 
Findings based in the author’s examination of the 
ISOs doctrinal and strategic concepts appear to sub-
stantially support current USG policy and strategy, 
though recommendations are suggested by the pres-
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ent author to address the specific “stateness” dimen-
sion of ISO. These LOEs may be neatly categorized 
into three distinct clusters that correspond to the three 
key strategic objectives earlier identified as key to anti-
AQO strategy: attacking and destroying the terrorist 
network, preventing radicalization (i.e., encouraging 
behavioral disengagement from) and recruitment to 
terrorism, and protecting against and preparing the 
U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks.277 The third stra-
tegic objective is straightforward and we here exam-
ine the first two in greater detail.
1. Attacking and destroying the ISO: (military): 
military-led denial of sanctuary and building 
partner capacity; (intelligence): enhancing in-
telligence collection; (financial, legal): disrupt-
ing local and international financial channels; 
(legal, cyber, informational): disrupting the 
flow of foreign fighters. 
2. Encouraging behavioral disengagement from 
ISO terrorism: (cyber, informational): counter-
messaging or defeating ISO as an idea.
3. Preventing against and preparing for ISO ter-
rorist attacks: (intelligence, legal): disruption 
of terrorist threats to the homeland.
Let us examine these first two strategic objectives 
in more detail. The first strategic objective, attacking 
and destroying the ISO, is mostly well-supported by 
its relevant LOEs and those instruments of national 
power required for their realization. For example, de-
nial of sanctuary, disrupting finances,278 and disrupt-
ing foreign fighters279 directly addresses the spatial, 
monetary, and kinetic resources essential to recruit-
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ing, training, fielding, furnishing, and deploying ter-
rorist operatives. The critical roles of U.S. airpower280 
and building partner-capacity are key to prevent-
ing additional ISO offensive gains, and potentially a 
non-U.S. indigenous capacity for sustained counter-
offensive action. Though not mentioned in the mili-
tary LOEs, one must also include the present activities 
of JSOC and CIA operatives methodically hunting , 
neutralizing, or capturing key leadership and other 
ISO high value targets,281 and meticulously pursuing 
intelligence-driven, high-tempo find, fix, finish, ex-
ploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) operations.282 
Reports suggest that from January through early-June 
2016 alone, “more than 120 Islamic State leaders, com-
manders, propagandists, recruiters and other so-called 
high-value individuals” have been killed.283 Some of 
the most notable include: 
• Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (aka: 
Abu Omar al-Shishani), ISO’s “minister of war” 
(March 2016).284 
• Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka: Haji 
Iman), ISO’s second-in-command and major 
operational planner and organizer, and Minis-
ter of Finance (March 2016).285
• Abu al-Haijaa al-Tunisi, senior ISO military 
leader in Aleppo area (March 2016).286 
• Shaker Wahib al-Fahdawi al-Dulaimi (aka: Abu 
Waheeb), ISO military emir for Anbar province 
(May 2016).287 
Several key high value targets have also been killed 
since, among them: 
• Basim Muhammad Ahmad Sultan al-Bajari, 
ISO deputy minister of war (June 25, 2016).288
• Hatim Talib al-Hamduni, ISO military com-
mander (June 25, 2016).289
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• Saad Emarati, ISO in Afghanistan/Pakistan re-
gion, founder and senior military leader (July 
2016).290
• Hafez Sayed, senior ISO commander in Af-
ghanistan (July 26, 2016).291
• Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, ISO se-
nior spokesman, propagandist, external opera-
tions chief, strategist (August 30, 2016).292
• Abu-Muhammad Furqan, ISO Chief of Media 
Operations (September 7, 2016).293
Moreover, focus has been placed on silently decimat-
ing the ranks of nearly 40 “external operations leaders, 
planners, and facilitators” conducting external terror-
ist operations directed against Coalition and other al-
lied countries,294 and also the JSOC-led capture of key 
operatives and critical intelligence. For example, four 
to seven terabytes of critical data contained on laptop 
computers, cell phones, and other sources detailing 
ISO’s financial, logistical, and leadership operations 
was recovered by a JSOC-led operation designed to 
capture senior ISO financial official Abu Sayyaf. Ad-
ditional critical information was elicited from the 
3-month interrogation of his wife, Umm Sayyaf.295 The 
capture and interrogation of another ISO senior op-
erative, Sulayman Dawud al-Bakkar (aka: Suleiman 
Daoud al-Afari)—a key operative in ISO’s chemical 
weapons program—has led to far greater knowledge 
of this program, including how the group weaponized 
sulfur mustard and loaded it onto artillery shells, and 
also facilitated target selection used to attack and de-
stroy existing manufacturing sites and tactical units.296 
USG shaping operations now in progress in Mosul led 
to intelligence facilitating what is described as “one of 
the largest airstrikes yet on an Islamic State car bomb 
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factory. . . hitting a sprawling compound south of Mo-
sul.”297 The recent liberation of the key strategic north-
ern Syrian town of Manbij contributed a huge trove of 
vital intelligence that further fed this F3EAD cycle.298 
Most recently, in the wake of Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter’s specific demands, the USG has tasked 
the U.S. Cyber Command to embark on a systematic 
campaign of publicly acknowledged offensive cyber-
attacks directed at disrupting, degrading, and dissem-
bling ISO’s command and control.299 
The previously mentioned LOEs, however, insuffi-
ciently recognize that the ISO is not just a terrorist net-
work or organization with sanctuary, but is endeav-
oring to build and sustain a state-centered terrorist 
enterprise. Though the ISO is a criminal, exploitative, 
coercive, proto-police-state neither representative nor 
supported by the vast majority of Sunnis who suffer 
its rule, it is in de-facto control of territory, resources, 
persons, substantial infrastructure, and various means 
of extracting monies. It is for this reason that tradition-
al counterterrorism strategies require supplementing. 
Suggestive candidates include unconventional war-
fare300 developed with a broader policy objective of 
short-term containment and a final objective of per-
manent defeat and destruction.301 
ISO is an occupying power lacking authority, le-
gitimacy, and support from the vast majority of per-
sons residing in its conquered territories. It has much 
in common with a Ba’athist totalitarian police state 
and virtually nothing in common with the sovereign 
that most persons, if able to determine their own 
fate, would choose. Brutal terror, murder, extortion, 
coercion, and assassination do not furnish the foun-
dations of a state bound to last.302 Given these facts, 
which resemble those applicable to Communist and 
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Fascist-conquered Europe, it is highly probable that 
an unconventional warfare strategy can pay large 
dividends. It is true that resistance to occupation is 
mercilessly punished through exemplary crucifixions 
and beheadings, and so this is a project that requires a 
broadened scope and longer time-frame. Much can be 
done to sever essential logistical links to the occupying 
ISO terrorist State, and many of the LOEs designed to 
repress terrorist networks can be modified to address 
states.303 
The present author therefore agrees with those 
analysts who have recently suggested the prudence 
of a short-term containment-to-roll-back strategy to 
address ISO’s expansionist designs.304   
The second strategic objective—encouraging be-
havioral disengagement from ISO terrorism—exploits 
a key ISO critical vulnerability: the need for a steady 
supply of persons willing to either travel to Syria and 
assist ISIS’s terrorist State, or—as is increasingly like-
ly—to remain in one’s own homeland and mercilessly 
and brutally murder anyone within one’s potential 
reach. This message of: “No More Hijra! Stay Home 
and Mercilessly Slaughter Your Infidel Neighbor!” 
has become far more prevalent following the USG’s 
August 7, 2014, commencement of aerial bombing to 
prevent a potential genocidal slaughter of the Yezidi 
ethno-religious minority, and also an ISO offensive on 
the key provincial city of Arbil.305 
ISO’s terrorist media operations, as noted by scores 
of analysts, surpass those of any terrorist organization 
on record.306 Vastly eclipsing classical bin Ladenism 
or AQO’s relatively media-savvy affiliate AQAP, the 
ISO employs cutting edge film and editing techniques 
to produce high-quality, action-packed, dramatically-
compelling videos; operates a virtual social media 
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army operating across a range of platforms, including 
Twitter and Instagram to broadcast tens of thousands 
of messages and images per day; and has employed a 
cadre of groomers whose sole mission is to target and 
recruit individuals from abroad to either emigrate to 
Syria and remain, or increasingly more likely, to plan 
and execute home-based terrorist attacks.307  
ISO’s juggernaut has finally been facing a far stiffer 
wind, however,308 and its media operations have forced 
several nations and organizations to develop effective 
campaigns designed to counter ISO’s siren song and 
effectively encourage behavioral disengagement from 
ISO’s terrorist enterprise.309 Leaving terrorism behind, 
being based on deeply personal, psychological re-
alities, has now replaced a rationalistically conceived 
“de-radicalization” process as the more effective ap-
proach to detaching human lives and souls from ISO’s 
terrorist enterprise. Though it has taken time to adapt, 
a coterie of media operatives is now busy developing 
tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter those 
ISO has to date used with great effect.310 Other efforts 
include targeted removal and exploiting ISO’s online 
presence to develop actionable intelligence on ISO’s 
operatives and even military operations.311 
A notable evolution in USG counter-ISO informa-
tion operations has been effected that substantially 
extends beyond the CSCC’s earlier tactics, techniques, 
and procedures directed exclusively at AQO/AQAP. 
The CSCC shifted from countering AQAP’s “lone mu-
jahid” terrorism to exclusively focusing on the ISO,312 
and has used ISO defectors’ compelling testimony313 
in a series of videos that employ highly-compelling 
techniques to drive home, rationally and emotion-
ally, several reasons to disengage from terrorism; for 
example: observed hypocrisy, deceit, cruelty, murder, 
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dishonor, loneliness, broken promises, missed love 
one’s, and wasted and destroyed lives.314 The CSCC’s 
“Think Again Turn Away” campaign, while laudable, 
has recently ceased in its present form, and counter-
ISO information operations reorganized to more effec-
tively pursue and realize the Obama administration’s 
demand for a more nimble, sophisticated, and effec-
tive counter-ISO posture in the cyber domain.315 
Concluding Observation: What is the Difference 
between “Defeat,” and “Permanent Defeat” of the 
ISO “Idea”? 
All LOEs, except one, have now been examined. 
We have saved the most important for last. For in a 
very real sense it is the beginning and the end of the 
ISO story. This LOE is described earlier by the two 
senior-most USG officials, below the Commander-in-
Chief, charged with overseeing the nation’s armed 
forces. It is inclusive effective governance. It was 
said earlier by the present author when examining the 
ISO’s doctrine that:
The ISO’s apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination, 
‘Nearest Enemy’ and ‘Near Enemy,’ and “Caliphate 
Now!” doctrines would be little more than hindrance 
were these not combined with two additional factors. 
First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional, 
military leadership cadre comprised of former Ba’athist 
military and intelligence officers whose tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian 
Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, the revengeful 
anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Prime Minister al-
Maliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional 
dynamic enervated by the ‘Arab Spring,’ precipitating deep 
alienation among Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sun-
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nis, and thus enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as 
their rescuers and defenders [italics added].316  
It is this second point that is of grave concern here. If 
it was willing to employ the means required, the USG 
could temporarily defeat ISO within a brief period. 
This can be done; it is not beyond U.S. means. Our 
reluctance to do so is based in a hard-earned wisdom, 
one bathed in the blood and treasure of America, its 
allies, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and now 
Syrians. This simple, hard-won truth is that every 
genuine insurgency, in this case the Sunni insurgency, 
is at heart a political struggle. ISO was able to op-
portunistically and ruthlessly exploit current Sunni 
disenchantment, disfranchisement, and a revengeful 
Iranian-backed al-Maliki regime that broke promises 
and delivered repression, exclusion, and despair. The 
permanent defeat of the ISO idea will only occur when 
Iraqis make the choice to create a new social compact 
in which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, 
and protected.317 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are suggested to 
further strengthen existing policy, strategy, and pro-
fessional leader education.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SENIOR MILITARY 
LEADERS, PLANNERS, AND STRATEGISTS
Two classes of recommendations are suggest-
ed: one is doctrine-independent, and the second is 
doctrine-dependent.
Doctrine-Independent Recommendations. 
By “doctrine independent,” the recommendations 
are meant to hold regardless of the worldview, creed, 
and doctrine of one’s adversary. It is likely that the 
vast majority of relevant recommendations fall into 
this category. Terrorism, as earlier described, is a 
distinct method. Combating terrorism (CbT), which 
combines counterterrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism 
(AT), demands knowledge of the method of terror, 
regardless of the substantive presuppositions of the 
terrorist doctrine. The author’s Terrorist Quadrangle 
Analysis (TQA) is recommended, however, as a heu-
ristic for conceptualizing and countering the terrorist 
enterprise and modus operandi. It facilitates ready 
visualization of its four key inter-related dimensions, 
and thereby the clarification of critical requirements, 
critical vulnerabilities, and opportunities.  
Irregular warfare (IW), most notably unconven-
tional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN), 
regardless of specific adversarial worldview and doc-
trine, adeptly attack adversarial states and insurgents. 
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U.S. military leadership has for nearly a decade been 
crystal clear about how to degrade, defeat, and de-
stroy the ISO modus operandi.318 It is not knowledge 
but the mangled, compromised political dynamics of 
the present Iraqi state that have limited its effective-
ness. The present book offers no greater clarity than 
that already possessed by the USG’s highly competent 
leadership now possessed of a realistic policy, strat-
egy, and its essential LOEs. 
Doctrine-Dependent Recommendations. 
Islam, a major world religion, is the third of three 
great faiths whose eponymous ancestor Abraham is 
considered the superlative exemplar of one who for-
sook all, including the unimaginable, his firstborn son, 
to worship God. Islamic orthodoxy presumes man by 
nature is a born monotheist (fitra) endowed by the Cre-
ator with the pure knowledge of all worshipful prac-
tices demanded of God’s slave. The Arabic word for 
God (or better, “the God”) is “Allah” (al-ilah). “Allah 
is the Greatest” (Allahu-akhbar) is for non-Muslims rec-
ognizable only as the battle cry of criminal and sinful 
mass murderers who profess to realize Allah’s Divine 
will by murdering in cold blood. This is a great trav-
esty and predicament now facing potentially billions 
of persons—Muslim and non-Muslim—who must on 
the grounds of Islam itself answer these perpetrators 
and criminal masterminds and assist their utter de-
feat. Fortunately, in the present author’s view, Islam 
does amply provide without question the answers 
necessary.
This does not demand that one deny that violence 
or religiously-inspired warfare has accompanied Is-
lam’s rise. In earlier writings, the present author has 
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insisted that a proper and effective answer to counter-
ing terrorism conducted in the name of Sunni Islam 
cannot honestly, and should not in practice be based, 
in denying that the military jihad remains for obser-
vant orthodox militant Sunni Muslims a superlative 
religious obligation binding until the Day of Final 
Judgment.319 Having conceded this “jihad-realist” 
premise, however, rather than a slippery slope autho-
rizing further AQO and ISO terrorism, one can and 
should be led to the exact opposite conclusion. The 
military jihad, even if it is an offensive jihad carried 
out to raise Allah’s Word supreme, is governed by a 
strict jurisprudence rooted in core religious principles 
and values that amounts to an Islamic variant of in-
ternational law. The present author has previously il-
lustrated how this jurisprudence of lawful jihad may 
be used to great effect to attack AQO’s terrorist modus 
operandi.320 A brief but pointed critique of ISO has also 
been penned.321 It is highly recommended that senior 
military leaders, planners, and strategists fully com-
prehend this jurisprudence of lawful military jihad, 
and how key dissident and non-dissident orthodox 
Sunni scholars may be leveraged to categorically con-
demn and proscribe AQO and ISO terrorism commit-
ted in the name of Sunni Islam.322 
AQO and ISO are extreme deviant criminal outli-
ers within the Sunni Islamic spectrum. Their margin-
alization ensures their eventual implosion. The vast 
majority of Sunni Muslims ascribe neither to the ends 
they seek—a supranational Caliphate governed by 
medieval Sharia—nor to the means they use. Perma-
nently prying these parasitic organizations away from 
their healthy hosts is best achieved by strengthening 
the host societies, i.e., creating viable, functional, rep-
resentative polities capable of protecting populations, 
resolving internal divides, and delivering essential 
services. AQO cannot survive if its claim to defend 
against a supposed “Crusader War Against Islam” 
rings insincere, incredible, and hollow. Its three fu-
tures appear to be either evisceration at the hands of 
the USG’s lethal campaign to destroy this entity and its 
leadership; criminal reorientation into “lone mujahid” 
anarchistic-like small-scale terrorist attacks on de-
fenseless populations, Muslim and non-Muslim; and 
what may turn out to be its last lifeline, a long-term 
reinvention of AQO as secretly-embedded insurgents 
within nationalist-territorial Islamist fronts focused 
not on attacking the “Far Enemy,” but on transform-
ing “Near Enemy” regimes into Sharia-based states 
(e.g. Syria, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia).323 
The ISO based in four signature premises—apoca-
lypticism, genocidal anti-Shi’ism, Caliphalism, and 
“Near Enemy” obsession—provide, despite alarm-
ist interpretations now widely in vogue, a far easier 
target for near-term elimination. ISO is essentially an 
ultra-sectarian mass-murdering terrorist army whose 
wealth, social media sophistication, and recent ter-
ritorial conquests have led many to mistake a mouse 
for a lion, and a molehill for a mountain. This feroc-
ity, lethality, brutality, coercion, and police-state so-
phistication of former Ba’athist officers leading an 
apocalyptically-inclined ultra-sectarian extremely de-
viant organization, has no base and no future in the 
world of actually existing Sunni Islam. Mass murder, 
threatened and actual genocidal intention, criminal 
extortion, ransoming, theft, despotism, tyranny, and 
hubris have led the ISO to become a permanent tar-
get of virtually every nation and people who shall 
ensure its relatively swift destruction. ISO is at the 
time of this writing on the strategic defensive.324 ISO 
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defeats in Kobani (January 2015), Shadadi (February 
2015), Tikrit (March 2015), Baiji (October 2015), Ra-
madi (December 2015),325 Fallujah (June 2016), Manbij, 
Syria (August 2016), Jarablus, Syria (September 2016), 
and Sirte, Libya (August/September 2016),326 coupled 
with the apparent momentum across a range of other 
ISO strongholds, provide key evidence confirming 
ISO’s loss of momentum, territory, and battlefield ini-
tiative.327 ISO’s strategic defensive posture is now also 
evident not only in its brutally vicious tactics directed 
at retaining physical terrain and population control,328 
but also tactically as it shifts like its predecessor AQI 
when losing ground, toward increased emphasis on 
high-visibility mass-casualty terrorist attacks.329 
The permanent destruction of ISO requires, as 
earlier stated, resolution of the intra-Islamic sectar-
ian divide among Sunni and Shia Muslims,330 though 
ISO’s targeting of even lay Shia creates the potential 
for Sunni-Shia cooperation to prevent this murderous 
result. Strategic patience will pay off, and it is highly 
recommended that focus also be placed on preparing 
for and preventing against ISO’s potential to wreak 
massive destruction in the process of its inevitable 
defeat.331
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEADER  
DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION
The present author presumes that highly compe-
tent professionals are already effectively educating 
leaders to engage these two terrorist adversaries. 
However, in conclusion, we here offer a few remind-
ers or perhaps further extrapolations on points earlier 
made. It is highly recommended that leaders acquire 
a deepened knowledge of Islam: its essential reli-
gious core; key facts of history and evolution; and a 
clear comprehension of the contemporary spectrum 
of Islamic activism, including the varieties of politi-
cal Islam—violent and non-violent—that now and 
into the foreseeable future shall also play their role in 
shaping the world’s sociopolitical and sociocultural 
life. Having a deepened knowledge and genuine re-
spect for this Abrahamic-derived faith, one will also 
discover why the vast majority of Muslims can easily 
and justifiably disassociate AQO and ISO terrorism 
from this faith. The criminal essence of terrorism—
treachery, deceit, murder, creating insecurity, dread, 
fear, horror, and calamity—is so far from the essen-
tial religious core defining Islam that many deny that 
Muslims themselves can actually be behind this mad-
ness and murder. Conspiracy theory is rampant, and 
denial that this has anything to do with Islam at all is 
a certain and emphatic conviction, especially in those 
regions suffering its brunt. What is certain is that per-
sons act in the name of Islam, and as earlier stated, it 
is for Sunni Muslims themselves to ultimately deter-
mine the legitimate versus illegitimate bounds of this 
world faith. 
Possessed of a deepened knowledge and respect 
for Islam, however, leaders can become natural al-
lies in what can and should be an inter-civilizational, 
long-term alliance to extinguish terrorist enterprises 
as legitimate vehicles for changing lives and social or-
ders. Healthy sociopolitical orders surely doom AQO 
and ISO to inevitable marginalization and implosion. 
Strengthened host societies and competent security 
forces defending legitimate borders, in alliance with 
the world’s civilizations—including most certainly Is-
lam—will lead AQO to occupy only virtual territories 
and ever-shriveling sanctuaries. The only card left to 
play is to poison, polarize, and plot attacks designed 
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to estrange Islam and Muslims from the world, and 
to incessantly parrot their “Crusader War Against Is-
lam” mantra to ever-diminishing target audiences. Is-
lamophobia, ironically, is their only genuine potential 
Western ally, and inter-civilizational dialogue, coop-
eration, and evolution their only actual genuine en-
emy. It turns out that “the tyrant,” the “idol worship-
per,” and the “Crusader” has not been the West at all, 
but these organizations themselves who have made 
their own desires and “will to power” their object of 
worship, their God; their self-anointing as usurpers 
of all authority, their Idol; and their fabricated de-
fense against a non-existent war against Islam, their 
Crusade. 
AQO and ISO are two extremely deviant Salafi-
jihadi organizations. Fully understanding Sunni Islam 
in all its complexity, variety, and majesty, and how 
these two deviant criminal terrorist entities attach to 
this faith, requires knowledge. Professional educators 
should ensure that this knowledge is being adequate-
ly conveyed to those who now, and in the near future, 
shall ally with Sunni Islam against these terrorist enti-
ties. 
The war we now wage is not now and has never 
been against Islam. Rather, it is the war first quite ac-
curately declared by former President Bush and more 
recently by former President  Obama: it is a war against 
terrorist murderers who act in the name of a faith wor-
thy of great admiration and respect. Detached from 
a faith they have maligned, besmirched, and unfairly 
damaged in the eyes of the world, they shall again 
sooner rather than later become strangers wandering 
without land or followers. It is a fate they have earned 
for themselves, by their own hands. A murderer is not 
a martyr, after all.
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hAmir/Apologies%20Oh%20Amir_djvu.txt, accessed on December 
1, 2014.
164. Salvific jihadism and martyrology, to which we shall 
later turn, is one way to attempt to avoid these travails since the 
true Mujahid (fighter on Allah’s path), it is hoped, will be imme-
diately evacuated to Paradise and not only enjoy its magnificence 
in proximity to Allah and its promised fruits, but also to inter-
vene on behalf of loved ones to increase their odds of attaining 
the same.
165. For AQO, the following AQO-affiliated English-language 
online publications were analyzed (as of October 15, 2015): [1] In-
spire, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Issues, 1-14, 
Summer 2010 to Summer 2015. Archived copies of all issues of 
Inspire are available from jihadology.net/category/inspire-magazine/, 
accessed on September 24, 2015; [2] Resurgence, Qa’idat al-Jihad in 
the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Issues 1-2, Fall 2014 to Summer 
2015. See Resurgence, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, available from azelin.files.
wordpress.com/2015/04/resurgence-1.pdf, accessed on May 5, 2015; 
Resurgence, Iss. 2, Summer 2015, available from pietervanostaeyen.
files.wordpress.com/2015/06/resurgence-special-issue_summer-2015.
pdf, accessed on June 29, 2015; [3] Al-Risalah (The Letter) Issue 
1, July 2015. See Al Risalah, Iss. 1, July 2015, available from https://
pietervanostaeyen.com/2015/07/05/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-
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shaam-al-risalah-issue-1/, accessed on July 8, 2015. Al Risalah is pro-
duced by AQO’s Syrian affiliate, Nusrah Front (Jabhat al-Nusrah 
li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad [Protection 
Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahadin of the Levant 
in the Battlefields of Jihad]; hereafter, Jabhat al-Nusrah).
166. Abu Saleh, “Insightful Opinions from the Frontlines: Just 
a Thought: How Can They Handle It,” Dabiq, Iss.13, January 19, 
2016 [1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir], p. 48.
167. Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu 
Dujana al Pasha), “The Land of the Prophets Awaits You,” Re-
surgence, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, p. 39. Note: the more common English 
spelling of this author’s name is Muhammad bin Mahmoud Rabie 
al-Bahtiyti (aka: Abu Dujana al-Basha), this book uses the spelling 
provided in the referenced Resurgence issue.
168. Background on Dujana is found in Thomas Joscelyn, “Al 
Qaeda official warns against Islamic State in new speech,” The 
Long War Journal, September 27, 2014, available from www.long-
warjournal.org/archives/2014/09/a_senior_al_qaeda_of.php, accessed 
on October 15, 2015. Abu Dujana is Ayman al-Zawahiri’s son-in-
law, and was a long-time Egyptian Islamic Jihad member, who 
has closed ranks with AQO against the ISO’s claim to the Caliph-
ate, extremism in takfir in the Syrian theater, and violation of what 
he deems essential Sharia regulations pertaining to intra-Muslim 
disputes.
169. Al-Risalah, Iss. 1, July 2015; Al-Risalah, Iss. 2, October 
2015, archived copy available from https://pietervanostaeyen.
com/2015/10/26/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-shaam-al-risalah- 
issue-2/, accessed on October 26, 2015.
170. An English version of all the listed issues, 1-14 of Dabiq, 
is available from www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-
propaganda-magazine-dabiq#, accessed on August 11, 2016. Specific 
issues and dates are as follows: Dabiq, Iss. 1, July 5, 2014 [Rama-
dan 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 2, July 28, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 
3, August 2014 [Shawwal 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 4, c. September/Oc-
tober 2014 [Dhul-Hijjah 1435]; Dabiq, Iss. 5, November 22, 2014 
[Muharram 1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 6, c. December/January 2015 [Rabi’ 
al-Awwal 1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 7, February 12, 2015 [Rabi’ al-Ahkir 
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1436]; Dabiq, Iss. 8, c. March 2015 [Jumada al-Akhirah 1436]; Dabiq, 
Iss. 9, c. May 2015 [1436 Sha’ban]; Dabiq, Iss. 10, c. July 2015 [1436 
Ramadan]; Dabiq, Iss. 11, September 9, 2015 [1436 Dul-Qa’dah]; 
Dabiq, Iss. 12, November 2015 [1437 Safar]; Dabiq, Iss. 13, January 
19, 2016 [1437 Rabi’ Al-Akhir]; Dabiq, Iss. 14, April 2016 [1437 Ra-
jab]. Hereafter all citations to Dabiq articles or graphics refer only 
to issue number without the publication date. To this author’s 
knowledge while AQO dedicates extensive attention in its vari-
ous online publications Inspire, Resurgence, and Al-Risala to the 
superlative value of jihadist martyrology (as does Azzam and the 
ISO), apocalypticism and eschatology are virtually non-existent. 
Their predominantly inspirational, agitational, and exemplary 
role in strategic communication will be taken up in Chapter 2 of 
this book on strategy.
171. Middle East Media Research Institute, “Al-Zarqawi’s 
Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004.” 
The original  speech on September 11, 2004 was recorded and 
broadcast by several Islamist websites the next day. For a pre-
scient article noting the possibility for this development, see Da-
vid Cook, “Iraq as the Focus for Apocalyptic Scenarios,” CTC Sen-
tinel, Vol. 1, No. 11, October 2008, available from www.ctc.usma.
edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss11-Art8.pdf, accessed on 
April 21, 2015; For a deep scholarly analysis of original sources, 
consult David Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Princeton, NJ: 
Darwin Press, 2002; For his pioneering role in scholarly study 
of what many consider to be merely a “crank fringe,” see David 
Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2008; David Cook, “Dajjal,” in Kate 
Fleet, F. Kramer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, E. Rowson, eds., Ency-
clopedia of Islam, 3rd Edition, Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 2007-present, 
available from referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-
of-islam-3/dajjal-COM_25826, accessed on August 2, 2016. Finally, 
see McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse,  pp. 161-181, for a brief, but ac-
cessible compilation of key excerpts from the classical source lit-
erature—the ahadith, or Traditions of the Prophet—covering “The 
Final Days,” “The Victorious Group,” “The Mahdi is Preceded by 
an Islamic State,” and “Twelve Caliphs.”
172. See Sahih-Muslim, Vol. 4, Book 39, [“Kitab al-Fitan wa 
Ashrat as-Sa’ah”] (Book pertaining the turmoil and portents of 
the last hour), No. 6924, p. 1501. In Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, transl., 
Sahih Muslim, Sh. Lahore, Pakistan: Muhammad Ashraf, 2004.
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173. Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 26.
174. These all refer to the following: Dabiq, Iss. 2, “The Flood” 
cover art with Noah’s ark, p. 1, and Abū ‘Amr Al-Kinānī, “It’s 
Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” pp. 5-11; Dabiq, Iss. 3, “A 
Call to Hijrah,” cover art, p. 1; this connects Hijrah to al-Sham 
as the land of the final apocalyptic battles. Also “The Islamic 
State before Al-Malhamah (The Immigrants to the Land of Mala-
him [Final End Times Battles]),” pp. 5-11, and “The Liberation of 
Dabiq,” p.15, which links Dabiq to its apocalyptic and prophesied 
relation to the End Times battles, and also the name of the maga-
zine; Dabiq, Iss. 4, p. 1, cover cites the following 2 articles: see “The 
Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” pp. 14-17, and “Reflections 
on the Final Crusade,” pp. 32-44, i.e., the Final Crusade, the Fi-
nal Hour, which includes a section “The Islamic State Founders 
on Signs of the Hour,” that contains quotes from Shaykh Abū 
Mus’ab az-Zarqāwī, Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir, and Abū ‘Umar al-
Baghdādī; Dabiq, Iss. 5, “YAHYĀ: LESSONS FROM A SHAHĪD,” 
pp. 4-9, which discusses End Times battles and tribulations; Dabiq, 
Iss. 7, “THE SALVATION FROM FITNAH IS KHILĀFAH AND 
JIHĀD,” pp. 44-45, and “The Hour Will Not Be Established until 
Seventy Thousand From the Children of Ishāq Attack Constanti-
nople,” p. 83; Dabiq, Iss. 9, “And Allah is the Best of the Plotters,” 
pp. 50-59, in the concluding section, “An Analysis of a Doomed 
Plot,” pp. 57-59, is End Times based, for example, p. 57: 
In his words [referring to Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī’s quoted 
speech referred to above] there is a summary on this final plot 
. . . of the crusaders and their apostate allies before the major 
malhamah [great battles of The End Times].
Next, see “INTERVIEW WITH THE AMĪR OF THE YARMŪK 
CAMP REGION,” pp.66-73, which is also presented within frame-
work of End Times. For example, p. 66:
In light of the victories this month in Wilayat Dimashq (Da-
mascus) as the Islamic State continues to advance towards the 
future stronghold of the believers during the Malahim, Dabiq 
presented a number of questions to the amir of the region en-
compassing the Yarmuk Camp in the Wilayah.
And a final example in its concluding paragraph pp. 72-73 (see 
pp. 66-73 for entire article): 
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Our role model and noble Messenger . . . praised Dimashq very 
much, and this was mentioned in a number of authentic nar-
rations. Dimashq is the camp of the Muslims during the great 
battle (al-Malhamah al-Kubra). But every Muslim who cannot 
come and wants to perform jihad and support the Islamic State 
can do so wherever he may be, just as he was ordered by the 
Khalifah in his latest address. A simple supplication from our 
Muslim brothers practicing ribat is in itself support—a great 
support for us. Any advance of the Khilafah against the Nusay-
riyyah and Rafidah, any manifestation of unity through new 
bay’āt to the Khalifah, and any attack against the supporters of 
the Sahwah—the crusaders and Al Salul—strengthens the mu-
jahidin in Dimashq. May Allah facilitate for the armies of the 
Khilafah to liberate Dimashq.
See Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 79, for an untitled, very unflattering picture 
of al-Nur Salafi members of the Egyptian Parliament—two were 
asleep, and two were distracted—with a note, “The murtaddin 
of the ‘Nur’ party in the Egyptian parliament,” accompanied by 
an End Times prophecy quote; Dabiq, Iss. 11, “The ‘Mahdī’ of the 
Rāfidah: THE DAJJĀL,” p. 16, with a big picture of former Iranian 
Prime Minister Ahmadenijad with an ultra-orthodox, anti-Zionist 
rabbi sharing space and face-time. The article begins: 
As the Hour approaches, it becomes important to reflect upon 
the fabricated accounts of future events, as they will undoubt-
edly play a role in actions by various deviant sects. Of these 
accounts is that of the ‘Mahdi’ of the Rafidah who wages war 
against Islam and the Muslims, contrary to the just and rightly 
guided Mahdi of the future described in the Sunnah. The closer 
the Hour approaches, the more the Rafidah fall in line with the 
Jews in preparation for the appearance of this awaited evil lead-
er. Upon reading the Rafidi account of the “Mahdi,” it becomes 
clear that he is none other than the Dajjal.
The article’s concluding paragraph, p. 17: “We seek refuge with 
Allah for Ahlus-Sunnah from the evil of the Dajjal.” Next, see 
“FROM THE BATTLE OF AL-AZHĀB TO THE WAR OF COALI-
TIONS,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 46-55, whose final paragraph (p. 55) 
ends with an Apocalyptic statement:
Finally, it is not the apostasy and deviance of the weak-hearted 
and the hypocrites that will lead to the truce with the Romans 
before the Hour, rather it is the patience and perseverance of 
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the mujahidin on their way to further consolidation and greater 
expansion in the face of the international crusade against Islam 
that will achieve such. O Allah, turner of hearts, keep our hearts 
firm upon Your path until the last of us fights under the ban-
ner of al-Masih [the Mahdi, Messiah] against ad-Dajjal [Anti-
Christ].
See also, “THE BEST SHUHADĀ’,” Dabiq, Iss. 13, pp. 20-21, which 
contains an image with the words: “A Word of Truth” on a letter 
resting in a hangman’s noose; and finally, “THE RĀFIDAH: From 
Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjāl,” Dabiq, Iss. 13, esp. pp. 44-45. 
175. The following book series is devoted exclusively to 
prophesies, preparations, and the privileges associated with mar-
tyrdom (Shuhada) in these End Times tribulations and battles: 
For the original series of 6, Conquest, End Times battle-type 
works confirmed by prophecy: East, Syria, Arabia, Persia, Rome, 
and Palestine [then Major End Times Signs, Events]: 
Unattributed, Black Flags of the East: The Movements Past. Pres-
ent. & Future-1979-2012+, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.
org/details/BlackFlagsFromTheEast, accessed on August 12, 2016; 
Unattributed, Black Flags From Syria: Revolution 2011-2020+, n.p., 
n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/BlackFlagsFromSyr-
ia-Ebook, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Black Flags 
From Arabia:, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/
EbookBlackFlagsFromArabia, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unat-
tributed, Black Flags from Persia . . . which merge the Khorasanis’ with 
the Arabs, n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.org/details/Ebook-
BlackFlagsFromPersia, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, 
Black Flags from Rome: (Europe)—Armed Gangs & Missiles, available 
from https://archive.org/details/EbookBlackFlagsFromRome, accessed 
on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Black Flags from Palestine: (Mag-
ic, Deception & War), n.p., n.d., available from https://archive.org/
details/EbookBlackFlagsFromPalestine-Final, accessed on August 12, 
2016; Unattributed, How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide 
(2015), n.p.: The Islamic State, 2015, available from www.memri-
jttm.org/e-book-distributed-via-twitter-how-to-survive-in-the-west-a-
mujahid-guide.html, accessed on August 12, 2016; Hijrah to the Is-
lamic State: What to pack up, who to contact and where to go. Stories and 
more! n.p.: The Islamic State, 2015 available from https://archive.org/
details/GuideBookHijrah2015-ToTheIslamicState, accessed on Au-
gust 12, 2016; The Shuhada [Martyrs] Book Series is available from 
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Archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20
Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 
12, 2016; The Original Shuhada Series includes: Lover’s of Maidens 
of Paradise [Lover’s of the Hur al Ayn], available from archive.org/
download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20
Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016. This 
is an English translation of Abdullah Azzam’s, The Martyrs of Af-
ghanistan, Azzam Publications, available from  archive.org/stream/
MiraclesOfJihadInAfghanistan-AbdullahAzzam/Signs_of_ar-Rahman_
djvu.txt, accessed on August 12, 2016. Azzam covers period 1979-
1989; Unattributed, Miracles in Syria (2012-13), available from 
archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20
Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 
12, 2016; Unattributed, Martyr’s of Syria (2014), [2011-2014] avail-
able from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/
Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed 
on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, The Undead Warriors, [Iraq, 
2003-2006] , available from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShu-
hadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Eb-
ooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, Revivers of the 
Khilafah (Global Caliphate) [2005-2010], available from archive.org/
download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20
Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016.
176. For a terse presentation of the four essentials of apoca-
lypticism—dualism, pessimism, judgment, and imminence—see 
Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish 
Preacher from Galilee, New York: HarperOne, 2014, pp. 99-102. For 
comprehensive scholarly accounts of apocalyptic, see Norman 
Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium, rev. and enlarged ed., New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970 [1957]; Norman Cohn, Cha-
os, Cosmos, and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyp-
tic Faith, Second edition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1999 [1993]; John R. Hall, Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire 
of Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009; Richard Landes, Heav-
en on Earth: The Varieties of the Millenial Experience, New York and 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011; Arthur P. Mendel, 
Vision and Violence, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1992/1999; Richard Landes, “Millenialism (Millenarianism, 
Chiliasm),” Draft of article for Merriam-Webster Encyclopedia of 
World Religions, 1999, available from www.mille.org/people/rlpages/
millenialism-mw-encyl.html, accessed on April 30, 2015.
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177. Graeme Wood successfully corroborates this dimension 
in ISO, as well as its strict adherence to key tenets of Salafi-Wah-
habi Jihadism. See Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants: The 
Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious 
group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a 
key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for 
its strategy—and for how to stop it,” The Atlantic, March 2015, 
available from www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-
isis-really-wants/384980/, accessed on February 20, 2015. A vigor-
ous debate was spawned by Graeme’s article that centered on his 
primary thesis: 
The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, 
it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn 
largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and 
Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent follow-
ers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of 
Islam.
By February 20, 2015, 6,543 online comments had been made; by 
May 13, 2015, comments more than doubled to a total of 14,163; 
see also, Graeme Wood, “‘What ISIS Really Wants’: The Re-
sponse: A survey of reactions to The Atlantic’s cover story—from 
think tanks to jihadist Twitter,” February 24, 2015, available from 
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-
wants-reader-response-atlantic/385710/, accessed on September 15, 
2015. An initial spate of commentary argued for a complete dis-
juncture between the ISO and Islam, for example: Mehdi Hasan, 
“How Islamic Is the Islamic State? Not at All: What The Atlantic 
got wrong about ISIS,” March 12, 2015, available from www.ne-
wrepublic.com/article/121286/how-islamic-islamic-state, accessed on 
September 15, 2015 (originally in New Statesman); Fareed Zakaria, 
“The limits of the ‘Islamic’ label,” The Washington Post, February 
19, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
the-limits-of-the-islamic-label/2015/02/19/6571004e-b878-11e4-a200-
c008a01a6692_story.html?utm_term=.f6b14917d392, accessed on 
February 20, 2015; Caner K. Dagli, “The Phony Islam of ISIS,” 
The Atlantic, February 27, 2015, available from www.theatlantic.
com/global/archive/2015/02/the-phony-islam-of-isis/386156, accessed 
on March 2, 2015; J. M. Berger, “Enough about Islam: Why reli-
gion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS,” Order From 
Chaos blog entry, posted February 18, 2015, available from https://
www.brookings.edu/2015/02/18/enough-about-islam-why-religion-is-
not-the-most-useful-way-to-understand-isis/, accessed on August 12, 
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2016. However, a more reasoned (in the opinion of the present 
author) position was soon advanced. More carefully develop-
ing the theological nuances to which Wood’s principal expert on 
Salafism, Bernard Haykel, had testified, this literature concludes 
that while ISO is an Islam, Islam has a robustness, and possible 
futures, and pasts, that the ISO has failed to convey. Moreover, 
there are good grounds for believing that what 1.6 billion Muslims 
come to regard as an Islam that deserves its place at the historic 
banquet of contemporary value systems will in the end deter-
mine what Islam is. For key sources articulating this latter posi-
tion, see Robert Wright, “The Clash of Civilizations That Isn’t,” 
The New Yorker, February 25, 2015, available from www.newyorker.
com/news/news-desk/clash-civilizations-isnt, accessed on February 
27, 2015; Jack Jenkins, “What The Atlantic Left Out About ISIS 
According To Their Own Expert,” ThinkProgress, February 20, 
2015, available from thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/20/3625446/at-
lantic-left-isis-conversation-bernard-haykel/, accessed on September 
16, 2015; Hussein Ibish, “How ‘Islamic’ is the ‘Islamic State?: re-
cent controversies have revived a pointless debate from the Bush 
era’,” March 3, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 
on March 3, 2015; Mustafa Akyol, “Is the ‘Islamic State’ Islamic?,” 
February 28, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed 
on February 28, 2015. 
178. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 35-
41; “The Salvation from Fitnah is Khilafah and Jihad,” Dabiq, Iss. 
7, pp. 44-45; “And as For the Blessings of Your Lord Then Men-
tion It,” Dabiq, Iss. 12, pp. 29-32. 
179. The “stateness” dimension of the Caliphate, distinct from 
its destined existence as eschatological necessity, will be taken up 
in the following chapter on ISO strategy under the heading “Tam-
kin,” i.e., consolidation and expansion. The “stateness” of Khilafa 
is exemplified in Dabiq, Iss. 9, “Healthcare in the Khilafah,” pp. 
24-26, (with data and pictures on an actually functioning health 
care sector); Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 3: One page ad for: “The Rise of the 
Khalifah: Return of the Gold Dinar,” movie translated into mul-
tiple languages with subtitles.
180. Unattributed, Revivers of the Khilafah (Global Caliphate): 
Stories of Muslim Shuhadaa’ (Martyrs), n.p., 2013 (1434 H), avail-
able from https://archive.org/stream/Revivers-of-Global-Khilafah-Shu-
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hada-stories-2013#page/n0/mode/2up, accessed on August 12, 2016; 
Unattributed, The Revived Caliphate, (2014) /The Islamic State, 
2003-2014+, archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/
Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed 
on May 13, 2015; Unattributed, The Islamic State (2015), avail-
able from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesE-
books/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, 
accessed on May 13, 2015.
181. Amir ul-Mu’minin Abu Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Qurashi al-
Baghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah 
in the Month of Ramadan.” 
182. Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani al-Shami, “This is The 
Promise of Allah,” June 28, 2014, available from myreader.toile-
libre.org/uploads/My_563039f00cb03.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2014.
183.  See for example: “Photo Report: On the Destruction of 
Shirk in Wilayat Ninawa,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17. 
184. See Samir Khan, “RAFIDHA FOCUS: WINTER 2010,” In-
spire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 5. 
185. Bin Mahmud al Bahteeti, “The Land of the Prophets 
Awaits You,” pp. 38-42. 
186. In the second issue of Al-Risalah, Shi’ism is addressed. 
See Al-Risalah, Iss. 2. In the full page illustration, p. 20, Al-Nusrah 
Emir Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Joulani offers a reward for kill-
ing Hizb Allah [Party of God] leader Hassan Nasrullah, but also 
states: “even if they [the assassins] be from his people or family 
. . .  we will provide security for him and his family, and deliver 
him to wherever he wishes, and I am guarantor of that, Allah will-
ing”; The same reward, and willingness to protect his family and 
kin, is offered for the killing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, in 
the full page illustration, pp. 69-70. Then, see Sheikh Abu Qatada, 
“The Markets of Faith,” pp. 41-44. On p. 41, Sheikh Abu Qatada 
refers to Hassan Nasrullah as: “the evil leader of the Rafidha par-
ty in Lebanon,” which he says: “is of course a serious issue, along 
with some people’s adopting attributes of the Rawafidh,” but in 
his brief Sharia lesson, he distinguishes between the “Rawafidh” 
(an extreme disbelieving sect of the Shia), and implicitly other 
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Shia less extreme. There is nothing in his article, however, that 
calls for killing even the leadership of the Shia since its conse-
quences for Fitnah are greater than its benefits for the jihad. There 
is, in short, no demonization or takfir of the Shia in general, nor the 
Shia laity in particular. 
187. From Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s 12th Speech, released as 
an audio recording to the Internet September 24, 2008; see Nibras 
Kazimi, “Fascinating: The Jihadists Admit Defeat in Iraq,” May 
15, 2008, available in talismangate.blogspot.com/2008/05/fascinating-
jihadists-admit-defeat-in.html, accessed on August 18, 2014.
188. See also, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, “As For the Foam, it 
Passes Away as Scum,” Speech presented c. between October 
15, 2007, and January 29, 2008, available from https://archive.org/
stream/AsForTheFoamItPassesAwayAsScum/As%20For%20the%20
Foam,%20it%20Passes%20Away%20as%20Scum_djvu.txt, accessed 
on August 10, 2016. 
189. The present author believes that the key source for un-
derstanding the deeper theological structure of these debates is, 
as earlier stated, Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval The-
ology. Also of considerable value, are several scholarly contribu-
tions by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi expert: Joas Wagemakers, 
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id, “THE BATTLE OF MARATHON: MESSAGE TO THE 99% OF 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 50; 
Full page illustration, Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 51, has an 
image of Tzarnaev—next to him, a poem, SHEIKH ABU BISHR 
NASSIRUD DEEN BIN ABDULLAH, “FAREWELL, O HERO!” 
[written to Tzarnaev]; Yahya Ibrahim, “Editor’s Letter,”  Inspire, 
Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 4, lays out assumptions well in the first 
paragraph: 
Muslims continue to face the results and consequences of 
the fierce crusade aggression against Islam. The aggression 
that clearly manifested itself after the blessed 9/11 attacks. 
Exposing the hidden and true enmity they had towards 
Muslims and Islam. Revealing themselves in different forms 
of aggression: plundering Muslim wealth, occupying their 
lands, imprisoning their men and women, killing their 
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scholars and the worst of all is the aggression towards the 
very core principles of Islam. . . . We at Inspire, and in the 
cause of the events of 9/11 encourage the Muslims in the West 
to join the Lone Jihad caravan. The caravan that has and will 
always continue to trouble and bring nightmares to the west.
“WORDS  OF WISDOM,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 14-15, 
contains quotes from: Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi, Yahya Gadahn, 
Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawāhiri, Sheikh Abu Mus’ab Az-Zarqa-
wy, Sayyed Qutb, Sheikh Hussam ‘Abdul-Ra’uf, Hamza Usama 
Bin Laden. 
See also, the issues of Inspire, which contain works by AQO 
senior leadership. For example: Osama bin Laden, “THE WAY 
TO SAVE THE EARTH,” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 8-10; 
“RELIVING USAMA’S WORDS,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, 
pp. 18-19, which quotes from Osama bin Ladin, “Address to the 
American People,” Address presented in 2004; “An Address to the 
Revolutionaries,” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 51-53; “Free-
dom from Blind Following,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 56 (ex-
cerpt from bin Laden’s book, Methodological Instructions [Tawjihat 
al-Manhajiyyah]); Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Message to the People of 
Yemen,” Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 11; “The Open Meeting 
with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 10 
(Palestine focused); “Taken from ‘The Open Meeting with Shaykh 
Ayman al-Zawahiri’,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 32; “Defending 
the Prophet,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 12-13, where he says: 
“America has allowed the production of a film which commits 
blasphemy against the Prophet”; see also, the “Zio-crusade war” 
and “Judaizing of Al-Quds”; “Iman defeats Arrogance,” Inspire, 
Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 10-12, described as the first part of a tran-
script from a recently released As-Sahab film with same name, a 
speech; “Letter to the American People,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 
2014, pp. 12-14, includes first heading, “Why Do We Fight and 
Resist You?,” and next heading, “To What Do We Call You and 
What Do We Want of You?,” then lists seven demands, and con-
clusion; Adam Yahiye Gadahn, “Legitimate Demands, Barack’s 
Dilemma,” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 69-70; “Know that Jihad is 
Your Duty,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 17; “INSPIRE EXCLU-
SIVE: From Adam Gadahn,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 36-
38. At the bottom of p. 36 it describes Gadahn’s promised contri-
bution: “The following is an extract from the promised interview 
‘The Arab Intifada,’ which we were not able to release for timing 
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reasons . . .” The excerpt comprises three parts: “To the Govern-
ments of the Crusader West”; “To the Mujahideen Around the 
World”; and “Finally, To Those Calling to Islam and Jihad in Gen-
eral, and Those Working on the Internet in Particular.” Gadahn’s 
message to the West (p. 37) is essentially “Get out! Or else!” To 
“the Mujahidin” he offers the Classic AQO Bleed USA, France and 
Britain to economic crisis and near-collapse, and offers a trade-
off—“either the continuation of the Crusade against the Muslims 
and the continuation of their backing of Israel, or the continuation 
of viable governments and basic public services [in the West]” (p. 
38). Again: “[T]he Arab uprisings show that the American empire 
is at an unprecedented stage of weakness and decline” (Ibid.). Our 
strategy? “[L]et’s continue to bleed the head of unbelief dry and 
let’s beware of all attempts to divert us from our strategic objec-
tive or draw us into any battles of lower priority, particularly in 
light of the new realities in the region” (Ibid.). And, to “the Callers 
and Media,” he advises to use every method, and every media—
old and new—to reach every segment, in a way they understand:
we should fully acquaint ourselves with both the people to 
whom we are reaching out as well as the methodology and 
cause to which we are inviting them, so that we are able to hone 
our methods, refine our techniques and spread our message in 
an intelligent and educated fashion accessible to all sectors, sec-
tions, levels and factions of the Ummah (Ibid.).
Abu Yahya al-Libi, “The Middle Path and the Enemy’s Plot,” In-
spire,  Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 13-15; “It is either Jihad or Disgrace. 
So Choose,” Iss. 6, pp. 55-56; “Take from their guidance for there 
is no refuge from jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 54-55 (ex-
cerpts from his book, Jihad and the Battle of Misconceptions); “Cow-
ardliness will always be cowardliness even if you consider it to 
be using wisdom,” Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 49; “The Ameri-
can Army & War Ethics,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 26-27. 
This is stock propaganda extolling the Truth and Allah, and the 
False America and Shaytan. It attempts to Satanize the American 
military over a few select abuses that occurred but were neither 
officially sponsored nor condoned. The spirit: 
This test is the battle between the camp of Tawheed and the 
camp of Kufr; the allies of Allah and the allies of Shaytan. The 
allies of Shaytan have a disease in their hearts. This disease 
manifests itself with their jealously and plotting against those 
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who believe. With their total hate of Allah’s guidance and His 
laws [p.26].
210. See the following issues of Inspire, which contain excerpts 
from Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, n.p., 
n.d., in a series. Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENC-
ES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire,  Iss. 1, Summer 2010, 
pp. 48-54, contains excerpts from ch. 8, sec. 4. The following issues 
continue ch. 8, sec. 4, defending the necessity of an individualized 
terrorist modus operandi: 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: 
[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, 
pp. 17-21; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, 
pp. 31-35; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: 
[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, 
pp. 29-32; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, 
p. 15; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: 
[THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, 
pp. 18-19; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, 
pp. 23-24; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, 
pp. 22-24; 
• Abū Muş’ab al-Sūrī, “THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE 
SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD],” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, 
pp. 42-43. 
211. See the following article series: Anwar al-Awlaki, “Why 
Did I Choose Al Qaeda?” in the following issues of Inspire: Iss. 4, 
Winter 2010, pp. 48-50; Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 62-64; Iss. 6, Sum-
mer 2011, pp. 32-34; Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 50-53; Iss.9, Winter 2012, 
pp. 42-43; Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 34-35; Iss.11, Spring 2013, p. 27; 
Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 32-33. 
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212. “Spying: I am a Muslim, Spying is Kufr,” Inspire, Iss. 4, 
Winter 2010, p. 36 (likely related to drone warfare); Anwar al-
Awlaki, “The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers wealth in 
Dar al-Harb,” Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 55-60; “Targeting 
the Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims: 
Coming Soon,” Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, p. 36 (Advertisement for 
al-Awlaki’s  upcoming article). Anwar al-Awlaki, “Targeting the 
Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims,” In-
spire,  Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 40-47; Shaykh Harith al-Nadhari, “The 
Ruling of Burning the Forests in the Lands of the Kuffar Enemies,” 
Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 45-48; Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, 
“Condition for the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire,  Iss. 12, Spring 
2014, pp. 34-35; Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi, “A Message to the Ameri-
can People Regarding the Killing of the Hostage Luke Summers,” 
Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 8-9; “Excerpts from Al-Malahem’s 
Q & A Session with Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi,” Inspire,  Iss. 13, Winter 
2014, p. 9 (Includes the question, “What is the role of the lone Mu-
jahideen in repelling this crusade?”); Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, 
“The Word of Tawheed: Part 2: The Meaning and the Pillars of the 
Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 38-39 (also 
advertises “Next Issue: The Types of Tawheed” [p. 39]); “Q & A 
with Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 
52-53 (responses to five emailed questions); Sheikh Harith An-
Nadhary, “Conditions of the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Iss. 14, 
Summer 2015, pp. 24-29.
213. See the ongoing article series, “Open Source Jihad” (OSJ) 
in the following issues of Inspire: Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 31-44; 
Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 51-59; Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 37-43; Iss. 5, 
Spring 2011, pp. 22-25; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 36-45; Iss. 8, Fall 
2011, pp. 27-39; Iss.9, Winter 2012, pp. 26-40 (includes creedal 
permission to firebomb and start forest fires, etc.); Iss. 10, Spring 
2013, pp. 49-57 (includes torching parked cars, causing road acci-
dents with oil, ambushing, and tire bursters). For their delusional 
reasoning: 
The goal is . . . that if enough Muslims fulfill their obligations to 
Jihad, the Kuffar and their insurance companies will be so sick 
of the terror caused and money wasted by these simple opera-
tions that they will press their government to stop the tyranny 
against Muslims. These operations come under the umbrella of 
deterrence operations [p. 55].
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See also, OSJ Specialist Consultant, “You Ask, We Answer,” In-
spire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 56, who put the question, “Who can 
use OSJ tools and ideas?” and supplies the answer: 
Inspire Magazine seeks to free the oppressed nations from the 
Western Hegemony [sic]. There tools are for muslims [sic] in 
particular, but others could also use them in their war against 
the present oppressors, America and its allies [emphasis in 
original].
“Lone Mujahid Pocketbook: A step to step guide on how to be-
come a successful lone mujahid. Collected from Inspire Magazine 
Issue 1-10’s OSJ [sic],” Inspire, Open Source Jihad Special, No 
Number given, pp. 1-63; Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 62-72 
(on car bombs; at pp. 71-72, a large photograph with the heading, 
“The right man in the right place devastates the enemy: Choose 
wisely”); Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 15, presents a “martyr-
dom seeker” with New York City in the background, and states: 
“If you Have the Knowledge and Inspiration all That’s Left is to 
Take Action. OSJ: Empowering Muslims”; “Interview with the 
AQ-Chef [bombmaker],” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21; 
“From AQ’s Kitchen: The Hidden Bomb: 1.Breaching Airport Se-
curity; 2.Making the Hidden Bomb; 3. Field Tactics,” Inspire, Iss. 
13, Winter 2014, pp. 66-109. This OSJ section is earlier introduced 
by Yahya Ibrahim, “Editor’s Letter,” p. 4, in the following words: 
Hereby, Inspire Magazine is committed to arm Muslim indi-
viduals—as well as Muslim groups as is in this issue—in their 
Jihad on America. Previously, we have presented Muslims with 
different weapons, including bombs and tactics. . . . Now we 
are obliged to give your ummah something special. Something 
unique that can easily be prepared at home.
Also, at p. 69, see the following dedication: 
Dedication: To the vanguard of lone jihad; Ramzi Yusuf, ‘Umar 
Farouq, Richard Ried [sic] among other brothers. . . . To he who 
Humiliated American’s [sic] arrogance, the lion behind bars, 
Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. . . . To our amir Dr. Aiman Ad-
wawahir [al-Zawahiri]. . . . To every Muslim concerned with 
supporting the religion.
At the end of this OSJ section an assassination list is supplied, 
which includes the following: 
264
American Economy High Profile Target: We can categorize 
them into two groups . . .  Economic Personalities. . .  and 
Wealthy Entrepeneurs—These are people who run the Ameri-
can economy. They are considered to be the great economic 
minds. It is not necessary for them to have a large capital [sic]. 
One example is Ben Shalom Bernanke. He is the current Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United 
States, one of the most important influential personalities in the 
stock market and world economy.
(A photo of Bernanke accompanies this section.) Also on Inspire’s 
assassins list are: “‘Company Owners’: They have the largest 
capitals [sic], the greatest investors in America. One of them is 
William Henry ‘Bill’ Gates, the current chairman of Microsoft. He 
has a great influence in the American economy” [sic] (also accom-
panied by a picture of Gates). See also, p. 111: Detailed instruc-
tions on how to carry out an assassination of these persons, under 
the heading, “Preparation Steps of the Operation,” where one is 
instructed to wait for a “Chance,” and instructions are offered to 
potential targets on how they may avoid assassination: 
The economists and wealthy people can save themselves and 
their money by following simple conditions: 1. Drawing all 
their money from American banks, and moving them to banks 
that are not related to the American stock market. 2. Investing 
their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that 
he is far from American policies towards Muslims and Ameri-
ca’s support for Israel. 
See also, Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 61, appearing just be-
fore the official OSJ section, a “Did You Know?” claiming a 95.7% 
success rate of smuggling a water bottle through United States 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security measures; 
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 62-
71, includes the following: “A. Specifying a Target, B. Collecting 
Information, C. Generating a Plan, Preparing for the Operation, 
Executing the Operation”; The AQ-Chef, “Designing a Hand Gre-
nade,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 72-81; Reconnaissance 
Team, “Assassinations: Field Tactics,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 
2015, pp. 82-87. Presented here are photographs of: “Economic 
Personalities” Bernanke and Robert James Shiller (listing the lat-
ter’s accomplishments, and as a co-recipient of 2013 Nobel in 
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Economic Science); “Wealthy Enterprenuers [sic] and Company 
Owners,” listing multi-billionaires Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, 
Lawrence Joseph (Oracle), Charlie and David Koch, Sam Walton, 
Sheldon Adelson, and Michael Bloomberg. The article repeats 
(see p. 87) the conditions required for removal from their targeted 
assassination list: 
And we repeat what we had mentioned in the previous issue 
to whosover wants to secure himself and wealth [sic], we say. 
. . 1. Drawing all their money from American banks, and mov-
ing them to banks that are not related to the American stock 
market. 2. Investing their wealth outside American soil. 3. De-
claring via media that he is far from American policies towards 
Muslims and America’s support for Israel.
214. See Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 5-29 for statements 
about Nigerian Umar al-Faruq Friday, December 25, 2009, at-
tempted downing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 jet; “Opera-
tion Hemmorhage,” Inspire, Iss. 3, November 2010, pp. 3-10, 13-16 
(explosive cartridges sent to Jewish synagogues); “Prepared by 
The External Operations Team: Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves 
& Isolating the Head [of the Snake],” Inspire, Iss. 13, front cover, 
Winter 2014, and pp. 60-63: This article declares: 
In short, the program [Neurotmesis] is about targeting different 
modes of transport. These are counted as the security’s Achil-
les’ heel, e.g. aviation and others. These targets include public 
and private, passenger and freight transport system. 
It continues: “this program is for you, Muslim in the West. We 
single you out because you yearn to act and support, to repel and 
expel aggressors and oppressors” (p. 60). It then outlines a gen-
eral program, including identifying “main pillars of the American 
power. [sic] American’s war—like any other country or organiza-
tion—is based on four main pillars: 1. Military technology; 2. Man-
power; 3. Media; 4. Economy.” The article concludes by describ-
ing “the Military Policy of Al-Qaeda in its War Against America” 
(pp. 62-63) and various direct and indirect economic targets (pp. 
62-64); Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi [AQAP], “Statement Regarding the 
Blessed Paris Operation: ‘Vengeance for the Prophet’,” Inspire, 
Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 7-9; Ibrahim Hassan Az-A’sir, “Char-
lie Hebdo: Military Analysis,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 
38-42; “Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who 
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insult the prophet [sic] and religion of Islam” (10 listed, both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful attacks), in Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, 
pp. 48-49 (see also, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki listed at bottom 
with lift-out quotes); see also, “The Greatest Special Operation of 
all Time: The Expeditions of Washington, D.C. and New York,” 
Inspire, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, Special Issue: 10th Anniversary of 9/11, 
pp. 12-14; “A Decade in Pictures: From 9/11 Till Today,” Inspire, 
Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 16-35, which leads off with this quote, p. 16: 
A great and powerful nation, isolated from the rest of the world 
by two great oceans, America believed it could carry on with an 
imperialistic policy in the Muslim world without suffering the 
consequences. 9/11 proved America wrong. American’s [sic] 
evil has come back to haunt it. Following 9/11, George W. Bush 
promised a war on Islam and Muslims, which he termed the 
‘War on Terror.’ He also forecasted [sic] that this war would 
be a long one. Here we look into the main events and conse-
quences of what is turning out to be an epic conflict between the 
Muslims and the West.
215. See for example: “How to communicate with us” page 
appearing in various issues: Inspire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 72; Inspire, 
Iss. 3, November 2010, p. 22; Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 44-46 
(including here an extensive discussion of operational security); 
Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 65; Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, p. 
67 (includes advertisement for digital downloads); Inspire, Iss. 5, 
Spring 2011, p. 69; Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 60; Inspire, Iss. 7, 
Fall 2011, p. 37; Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 62; Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 
2012, p. 61; Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 60; Inspire, Iss. 11, Spe-
cial Issue, Spring 2013, p. 38. 
216. The following is the virtual universal set of these themes 
as presented in Inspire. See “O Martyr, You have illuminated,” 
Inspire, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 30; “MY LIFE IN JIHAD: THE 
STORY OF COMMANDER `UTHMAN AL-GHAMIDI,” Inspire, 
Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 11-16; Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani “O HESI-
TANT ONE: IT’S AN OBLIGATION,” Inspire,  Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 
65-66 (“author” murdered a CIA team in Khost in blackmail); In-
spire, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 67-68 (re: martyrs); Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 
2010, p. 25 (re: advertisement, “What Will You Choose,” Jannah 
[Paradise] or Hellish Torment, and at the bottom of the page the 
tag line states: “This ad a product of INDIVIDUAL JIHAD”; Abu 
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Khowla, “WHICH IS BETTER: MARTYRDOM OR VICTORY?” 
Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 26-28; Inspire, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, 
p. 62 (re: Jihadi Cool, Gangsta-type rap poem); Inspire, Iss. 4, Win-
ter 2010, p. 64 (re: Shuhada [martyrdom]-type videos); Inspire, Iss. 
5, Spring 2011, pp. 56-59 (re: Jihad Stories); Inspire, Iss. 5, Spring 
2011, p. 61 (re: Abyan, Yemen In Search of Martyrdom); “Shuha-
da Exclusive,” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 16-30, with focus 
on Abu Ali Al-Harithi, Ammar al-Wa’ili, and Fawaz al-Ma’ribi. 
Some lift out quotes include: “So why do you continue to rush to 
your homes and not to the palaces of Paradise” (p. 24),  and “Be-
fore he would set out in any operation, he would raise his hands 
to the heavens and beg Allah for shahada, crying endlessly” (p. 
29); “Progeny of the Exceptional” Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 
54; Inspire, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 57 (re: a quote from Sahih al-
Bukhari):
All my [Prophet Muhammad] followers will enter Paradise ex-
cept those who refuse. They [his followers] asked, ‘O Allah’s 
Apostle! Who will refuse?’ He said, ‘Whoever obeys me will 
enter Paradise, and whoever disobeys me is the one who re-
fuses (to enter it).’
Shaykh Ibrahim al-Banna, “The martyrdom of the Commander 
Abu Ayman,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 12-15; Ayub Sideeq, 
“The unique trait of al-mu’minîn,” Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 58-
59 (re: The unique trait of the faithful is incitement to martyrdom); 
Inspire, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 60-61 (re: two pages—one an adver-
tisement for the “Convoy of Martyrs” video, and the second a 
poem, “The hymn of my life”; Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 8-21 
(re: the section, “Shuhada’ Special”). This includes an ultra-mar-
tyrdom quote from Prophet Muhammad, p. 8, and the following 
articles: Shaykh Harith Al Nadari, “My story with Al Awlaki,” 
pp. 9-13; Abu Yazeed, “Samir Khan: The Face of Joy,” pp. 14-19; 
Um Ahmed, “They Killed Father, They Killed Son,” p. 20, ”The 
Path of Honor,” p. 21 (re: martyrdom-celebrating prose); “OSJ,” 
Inspire, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 28 (re: “The Convoy of Martyrs: Rise 
up and board with us”), located at the beginning of the OSJ sec-
tion,  reads: 
The objective of this workshop is to communicate with those 
seekmartyrdom [sic] operations or those who want to execute a 
slaughter to the enemies of Islam, those who have no means of 
contacting their Mujahideen brothers whatever the reasons, the 
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aim is to activate them in the midst of the enemy weather [sic] 
the enemy was [sic] the Jews, the Christians or the apostates. 
It is becoming obvious to many that the concept of individual 
jihad which features [sic] have begun to appear recently has 
been called for by the leaders of jihad. it [sic] is briefly that 
one individual only carries out the entire jihadi operation. 
For more information about the concept of individual jihad, 
watch the film entitled ‘You are not held responsible except 
for yourself’ produced by al-Sahab jihadi foundation. [And 
at the very bottom of this one-page introduction, targets are 
identified] . . .  “Targets: 1-Personalities who are at war with 
Islam and Muslims; 2-Economic targets belonging to the 
enemy; 3-Military targets belonging to the enemy; 4-Media 
targets belonging to the enemy.
It continues under the heading “Targets according to priority” . . . 
“American targets; Israeli targets; French targets; British targets; 
Apostate regimes targets in the Muslims’s lands” (p. 28); Inspire, 
Iss. 9, Winter 2012, (re: quote from the Quran: “The Day their fac-
es will be turned about in the Fire, they will say, ‘How we wish 
we had obeyed Allah and obeyed the Messenger’” [Quran 33:67] 
(p. 44); Abu Muhammad, “Unremorseful Mujahid,” Inspire, Iss. 
9, Winter 2012, p. 59 (re: Umar al-Faruq al-Nigiri); Samir Zafar 
Khan, “The Dust Will Never Settle Down,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 
2013, pp. 12-13 (re: It states: “Written by martyred Brother: Samir 
Zafar Khan (may Alah [sic] accept his martyrdom); Inspire, Iss. 
10, Spring 2013, p. 14 (re: a full-page ad which states, “Yes We 
Can: A Bullet a Day Keeps the Infidel Away; Defend Prophet 
Muhammed peace be upon him.”), Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 
15 (re: “Wanted Dead or Alive for Crimes Against Islam”; elev-
en pictures are posted, and two names without pictures in large 
font, for targeted assassination accused of insulting/blasphem-
ing the Prophet); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 19 (re: advertise-
ment for “a video coming soon” . . . “He Takes from Among You 
Martyrs, 5.”); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 20 (re: quote, Quran 
9:111 [i.e., a key covenant promise of eternal life and abundance 
for killing and being killed in military jihad] centered on page, 
as stand-alone); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 21, (re: Abu Ziyad 
Al-Muhajir, “Brother ‘Askar, Abu Yazeed Al-Qatary,” obituary 
on his “martyrdom” in Sana’a); Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 25 
(re: a photograph of a “mujahid” with gun strapped on shoul-
der longing to fight with a poem placed in the foreground which 
reads: “Whoever does not die by the sword, will die by other 
means, Various are the means but death is one, Provided there 
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is no escape from death, it is of weakness that you die in a cow-
ardly manner.”); Taiel Haya, Women of Jihad—Facebook, “My 
Wish: If only I was a mujahid,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 30; 
Umm Yahya, “Women of the Glorious Ummah,” Inspire, Iss. 10, 
Spring 2013, pp. 31-33 (re: After deconstructing the shallowness 
of materialism, instilling guilt, and perplexity about purpose, and 
addressing doubts others raise about female weakness and value, 
the following is stated:  
O sister, you have to wake up the hearts of the men, and 
arouse the determination of the heroes, and say, ‘We refuse 
humiliation and subjection, misery or subservience; and we 
want to be free from having to bow to the cross worshippers. 
You have to push your loved ones to the battlefield’ [empha-
sis added]. The Lord of the worlds is more deserving that we 
sacrifice what is most beloved to us for His sake, from our lives 
and our wealth. I say to you my Muslim sister, the least that is 
expected from you is when the men leave for Jihad, that you 
stay patient and are pleased with Allah’s orders [p. 32]. 
It continues: 
Our everyday life struggle is nothing compared to the agony 
and pain of our sisters in Palestine, Burma, Syria, Somalia and 
Afghanistan. There is so much more within your reach than the 
narrow path you have carved out for yourself. You are not like 
the others, you are a strong-willed muslimah [Muslim woman]  
who wants to build a nation that says no to oppression. A mus-
limah who wants to abide by the rules of Allah [p. 33].
Abu  ‘Ubaydah Al-Hadramy, “Oh Who Sits Behind,” Inspire, Iss. 
10, Spring 2013, p. 40; Ansar Dine, Salafi Media, “America will 
never Profit from the Assassination of Imam Anwar Awlaki,” 
Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 41; Yahya Ibrahim, “We Are all 
Usama,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 42-44 (re: Hagiographic 
account of Osama bin Laden, and editor Yahya Ibrahim’s wishful 
thinking on bin-Laden’s role in current Arab uprisings;. Sheikh 
Harith An-Nadhary, [killed in USG drone strike, January 31, 
2015] “To the Knights of Lone Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, 
p. 46, (re: Lecture excerpt from his “Mujahideen in the Cities,”) it 
begins: 
You are Lethal! You are Devastating! You are the knight who 
strikes the enemy’s heart, penetrating his armor, exposing his 
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vulnerabilities. You are the David who cuts down the Goliath. 
This unique heroic act can only be performed by you, with 
steadfast determination, unfaltering courage and rock-solid 
resolution. Few are selected for Allah for this purpose. The fol-
lowing advises [sic] are presented to the knights of lone jihad 
[emphasis added, p. 46].
Sheikh Harith An-Nadhary then lays out six principles: Reliance 
on Allah, Avoidance of Sins, Trust in the Promise and Reward 
of Allah, Perseverance, “‘Have a good omen,’  i.e., Don’t worry, 
you will again be near your target, and Patience,” Inspire, Iss. 10, 
Spring 2013, p. 47 (re: A lone jihad ad; hoodie-clad, dark, oversee-
ing a huge metropolis, with quote from Quran “So fight in the 
cause of Allah, you are not held responsible except for yourself. 
And inspire the believers” [4: 84]); “The Battalion of Terror,”  In-
spire, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 58-59 (re: A full-page ad with M-16, 
and suicide belt). It states:
IT IS YOU, YES IT’S YOU AND YOU ALONE—THE TER-
RORIST NEXT DOOR. SO BE TRUE TO ALLAH, AND BEING 
TRUE TO ALLAH IS TAKING YOUR WEAPON, PRAYING 
YOUR TWO RAKAAT, ASKING ALLAH TO HELP YOU—
GET OUT TO YOUR ENEMY, HE IS JUST NEXT DOOR. 
Among the quotes to follow: “It’s Either Victory or Martyrdom! 
. . . Did you Know that the Oppressed Muslims all Over the World 
are Waiting for You to Act?” pp. 58-59; “Dear American Muslim,” 
Inspire,  Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 16-17 (re: includes 
Boston Marathon bombing); Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 
2013, pp. 18-25 (re: Several short incitement jihad/martyrdom 
pieces and photographs concluding with Boston bomber); In-
spire, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 26 (re: Advertisement 
for “Convoy of Martyrs, 2,” a video with English subtitles); Mu-
hammad As-San’ani, “An Eye for an Eye; The Dear Price & The 
Constant Turmoil,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue,  Spring 2013, 
p. 24 (re: adulatory account of the savage beheading of an off-
duty British soldier by Adebolajo and Adebowale; Boston Mara-
thon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev referenced using agitational 
propaganda (“agitprop”); Tamerlan Tsaraev is shown decked out 
like a gangsta in Paradise; Abu Abdillah, “Cover Story: Who and 
Why,” Inspire, Iss. 11, Special Issue,  Spring 2013, pp. 28-37 (re: 
on the Boston Marathon terrorist act, an account using incitement 
agitprop; “The Arson Jihad: lex talionis,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 
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2014, p. 14; “Sincere advice from a muhajir,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 
2014, p. 15; “City Wolves,” Inspire,  Iss. 12, Spring 2014,  pp. 30-31; 
Muhannad J. S., “24/7 Terrorism,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, 
pp. 36-40 (re: includes a quote from Rep. Peter T. King in lift out, 
“We have an enemy that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in 
many forms” at  pp. 36-37); Abu Nuh, “The Good, the Lamb and 
the Ugly,” Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, p. 41; Inspire, Iss. 12, Spring 
2014, pp. 50-51 (this includes a photograph of a lone traveler in a 
train and the statement: “For how long will you live in tension? 
Instead of just sitting, having no solution, Simply stand up, pack 
your tools of destruction. Assemble your bomb, ready for detona-
tion.”); “Interview with the AQ-Chef [bombmaker],” Inspire,  Iss. 
13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21 (At page p. 21,  after stating “All in 
all, we call Muslims to participate in lone Jihad and make use 
of what the Mujahideen write and advise so that they achieve 
a better result Biidhnillah [emphasis added].”—article includes 
six “lone mujahid” quotes including Michael Adebolajo Mujahid 
(i.e., the British terrorist who attacked Rigby), Tamour Abudl-
Wahhab, Nidal Hassan (Fort Hood terrorist), Ali Muhammad 
Brown, and Faizal Shahzad (attempted but failed detonation of 
New York City Times Square Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive 
Device [VBIED]); Sheikh Abul-Harith Al-Iraqi, “Strike the Sea 
with Your Stick,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 26-27, the lift 
out paragraph reads: 
Fight in the Way of Allah, even if you have nothing but the 
kitchen of your mom, even if you have nothing but match-
sticks, even if you have nothing but a pressure cooker. Know 
that Allah has subdued everything for us. So be determined 
and place your trust in Allah, and have sincerity [emphasis 
added].
Also presents photographs of over one dozen “martyrs”; Com-
mander Shamel Basayev, “Independence and Courage,” Inspire, 
Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (Excerpt adapted from the book, “The 
Book of a Mujahid.”); “The Journey of Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Win-
ter 2014, p. 30 (re: Advertisement for three part documentary); 
Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Banna, “Between yesterday & tomorrow: the 
language America understands,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, 
pp. 32-33; Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 34-35 (re: Interview 
with AQAP’s Abu Dahdah and Basil Az-Zahrani, “I talk to In-
spire [double entendre intended]”); “Jihad profiles,” Inspire, Iss. 
13, Winter 2014, pp. 40-41 (re: focus on Ramzi Yusuf [real name: 
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Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Kareem], with pictures and time-
line); further states that he is the “First Mujahid to Attack the US 
Homeland” (p. 40); provides a lift out quote at top of page 41 of 
Ramzi Yusuf’s testimony to the court: 
Yes, I am a terrorist, and proud of it as long as it is against the 
U.S. government and against Israel, because you are more than 
terrorists; you are the one [sic] who invented terrorism and us-
ing [sic] it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.”
Also lists eight separate terrorist attacks or attempts, from 1993-
1995; “The Virtues of Inghimaasi: Immersing oneself deep into 
enemy lines to inflict damage or attain Shahada,” Inspire, Iss. 
13, Winter 2014, pp. 42-45, described as “Chapter in the book 
Mashari’ul Ashwaq, by Iman Ibnu Nuhas, translated by Sheikh An-
war Al-’Awlaqi.” Also includes “[five] [e]xamples of Inghimaasi 
operations,” which are listed below along with photographs: the 
2008 Mumbai, India, attack; 2013 Westgate attacks, Nairobi, Ke-
nya; Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hassan; Yemen Defense Ministry, 
and United Nations Headquarters in Mogadishu. It states: “More 
than 23 apostates & 17 crusaders killed,” and in a lift out quote,  
The Messenger of Allah said: ‘A time will come when the best 
among mankind would be a man holding on to the bridle of 
his horse in the Sake of Allah, [sic] whenever he hears a call to 
battle he mounts his horse and searches for death’ [p. 45].
“It’s Not Necessary,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 53, shows a 
picture of a “lone wolf” standing over a crowded street, with the 
following words written above: 
It’s not necessary to do what Muhammad ‘Atta did, [key 9/11 
terrorist perpetrator] it’s enough to do what Nidal Hassan 
[Fort Hood terrorist] did. It’s not necessary to see victory over 
the enemy, it’s enough to be part of making the victory. It’s 
not necessary to travel to the battlefield, it’s enough to kill the 
enemy back home [emphasis added].
Abu Muhammad as-Sana-ani, “Inspire Exclusive: Inspiration: 
The Story of Abu Rawi As-Sway’ari,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, 
pp. 54-55 (includes a description of “Operation: Martyrdom op-
eration on US drone operations base, Say’un, Hadramat); Muhsin 
Ali, “Facing Fear in Jihad,” Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 56-57 
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(includes sidebar, “10 useless matters [i.e., excuses] that cannot be 
benefited from [sic]”); Inspire, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 58-59 (in-
cludes an advertisement sponsored by “A Lone Jihad,” showing 
a man walking a big city street with huge knife, backpack, and a 
grenade); Khalid As-San’ani, “Suleiman Al-Halaby: 18th Century 
Lone Mujahid Assassin: Suleiman Al-Halabi First Lone Mujahid 
to Attack the French,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 30-31; 
“Some Things are too Beautiful to be Forgotten: Will We Ever 
Experience Such a Sight Once More?” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 
2015, pp. 32-33 (shows a picture of 9/11 WTC towers exploding); 
Qadhi Bishr, “Remembering Boston: Friday lecture,” Inspire, Iss. 
14, Summer 2015, pp. 34-36; Abu Nuh, “A Mountain of Ice,” In-
spire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 37; Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 
44-45 (Photograph of al-AQAP Emir al-Wuhayshi killed by USG 
drone strike in June); “Timeline: Selected list of operations target-
ing those who insult the prophet and religion of Islam,” Inspire, 
Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 48-49 (includes 10 listed [successful and 
unsuccessful] attacks); and, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki (listed at 
bottom with lift out quotes); Shaykh Batal’i, “If you Return We 
Too Shall Return,” Inspire, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 52-55.
217. For potential insights on ISO derived from social scien-
tific research on gangs, see Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz, 
“‘I’m down for a Jihad’: How 100 Years of Gang Research can 
inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism,” 
Perspective on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, pp. 104-112, available 
from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/405.
218. “THE MURTADD BROTHERHOOD,” Dabiq, Iss. 14, 
p. 43.
219. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, 
pp. 38-41.
220. Figure 3 adapted from Ibid., p. 38.
221. Ibid., pp. 34-36 (respectively); See also, “THE CONCEPT 
OF IMAMAH (LEADERSHIP): IS FROM THE MILLAH (PATH) 
OF IBRAHIM,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 20-30 (4-part presentation); The 
requirement of Hijrah and Bay’ah to the Caliph is discussed in 
“FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 3-4; Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 
al-Shami, “This is The Promise of Allah,”; Al-Qurashi al-Baghda-
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di, “A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the 
Month of Ramadan.”
222. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 38. 
223. Ibid.
224. Ibid., p. 36.
225. Ibid., p. 35.
226. Ibid.
227. Ibid. The use of the term “mujaddid” here is curious. 
It refers not to the Quran but to a hadith in Sunan Abu Dawood, 
Book 37: Kitab al-Malahim [Battles], Hadith Number 4278, avail-
able from kalamullah.com/sunan-abu-dawood.html, accessed on Oc-
tober 22, 2015, in which it is declared: “Abu Hurairah narrated 
that the Islamic prophet Muhammad said ‘Allah will raise for 
this community at the end of every hundred years the one who 
will renovate its religion for it’.” According to Islamic tradition, 
this great renewer returns the faith to purity, cleansing it of unac-
ceptable accretions, but arises from among the most prominent 
of Islamic scholars or pious rulers. See the question and answer 
from Islamqa.org, “Concept of a Mujaddid and the past and pres-
ent ones,” available from islamqa.org/hanafi/darululoomtt/52180, ac-
cessed on October 21, 2015. Al-Zarqawi’s organization emerges c. 
2000, and it appears his sycophantic followers have bequeathed 
on him this title, which was reserved in past times for sages and 
pious rulers. 
228. See Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
in Iraq, chs. 1, 2.
229. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq,  Iss. 1, p. 37. 
230. Ibid., pp. 36-37. The “istishhadiyyin” [i.e., those who vol-
unteer to become ‘martyrdom seekers’] are what we now refer 
to as “suicide bombers” or “martyrdom operations.” Recall that 
al-Zarqawi’s encounter with Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir was key 
to his acceptance of these operations on Sharia grounds. See also, 
Hamza Mustafa, “Inghimasis’ . . . Fourth Generation of ISIS’s 
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Bombers,” Asharq Al-Awsat, July 11, 2016, available from www.
opensource.gov, accessed on July 11, 2016, for a description of this 
ultra-fanatical special unit designed, according to Mustafa, to 
“fight till the last breath before they explode themselves . . . [and 
as] . . . a special faction of ISIS, which pledged victory or death 
and never to be captured or run away.”
231. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 37.
232. Ibid.
233. Ibid.
234. Ibid. 
235. See Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, and Muhammad 
al-Obaidi, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against 
Muslims, Occasional Paper Series, West Point, NY: Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, December 1, 2009, pp. 2-3, avail-
able from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/deadly-vanguards-a-study-
of-al-qaidas-violence-against-muslims, accessed on January 3, 2010.
236. For examples of the earliest publicity glorifying these ter-
rorist operations, and easily classifiable as pertinent to this phase, 
see ISLAMIC STATE NEWS, Iss. 1, June 1, 2014, available from 
jihadology.net/2014/05/31/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-
a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-is-
lamic-state-news-1/, accessed on August 6, 2014; ISLAMIC STATE 
NEWS, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/05/
al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-
state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-2/, accessed 
August 20, 2014; ISLAMIC STATE REPORT, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, 
available from jihadology.net/2014/06/07/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-
center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-
magazine-islamic-state-report-2/, accessed on July 8, 2014; and, 
ISLAMIC STATE NEWS, Iss. 3, c. June 2014, available from jih-
adology.net/2014/06/10/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-
new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-
state-news-3/, accessed on August 28, 2014. Hereafter all citations 
to the Islamic State News or The Islamic State Reports magazines re-
fer only to issue number without the publication date. This graph-
ic pictorial format accompanied by brief reports on terrorist “ni-
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kaya” attacks was later incorporated in sections of their flagship 
publication, Dabiq. For evidence in Dabiq, see “ISLAMIC STATE 
NEWS,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 42-48 (which documents terror attacks 
and alleged acts of “repentance”); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17 (discussion of fighting, destruction of 
“Shirk” (i.e., destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and mosques); 
“ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 12-22 (documents 
“punishing the  Sahwat,” i.e., punishing in practice everyone who 
opposes ISO, does not repent and turn in their weapons; this sec-
tion includes coverage of terror, destruction, murder, assassina-
tion, and the destruction of shrines); “IN THE WORDS OF THE 
ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 18-29 (includes reports on various aspects of de-
stabilization and terror, but also descriptions of consolidation 
[tamkin]of the State, e.g. creation of a new province “Wilayat Al-
Furat” on basis of the alleged elimination of the historic Sykes-Pi-
cot border, [pp. 18-19]; the conquest of Al-Faluja [p. 20], a pledge 
from Ansar al-Islam [pp. 21-2], various terrorist operations [23-
26]; and, “A Window into the Islamic State” [pp. 27-29] which fo-
cuses on repaired bridges, restored electricity, elderly home care, 
cancer treatment of a child, and services for Muslims, including 
street cleaning [pp. 27-29]);  “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, 
Iss. 6, pp. 26-33 (includes training camps, fighting and consoli-
dation, killing of opponents); “MAJOR OPERATIONS IN LIBYA 
AND SINAI,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 40-41; “SOLDIERS OF TERROR,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 17-19 (documents horrific ISO terror attacks in 
Yemen and Tunisia); “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 3-4  (lauds 
Garland, TX, terrorist attack); “For the Sake of Allah FISABILIL-
LAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 5 (a terrorist incitement/recruitment ad-
vertisement directed at Germany, Britain, France, and Australia); 
Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 27 (several videos advertised, including presenta-
tion in the 4th video of a horrified person displaying an extreme 
fear face, and also includes attack and terror scenes); “HAR-
VESTING THE SAHWAH” and “THE CAPTURE OF THE 4TH 
REGIMENT BASE,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 28-30; “The Yarmūk Camp,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 34-36 (directed at “the tawaghit [idolaters] of 
[Palestinian] Hamas . . . [who are] appealing to Iran for interven-
tion, while the PLO tawaghit are agreeing to have their militias 
serve as a Nusayri Sahwah”); “Until There Came to Them Clear 
Evidence,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 43 (a one-page gang-like murderdom 
advertisement that portrays  a brutal assassin standing above a 
kneeling, submissive hostage—with subtitles in English, French, 
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Kurdish, Turkish, and German—and providing instructions on 
how to download it); Dabiq, Iss. 9, p. 78 (a one-page advertise-
ment for 10 videos whose covers portray destruction, execution, 
bombings, and extreme fear-faces of victims; mimics format of 
widely-available shooter-videos); “AMERICAN KURDISTAN,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 30-34 (a dehumanized, demonization of Kurds); 
“THE FINAL STATEMENT OF ABŪ SINĀN AN-NAJDĪ,” Dabiq, 
Iss. 11, pp. 34-35 (the Saudi terrorist who carried out a terrorist 
operation on Saudi soil; his “Shahid” [martyrdom] statement 
published here); “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 15 (a one-page 
advertisement for 10 videos focused on murder, terror, fighting, 
and “repentance”; the 10th video is titled, “There is Life in Retri-
bution,” displays a sheathed sword). 
237. McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, p. 32.
238. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, 
pp. 37-38.
239. For an excellent and incisive examination of the ISI’s Ca-
liphate pretension, and their relation to the history of the Sunni 
Caliphate, see especially: Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate At-
tempted,” p. 1, Kazimi states, for example, “The Islamic State of 
Iraq was to be the first incarnation of the resurrected caliphate, 
and its leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi was to be the caliph in 
waiting.” For earlier critiques of Caliphalism within Islam, ow-
ing to the divergence between its ideal and real existence in Is-
lamic governance, see Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist 
Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Takfir Groups,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 
Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and 
Militance, Chicago and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 
1993, p. 153. 
240. There are multiple spellings of this person’s name; how-
ever, this book commonly refers to this person as Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi. In keeping with the quoted material from “FROM 
HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 34-40, in this sec-
tion (Phase 4: Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State of 
Islam [Tamkin]) of this book, the spelling is presented as Amirul-
Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi.
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241. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 39.
242 . For an excellent report based on captured documents be-
tween 2005-2009, see Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Les-
sons Learned from Inside Al Qa’ida in Iraq, March 16, 2009, available 
from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on November 8, 2014.
243. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq,  Iss. 1, pp. 38-39. 
244. Ibid., p. 40.
245. Associated Press (AP), “Syrian protestors taunt Assad, 
saying regime next to unravel,” Al Arabiya News, August 23, 2011, 
available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/23/163646.html, 
accessed on August 31, 2016; Roula Hajjar, “Libyan rebels’ ad-
vance emboldens Syrian activists: Protesters say uprisings in the 
region are connected and that they will continue their peaceful 
movement against President Bashar Assad,” Los Angeles Times, 
August 22, 2011, available from articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/22/
world/la-fg-libya-syria-20110823, accessed on August 16, 2016.
246. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.
247. These developments were emerging as a source of great 
concern for scholars then beginning to examine the consequences 
of Syria’s rebellion for re-igniting this Zarqawist ember. See for 
example: Kazimi, “Western Inaction, Lebensraum for Jihad”; Mi-
chael R. Gordon and Wesley S. Morgan, “The General’s Gambit: 
Petraeus tried to warn Assad about the foreign fighters in Iraq. 
Now they’re coming for him,” Foreign Policy, October 1, 2012, 
available from foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/01/the-generals-gambit/, 
accessed on August 16, 2016; Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Syria 
Emerges as a New Battlefield for Jordan’s Jihadists,” Terrorism 
Monitor, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 10, 2013, available from www.
jamestown.org, accessed on October 2, 2014; Brian Fishman, “Syria 
Proving More Fertile than Iraq to Al-Qa’ida’s Operations,” CTC 
Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 11-12, November 2013, pp. 1-6, available from 
www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on December 2, 2013; Dr. W. Andrew 
Terrill, “Op-Ed: Will the Syrian Civil War Last 10 More Years?” 
December 30, 2013, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Will-the-Syrian-Civil-War-Last-10-More-
Years/2013/12/30, accessed on January 6, 2014. The scholarly anal-
ysis of the ISI’s re-emergence within Iraq c. 2012-2013 is also on 
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display: Bruce Riedel, “Zarqawism Lives: Iraq’s al Qaeda Night-
mare Is Back,” Op-Ed, August 12, 2013, available from https://
www.brookings.edu/opinions/zarqawism-lives-iraqs-al-qaeda-night-
mare-is-back/, accessed on August 16, 2016. 
248. Fortunately, much of this is now available in English 
translation, and interested readers may experience for themselves 
the documentary evidence of this fitnah, and why it is inconceiv-
able without a fundamental transformation of ISO creed, to imag-
ine any future reconciliation between these two Sunni terrorist 
organizations. To preserve the historical record, and to fully com-
prehend how this unfolded, we present these in chronological or-
der, alternating between organizations (labeled ISO and AQO) as 
they level charges and respond. 
For Fitnah Speeches/Writings subsequent to his April 7, 2013 
ISIS declaration, but before the official Caliphate speech by ISO 
spokesman al-Adnani June 28, 2014, see: 
• [ISO] April 7, 2013, see al-Quraishi al-Baghdadi, “The 
Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” 
April 7, 2013; 
• [AQO] May 23, 2013, see al-Zawahiri, “Translation of al-
Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to the leaders of 
the two Jihadi groups,” May 23, 2013; 
• [ISO] June 15, 2013, see Abū Bakr al-Hussaynī al-
Baghdādī, “Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām,” Audio-vi-
sual message aired June 15, 2013, original Arabic only, 
available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=AS77jfttxkc, or 
from Aaron Y. Yelin, “New audio-visual message from 
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’s Abū Bakr al-
Hussaynī al-Baghdādī: ‘Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām’,” 
Jihadology, blog entry, posted June 15, 2013, available 
from jihadology.net/2013/06/15/new-audio-visual-message-
from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-abu-bakr-al-
%E1%B8%A5ussayni-al-baghdadi-remaining-in-iraq-and-al-
sham/, accessed on June 18, 2013, (7-minute audio message 
that rejects AQO’s Ayman al-Zawahiri’s ‘Ruling’ that ISIS 
be dissolved and that al-Baghdadi return to the Iraqi the-
ater exclusively); 
• [ISO] July 30, 2013, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 
al-Shami, “ISIL Spokesman Responds to Accusations, 
Announces Military Campaign,” July 30, 2013, Audio 
transcript, available from triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/
dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/13829/ADN20130730_2.
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pdf?sequence=1, accessed on December 8, 2014. (From 
al-’Adnani al-Shami speech, “They shall by no means 
harm you but with a slight evil,” released by al-Furqan 
Media Foundation July 30, 2013; translation of the speech 
also available from archive.org/stream/AlAdnaniMayAl-
lahBeWithYouOOppressedState/Al-Adnani-%20They%20
Shall%20by%20no%20means%20Harm%20you_djvu.txt, 
accessed on December 1, 2014; 
• [AQO] September 14, 2013, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
“General Guidelines for Jihad,” Written message archived 
online by Aaron Y. Yelin, “As-Sahāb Media presents a 
new release from al-Qā’idah’s Dr. Ayman al-Zawāhirī: 
‘General Guidelines for the Work of aJihādī’,” Jihadol-
ogy, blog entry, posted September 14, 2013, available 
from https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/dr-ayman-al-
e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-of-
a-jihc481dc4ab22-en.pdf, accessed on October 10, 2014. (A 
key document identifying AQO’s TQA at this point; also 
creedal, methodological); 
• [AQO] October 8, 2013, see Abdel Moneim al Moshawah, 
“Zawahiri speech, though confused, shows U.S. is still 
main al-Qaeda target,” Perspective, Al Arabiya Institute 
For Studies, October 8, 2013, available from english.alara-
biya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/10/08/Zawahi-
ri-speech-though-confused-shows-U-S-is-still-key-al-Qaeda-
target.html, accessed on December 8, 2014; 
• [AQO] January 7, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-Golani, 
al-Nusrah emir, Audio message posted on Twitter Janu-
ary 7, 2014, (Audio tape only in Arabic. Condemns ISIS 
policy and strategy of weakening war against Assad; call-
ing for truce, prisoner exchange, Sharia adjudication);
• [ISO] c. early to mid-January 2014, see Abu Muham-
mad al-’Adnani al-Shami, “The Scout Doesn’t Lie to His 
People,” translated, transcribed, and archived online by 
Aaron Y. Yelin, “al-Furqān Media presents a new audio 
message from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’s Shaykh 
Abū Muhammad al ‘Adnānī: ‘The Scout Doesn’t Lie To 
His People’,” Jihadology, blog entry, posted on January 
7, 2014, available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/
shaykh-abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-adnc481nc4ab-22the-
scout-doesnt-lie-to-his-people22-en.pdf, accessed on August 
31, 2016. A hardcore response explicating ISO’s alterna-
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tive creed and methods based on power, blood, fear, ter-
ror, submission, and an enemies list; responding to the 
previously mentioned speeches, but also references al-
Golani’s January 7, 2014 audio message; 
• [AQO] January 16, 2014, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Statement 
from Zawahiri’s representative shows Syrian rebel group 
tied to al Qaeda,” The Long War Journal, January 18, 2014, 
available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/
statement_from_zawah.php, accessed on January 20, 2014. 
Provides translated excerpts of Abu Khalid al-Suri’s 
posted Twitter statement criticizing ISIS;
• [ISO] January 19, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Transla-
tion of the new audio-message by Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī,” 
pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted January 19, 2014, 
available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/01/19/
translation-of-the-new-audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-bagh-
dadi/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (Addresses “fitnah” 
among Syrian rebel groups); 
• [AQO] January 23, 2014, see Ayman al-Zawahiri’s speech, 
in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Attempt 
to Stop Syria’s Fitna,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, 
posted January 26, 2014, available from https://pietervanos-
taeyen.com/2014/01/26/ayman-az-zawahiris-attempt-to-stop-
syrias-fitna/, accessed on August 31, 2016, (Sheikh Ayman 
al-Zawahiri urges Mujahideen of Levant to immediately 
stop infighting);
• [AQO] January 23, 2014, see Scott Lucas, “Syria: State-
ment of Al Qa’eda Leader al-Zawahiri: An urgent call to 
our people in the Levant,” EA Worldview, January 23, 
2014, available from eaworldview.com/2014/01/syria-state-
ment-al-qaeda-leader-al-zawahiri/, accessed on December 8, 
2014. (English translation by Flashpoint Partners of full 
audio statement); 
• [AQO] January 23, 2014, see Aaron Y. Zelin, “New 
statement from Dr. ‘Abd Allah bin Muhammad al-
Muhaysinī: “Mubādarah al-Ummah,” Jihadology, 
blog entry, posted January 23, 2014, available from jih-
adology.net/2014/01/23/new-statement-from-dr-abd-allah-
bin-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-mu%E1%B8%A5aysini-
mubadarah-al-ummah/, accessed on December 8, 2014. 
(9-point plan for ending “fitnah,” delivered hours after 
al-Zawahiri’s own address on January 23, 2014; asserts 
“deadline” of 4 days [January 27] for acceptance); 
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• [ISO] January 27, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 
al-Shami, “ISIL’s rejection of the Moheisini peace plan,” 
Excerpts of a translation of Statement in Aron Lund, 
Twitter Post, January 27, 2014, available from twitter.com/
aron_1d/status/427857578014437376/photo/1, accessed on 
December 8, 2014;  
• [AQO] January 30, 2014, Associated Press, “Radical 
Preacher Rebukes Extremists in Syria,” Yahoo News, 
available from https://www.yahoo.com/news/radical-preach-
er-rebukes-extremists-syria-135716934.html?ref=gs, ac-
cessed on August 31, 2016. (Abu Qatada quoted, during 
break from trial after extradition from UK to Jordan);
• [AQO] February 3, 2014, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Pi-
eter Van Ostaeyen, “al-Qaeda disavows ISIS in Syria,” 
pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted February 3, 2014, 
English translation of speech by @IraqiWitness, available 
from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/02/03/al-qaedas-dis 
avows-isis-in-syria/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (The for-
mal AQO disavowal of ISO); 
• [ISO] c. February 2014, see the Brotherhood of Iman state-
ment in, Aaron Y. Zelin, “New release from al-Ghurabā’ 
Foundation for Media Production: ‘Brotherhood of Faith 
in Support of the Islamic State’,” blog entry, posted Feb-
ruary 17, 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/02/17/
new-release-from-al-ghuraba-foundation-for-media-produc-
tion-brotherhood-faith-in-support-of-the-islamic-state/, ac-
cessed on August 31, 2016. (ISO militant claim to exclu-
sive authority, power, right);  
• [AQO] February 24, 2014, see Aron Lund, “Syria in 
Crisis: Who and What Was Abu Khalid al-Suri? Part 
I,” DIWAN: Middle East Insights From Carnegie, Feb-
ruary 24, 2014, available from carnegieendowment.org/
syriaincrisis/?fa=54618, accessed on May 6, 2015. (Abu 
Khalid al-Suri, a top commander in Ahrar al-Sham, was 
killed by ISO February 23, 2014; a solid background 
article); 
• [AQO] February 25, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-Go-
lani, al-Nusrah emir, five-day ultimatum to al-Baghdadi 
to agree to terms of formal arbitration, etc. Reports, and 
English-language excerpts from Arabic original available, 
see Associated Press, “Syria al-Qaeda leader gives rivals 
ultimatum,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2014, available from 
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www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/syria-al-qaeda-
leader-gives-rivals-ultimatum-2014225173857928923.html, 
accessed on December 8, 2014; Naharnet Newsdesk, “Al-
Nusra Gives ISIL Ultimatum after Commander’s Death,” 
February 25, 2014, available from www.naharnet.com/sto-
ries/en/120150, accessed on December 8, 2014;   
• [AQO] March 5, 2014, see Abu ‘Abdullah as-Shami, in 
Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “A Message from Abu ‘Abdullah 
as-Shami, member of Majlis Shura of Jabhat an-Nusra 
and a member of the Sharia Committee,” pietervanos-
taeyen, original video, March 5, 2014, blog entry, posted 
March 8, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.
com/2014/03/08/a-message-from-abu-abdullah-as-shami-mem-
ber-of-majlis-shura-of-jabhat-an-nusra-and-a-member-of-the-
shariah-committee/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (After 
1 year of hostility, lays out a comprehensive, point-by-
point case against ISO based on creed, method, Sharia, ef-
forts at reconciliation, and also, the alternative principles 
and positive grounds for fighting ISO); 
• [ISO] March 7, 2014, see Shaykh Al-Mujāhid Abū Mu-
hammad Al-‘Adnānī Ash-Shāmī, “Then let us invoke 
the curse of Allah upon the liars,” Speech, Eng. trans. 
by Musa Cerantonio, available from justpaste.it/eo3h, ac-
cessed on December 1, 2014, (“rebuts” March 5, 2014 al-
Nusrah allegations); 
• [AQO], March 18, 2014, see Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir 
statements, in Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on 
ISIS spokesman al-’Adnānī (Part I)—Abū Sulaymān al-
Muhājir”; 
• [AQO], c. b/f March 20, 2014, see Abu Firas as-Suri, in 
Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-
’Adnānī (Part II)—Abu Firās as-Sūrī,” pietervanostaeyen, 
blog entry, posted March 27, 2014, available from https://
pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-on-
isis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-ii-abu-firas-as-suri/, accessed 
on December 8, 2014; 
• [AQO] c. late-March 2014, see Shaykh Faruq Abu Hamam 
as-Suri, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat an-Nusra reacts 
on ISIS spokesman al-’Adnānī (Part III)—Shaykh Fārūq 
Abū Hamām as-Sūrī,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, 
posted March 27, 2014, available from https://pietervanos-
taeyen.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-on-isis-spokes-
man-al-adnani-part-iii-shaykh-faruq-abu-hamam-as-suri/; 
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• [ISO] April 14, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani al-
Shami, “A translation of the speech of Abu Muhammad 
al Adnani, official spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Sham,” blog entry, posted April 14, 2014, available 
from ansaaar1.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/a-translation-of-
the-speech-of-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-adnani-official-
spokesman-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-sham/, accessed 
on December 1, 2014; 
• [ISO] April 17, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Message 
by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani as-Shami,” 
pietervanostaeyen, original audio message, April 17, 
2014, blog entry, posted April 18, 2014, available from 
https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/18/message-by-isis-
shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami/, accessed on 
August 31, 2014;
• [AQO] April 21, 2014, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Zawahiri 
discusses infighting in Syria, opposition to Egyptian gov-
ernment,” The Long War Journal, April 21, 2014, avail-
able from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/04/zawa-
hiri_discusses_i.php, accessed on April 22, 2014. (Discusses 
and provides excerpts from al-Zawahiri’s newly released 
audio interview with As Sahab, titled “Reality Between 
Pain and Hope); 
• [AQO] c. April 15-18, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jab-
hat an-Nusra: Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir about the 
Murder of Shaykh Abu Muhammad Fatih,” pietervanos-
taeyen, blog entry, posted April 18, 2014, available from 
https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/18/jabhat-an-nusra 
-shaykh-abu-sulayman-al-muhajir-about-the-murder-of-
shaykh-abu-muhammad-fatih/, accessed on December 9, 
2014 (a eulogy by Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir);
• [AQO] April 18, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Jabhat 
an-Nusra ~ This is their methodology,” pietervanos-
taeyen, blog entry, posted April 19, 2014, available from 
https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/19/jabhat-an-nusra-
this-is-their-methodology/, accessed on August 31, 2014.
(Contains the original video message published April 18, 
2014 of Baseerah Media Productions, “This is Their Man-
haj: Uncovering the details of the assassination of Amir 
Abu Muhammad Fateh and His Family Members,”and 
the English translation and transcription published April 
19, 2014);
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• [AQO] April 28, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “A mes-
sage of Shaykh Abū Qatādat al-Filistīnī—A Letter to the 
People of Jihād,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted 
April 28, 2014, available from https://pietervanostaeyen.
com/2014/04/28/a-message-of-shaykh-abu-qatadat-al-filisti-
ni-a-letter-to-the-people-of-jihad/, accessed on December 
9, 2014. (Abu Qatada al-Filistini accuses ISO of being 
ahderents of a non-Sunni deviant rejectionist sect, the 
Kharijites); 
• [AQO] May 3, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Dr. Ayman 
al-Zawahiri—Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mu-
jahideen in as-Sham,” pietervanostaeyen, May 3, 2014, 
available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/03/dr-
ayman-az-zawahiri-testimonial-to-preserve-the-blood-of-muja-
hideen-in-as-sham/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Ayman 
al-Zawahiri responding to Dr. Hani al-Sibai’s Islamist 
Sunni scholar’s request that he [al-Zawahir] responds 
specifically to ISO charges; Ayman al-Zawahiri exten-
sively documents his claims in 119 numbered sentences.); 
• [ISO] May 11, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “New audio 
message by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani as-
Shami – Apologies Amir al-Qa’ida,” pietervanostaeyen, 
blog entry, posted May 12, 2014, available from https://pi-
etervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/12/new-audio-message-by-isis-
shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-apologies-amir-
al-qaida/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Vitriolic response 
to al-Zawahiri’s recent video speech in which he openly 
denies any official bay’ah to AQO. See March 18, 2014 
sworn testimony by al-Muhajir cited earlier for evidence 
that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had in fact given Ayman 
al-Zawahiri the full bay’ah). 
249. “Ahrar al-Sham leader killed in Syria,” Al Araby al-Jadeed, 
July 15, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 
16, 2015. 
250. See for example: Ryan Lucas, Associated Press, “Syr-
ian Rebels Clash with Al-Qaida-Linked Fighters,” The World 
Post, January 5, 2014, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-
wires/20140105/ml--syria/, accessed on August 16, 2016; Reuters, 
“Al-Qaida Affiliate Pulls Out of Northern Syria Strongholds,” 
Voice of America News, January 5, 2014, available from www.
286
voanews.com/articleprintview/1823727.html, accessed on January 6, 
2014; Ryan Lucas, Associated Press, “Nearly 500 dead in Syria 
rebel clashes: Activists,” The Washington Times, January 10, 2014, 
available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/10/nearly-
500-dead-syria-rebel-clashes-activists/, accessed on August 16, 2016; 
Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-’Ubaydi, “The War of Jihad-
ists Against Jihadists in Syria,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 
2014, pp. 1-6, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on March 
24, 2014.
251. “FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.
252. See for example:
• [ISO] September 22, 2014, see Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani 
al-Shami, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Abū Muhammad al-
’Adnānī ash-Shāmī—Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watch-
ful: A new statement by IS spokesman Abū Muhammad 
al-’Adnānī ash-Shāmī, dated September 22 2014,” piet-
ervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted September 25, 2014, 
available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/09/25/
abu-muhammad-al-adnani-ash-shami-indeed-your-lord-is-ev-
er-watchful/, accessed on August 31,2016; 
• [ISO] October 3, 2014, see  Shaykh Turki al-Binali Abu 
Sufyaan as-Sulami, “Stretch Your Hands to Give the 
Bay’ah to al-Baghdadi,” in ansarukhilafah, “Stretch Forth 
Your Hands To Give The Bay’ah To Al-Baghdaadi,” An-
sar Al-Kilafah Media, Statement translated by Ubaidul-
lah Ibn Adam Aal-Ebrahim, blog entry, posted December 
21, 2014, available from https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.
com/2014/12/21/stretch-forth-your-hands-to-give-the-bayah-
to-al-baghdaadi/, accessed on September 7, 2016; 
• [AQO] November 4, 2014, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Eng-
lish Translation of the Interview with Jabhat an-Nusra 
leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani [sic],” pietervanostaey-
en, blog entry, posted November 11, 2014, available from 
https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/11/11/english-transla-
tion-of-the-interview-with-jabhat-an-nusra-leader-abu-mu-
hammad-al-julani/, accessed on November 24, 2014 (Abu 
Muhammad al-Golani, al-Nusrah emir, audio statement 
originally published November 4, 2014);
• [ISO] November 13, 2014, see Amirul-Mu’minin, the 
Khalifah of the Muslims, Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi 
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al-Baghdadi in, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Audio Message by 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—Even if the Disbelievers Despise 
Such,” pietervanostaeyen, original statement published 
November 13, 2014, blog entry, posted November 14, 2014, 
available from https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/11/14/au-
dio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelievers-
despise-such/, accessed on August 31, 2016;
• [AQO] November 21, 2014, see Thomas Joscelyn, “AQAP 
rejects Islamic State’s ‘caliphate,’ blasts group for sowing 
dissent among jihadists,” The Long War Journal, avail-
able from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/al_qa-
eda_in_the_arab_1.php, accessed on November 24, 2014. 
(Covers AQAP senior Sharia official Harith bin Ghazi al 
Nadhari’s November 13, 2014 response to al-Baghdadi’s 
speech; al-Nadhari killed by drone January 31, 2015.)
253. This concept of “consolidation” (Tamkin) is the second 
primary focus—the first is terror and inflicting catastrophic in-
jury—of the short-lived, 10+ page full-color online magazines, 
Islamic State News, and Islamic State Reports. For examples: Islamic 
State News, Iss. 1, pp. 5-6 (Focus on repentant “Sahwat”; “State” 
functions of aid distribution, da’wa, Sharia court, and execution 
of “sorcerer”); Islamic State News, Iss. 2, pp. 1-3, 9, (Major focus 
on trade flourishing, fresh produce [see front cover], implement-
ing the prescribed criminal punishments [hudud], aid, and enforc-
ing participation in prayer.). See also, Islamic State News, Iss. 2, 
p. 5, focus on “TO REPENT . . . OR NOT,” showing photos of 
persons having to dig their own graves before being murdered; 
Islamic State News, Iss. 2, p. 7 (“hunting for sahwat snipers” [i.e., 
abusing the term ‘Sahwat’ to refer to every element that opposes 
this State]); Islamic State Reports, Iss. 2, pp. 1-4 (Focus on “state-
ness” in economic harvest, and collection of the alms tax [zakat 
]; “On the Beat Interview [with Abul-’Abbas Ash Shami, Head 
of the Islamic Police, Wilayat Ar-Raqqah]: ISR examines how the 
Islamic Police safeguards Ar-Raqqa and their importance in State 
Building,” Islamic State Reports, Iss. 2, pp. 5-6; Islamic State News, 
Iss. 3, cover page, pp. 3-6 (implementing Hadd punishments, in-
cluding amputations, executions; distribution of flyers explaining 
its “aqida” [creed]; provision of security to farmers; “repentance” 
from opponents).
Dabiq’s emphasis on tamkin can be found in the following 
articles and elements: “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 
1, pp. 13-18; “THE ISLAMIC STATE: IN THE WORDS OF THE 
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ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, pp. 32-33; “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILA-
FAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1 pp. 35-41, and “ISLAMIC STATE NEWS,” 
pp. 42-48 focuses on destruction and “repentance”; “IN THE 
WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 31-32; “ISLAMIC 
STATE NEWS,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, pp. 33-43 (“Stateness” demonstrat-
ed in now-incorporated “News” Section from previous Islamic 
State News, and Islamic State Reports format with photographs 
and reports from various provinces, e.g. Halab, Kirkuk, Ninawa, 
Ar-Raqqa, Al-Anbar, Salahuddin, Al-Barakah, and Homs, dis-
playing ferocity, momentum, devastation, terror, taking terri-
tory, capturing bases, carrying out Hadd punishments including 
beheadings and stonings, distributing “ghanima” (war spoils) to 
orphans, i.e., “CARING FOR THE ORPHANS,” Dabiq, Iss. 2, p. 
38; “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 3-4, talks of the gruesome 
beheading of James Foley; “DA’WAH AND HISBAH IN THE IS-
LAMIC STATE,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 16-17 (Da’wah [preaching] and 
Hisbah [enforcing religious law]); “IN THE WORDS OF THE EN-
EMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; “REFLECTIONS ON THE FINAL 
CRUSADE,” Dabiq, Iss. 4, p. 44. The conclusion of this apocalyptic 
article orders ISO adherents to attack any and every citizen in ev-
ery Crusader country. Under the heading, “RUSH TO SUPPORT 
YOUR STATE O MUSLIM,” it declares: 
At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is 
very important that attacks take place in every country that 
has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, espe-
cially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather, 
the citizens of crusader nations should be targeted wherever 
they can be found [emphasis added]. Let the muwahhid not be 
affected by ‘analysis paralysis’ and thus abandon every opera-
tion only because his was-was [sic] and perfectionism pushes 
him towards an operation that supposedly can never fail—one 
that only exists theoretically on paper. He should be pleased 
to meet his Lord even if with just one dead kafir’s name writ-
ten in his scroll of deeds [emphasis added], as the Prophet 
. . .  said, ‘A kafir and his killer will never gather in Hellfire’ 
[Sahih Muslim]. Every Muslim should get out of his house, 
find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing 
becomes attributed to the Islamic State who have obeyed its 
leadership [emphasis added]. This can easily be done with ano-
nymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear 
to be random killings. . . . ‘Rely on Allah and stab the crusader’ 
should be the battle cry for all Islamic State patrons. Finally, do 
not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will not abandon 
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them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will remain until its 
banner flies over Rome.
“IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 45-51, 
(Vicious, horrific murder and propaganda, including murdered 
American-Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff); see also, ISO propa-
gandist John Cantlie, “HARD TALK: THE REAL STORY BE-
HIND MY VIDEOS”; Dabiq, Iss. 4, pp. 52-55; Dabiq, Iss. 5, cover 
page; “THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR,” Dabiq, Iss. 5, 
pp. 10-11 (“Remaining and Expanding”); “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, 
Iss. 5, p. 3, presents “evidence” of ISO’s expansion in the form 
of officially announced bay’ah [loyalty oaths secured] and wilay-
at [provinces conquered]; “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, 
Iss. 5, pp. 10-33 (Again, provides Islamic State Report-type format 
with photographs and brief text), for examples see the following 
“reports”: “THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR,” pp. 10-11; 
“UNIFYING THE RANKS,” pp.12-14, (Claims of bay’ah from vari-
ous quarters); “THE FIGHT FOR ‘AYN AL-ISLĀM,” pp. 15-17, 
(formerly Ayn al-Arab, or Kobani); “THE CURRENCY OF THE 
KHILAFĀH,” pp. 18-19; “REMAINING AND EXPANDING,” 
pp. 20-33. This includes an extensive quote from former ISI Emir 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s most famous speech “Hasad as-Sinin 
bi Dawlat al-Muwahhidin” (The Harvest of Years in the State of 
Muwahhidin) in Rabi’ al-Awwal 1428 [April 2007]):  
And indeed the Islamic State will remain. It will remain be-
cause it was built upon the corpses of martyrs and it quenched 
its thirst with their blood, and by such the market for Jannah 
[paradise] was convened [emphasis added].  It will remain be-
cause the success granted by Allah in this jihad is more obvious 
than the sun at the center of the sky. It will remain because it 
did not become contaminated by a prohibited income or dis-
torted methodology. . . . It will remain because kufr in all its 
religions and sects gathered against us, and every treacherous 
person of desire and innovation began to slander and vilify us, 
so we become certain of the truthfulness of the goal and the 
correctness of the path [pp. 32-33]. 
“IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 5, pp. 34-35; 
“FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 3-5 (in support of lone wolf at-
tack carried out in Sydney and elsewhere, emphasizing its con-
nection to IS); “ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 26-
33 (“reports” include: training camps, fighting and consolidation, 
and killing of opponents); “THE CAPTURE OF A CRUSADER 
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PILOT,” Dabiq, Iss. 6 , pp. 34-37 (report is of the Jordanian al-Ka-
sibah [“an apostate pilot flying for the crusader alliance was cap-
tured by the Islamic State”] who is “interviewed” as he is subjected 
to manipulation, terror, humiliation; “IN THE WORDS OF THE 
ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 6, pp. 56-57; John Cantlie, “MELTDOWN,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 6 , pp. 58-62 (on meltdown of currency freed from gold 
standard, and minting of ISO tied to gold); “ISLAMIC STATE RE-
PORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 26-45, “reports” include: (“WILĀYAT 
KHURĀSĀN AND THE BAY’ĀT FROM QAWQĀZ [Caucasus],” 
pp. 33-37; “DOZENS OF ‘NUSRAH’ AND ‘AHRĀR’ FIGHTERS 
REPENT AND JOIN THE ISLAMIC STATE,” pp. 38-39 [with 
heading “ABANDONING FACTIONALISM AND RAISING 
THE BANNER OF THE KHILĀFAH”]); “IN THE WORDS OF 
THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 52-53 (with a focus on “The Kafir 
Patrick Cockburn” and others); John Cantlie, “THE ANGER FAC-
TORY,” Dabiq, Iss. 7, pp. 76-82 (justifying the State terrorist attacks 
against the West with anti-Western propaganda advertisement 
for a “New Release . . . From Inside Halab” with John Cantlie as 
a host); Dabiq, Iss. 8, cover page (“Sharia Alone Will Rule Africa” 
[cover art, with monumental feel]); “THE BAY’AH FROM WEST 
AFRICA,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 14-15, which is announced: 
On the 16th of Jumada al-Ula the mujahid Shaykh Abu Bakr 
Shekau . . . leader of Jama’at Ahlis-Sunnah lid-Da’awah wal-
Jihad in West Africa, announced his group’s bay’ah to Amirul-
Mu’minin Ibrahim Ibn Awwad al-Qurashi. The bay’ah came on 
the heels of a widely successful campaign being waged by the 
mujahidin across Nigeria and into neighboring regions, was a 
tremendous cause of celebration for the Muslims and yet an-
other source of gloom for the kuffar. The hearts of the Muslims 
were healed as they [saw] their brothers in West Africa terror-
izing the Christians and the Nigerian army of murtaddin.
“THE LIONS OF TOMORROW: THE LION CUBS OF THE 
KHILĀFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 20-21; “ERASING THE LEGACY 
OF A RUINED NATION,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 22-24, announced 
thusly: 
Last month, the soldiers of the Khilafah, with sledgehammers 
in hand, revived the Sunnah of their father Ibrahim . . . when 
they laid waste to the shirki legacy of a nation that had long 
passed from the face of the earth. They entered the ruins of the 
ancient Assyrians in Wilayat Ninawa and demolished their 
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sculptures, and engravings of idols and kings. This caused an 
outcry from the enemies of the Islamic State, who were furious 
at losing a ‘treasured heritage.’ The mujahidin, however, were 
not the least concerned about the feelings and sentiments of the 
kuffar, just as Ibrahim was not concerned about the feelings and 
sentiments of his people when he destroyed their idols [p. 22].
”THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TWO NEW WILĀYĀT IN IRAQ,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 27; “AMONG THE BELIEVERS ARE MEN: 
SHAYKH ABŪ TALHAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 31, shows his death 
photo as a “martyr” and provides a brief quote:
After the announcement of the Khurāsāni bay’ah, Shaykh Abū 
Talhah began touring the region in a caravan of the Khīlāfah’s 
soldiers, calling the local tribes to give bay’ah to the Khīlāfah.
Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 38, (advertisement for “A Message to the People 
of Kurdistan”); “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, 
pp. 57-58; John Cantilie, “PARADIGM SHIFT,” Dabiq, Iss. 8, pp. 
64-67, with lift out quote: 
After all the gnashing of teeth in September, there appears to 
be a grudging acceptance by many Western politicians that the 
Islamic State is different to anything they’ve seen before. Their 
response, by necessity, has to be different too [p. 64]. 
“ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 24-37, (“reports” 
include: “HEALTHCARE IN THE KHILĀFAH,” pp. 24-26, with 
data and photographs depticting an actually functioning health 
care sector; “SELECTED10,” p. 27, videos advertised, includ-
ing presence of hisbah, zakah, monitoring and inspection; “AD-
VANCING EAST AND WEST,” pp. 31-32; “SELECTED10,” p. 33, 
adverstising for 10 more videos including terror-inducing images, 
including extreme fear-face, slaughter, and battle. Second place 
is “The Islamic State Health Service” and in tenth is “The Lion 
Cubs Raised under the Wings of the Khilafah”; “The Yarmūk 
Camp,” pp. 34-36, directed at: “the tawāghīt of Hamas are ap-
pealing to Iran for intervention, while PLO tawāghīt are agree-
ing to have their militias serve as a Nusayrī Sahwah [p.35]”); “IN 
THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” Dabiq, Iss. 9, pp. 60-64; Dabiq, 
Iss. 9, p. 65, advertisement for “AlBayan Radio, Broadcast by the 
Islamic State” in multiple languages; “FOREWORD,” Dabiq, Iss. 
10, pp. 3-4, again dedicated to slaughter carried out on Western 
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soil by “mujahids”; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 5, advertisement for “Join 
the Caravan of Islamic State Knights in the Lands of the Crusad-
ers,” with thirteen photos of IS operatives, and evidence of a shift 
from soliciting emigration (Hijrah) to soliciting localized slaugh-
ter; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 25, videos advertised that 
include terror, murder, repentance, and in the tenth “MEDICAL 
CARE IN THE WILAYAH”; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 35, advertisement 
for “HONOR IS IN JIHAD: A MESSAGE FOR THE PEOPLE OF 
THE BALKANS”; “THE QAWQĀZĪ [CAUCASUS] CARAVAN 
GAINS PACE,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 36-37; Dabiq, Iss. 10, p. 49, adver-
tisement for video “And They Give Zakah,” showing devastating 
scenes on top of the page, but the majority of the page shows an 
ultra-abundant harvest of ultra-wheat with an ultra-devoted  per-
son possessing a share in hand, representing the “purification” 
tax owed to the “Khilafah”; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 
65, adverstising for 10 more videos including the recently horrifi-
cally drowned prisoners, emphasizing brutality and submission, 
consolidation and expansion, for example: “ONE YEAR OF THE 
KHILAFAH”; “ELIMINATING THE JUDGES,” shows an assas-
sin with a rifle attacking an automobile with inhabitants inside; 
“CELEBRATING THE ONE YEAR MILESTONE OF THE KH-
ILAFAH”; “HARVESTING THE SPIES 2”; THE LIFE OF RIBAT 
IN THE MONTH OF JIHAD”; “AND HE WILL REPLACE THEIR 
FEAR WITH SECURITY 2”; includes one at bottom of page from 
“WILAYAH WEST AFRICA,” entitled “A GLIMPSE AT THE 
COURSE OF BATTLES”; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 66-69; “INTERVIEW WITH ABŪ SAMĪR AL-
URDUNĪ,” Dabiq, Iss. 10, pp. 70-76, with AQO’s Ayman al-Zawa-
hiri in backdrop, with lift out quote: 
Allah facilitated for Dabiq to interview the brother Abū Samīr 
al-Urdunī (the Jordanian), a former member of Jawlānī’s [Jabhat 
al-Nusra] shūrā council. He broke off from the Jawlānī front un-
til Allah blessed him by showing him the contradictions in the 
methodology and policies of the Jawlānī front. He also belessed 
him by allowing him to witness the realization of hakimiyyah 
(tawhīd of Allah in judgment) in the land of the Khilāfah. He 
returned to the ranks of the Islamic State and the following is 
the conversation we had with him [p. 70].
“SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 15, advertisement for 10 videos 
focused on murder, terror, fighting, repentance, and curiously 
in the 8th video shows a young, smiling girl’s face exemplifying 
the title, “THE AMBIANCE OF EID AL-FITR IN AR-RAQQAH 
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CITY,” her face fully unveiled, smiling, and in Western clothes, 
and in the 10th, “THERE IS LIFE IN RETRIBUTION,” showing a 
sheathed sword; “THE DANGER Of Abandoning Dārul-Islām,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 22-23, with a horrific use of the picture of the 
drowned toddler Alan Kurdi, and provides the accompanying 
passage: 
The repeated events of Syrians and Libyans dying on the shores 
of Turkey, Libya, and Italy, or even on the highways of Austria, 
is one that should awaken the heart into reflecting upon the 
issue of hijrah.
“A SELECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE IS-
LAMIC STATE,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 28-30, “report” includes ter-
ror operations, military operations, taking and holding ground, 
and in one picture describes in a subheading: “Imposing the Ji-
zyah [tax imposed on certain qualified categories of vanquished 
non-Muslim groups] on the Christians of al-Qaryatayn after lib-
erating the city [p.30]”and depicts a large gathering of Christians 
shown seated in an auditorium, with an ISO official in fatigues 
at a lectern signing an official document; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, 
Iss. 11, p. 39, advertisement for 10 videos, including: “THE ING-
HIMASIYYIN ARE THE PRIDE OF THE UMMAH”; “KILLING 
THE APOSTATES IN REVENGE FOR THE MUWAHHIDIN 2”; 
“THE TRAVELS OF THE MUSLIM”; “THE KNIGHTS OF IFRIQ-
IYYAH” from “WILAYAH WEST IFRIQIYYAH”; “DETERRING 
THE CRIMINALS” etc., depicting terror, submission, death, and 
a video-game like death cult; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENE-
MY,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 56-58; “SELECTED10,” Dabiq, Iss. 11, p. 
59, advertisement for 10 videos again in shooter-type video for-
mat with examples of terror, destruction, consolidation, expan-
sion, and Stateness; “INTERVIEW WITH ABUL-MUGHĪRAH 
AL-QAHTĀNĪ: The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilāyāt,” 
Dabiq, Iss. 11, pp. 60-63, and involves “Fitnah” with AQO’s groups.
254. Reference here is to Sahih Muslim, but without full ci-
tation. This is from Sahih Muslim, No. 1852, and it is considered 
Sahih (sound, reliable). See Abu Amina Elias, “Is it required for 
Muslims to have one ruler?” available from abuaminaelias.com/is-
it-required-for-muslims-to-have-one-ruler.
255. “FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH,” Dabiq, Iss. 1, p. 40.
294
256. Readers interested in examining the primary documents, 
research, and commentary that warrant these conclusions are en-
couraged to consult the relevant information presented in Chap-
ters 2 and 3 of this book and their corresponding endnotes.
257. The concept of a “deviant organization” is chosen care-
fully and intends to signify two facts. First, as organizations, they 
are deviant in a statistical sense; they are terrorist outliers oper-
ating on the extreme unlawful, criminal fringes far from Sunni 
Muslims generally, let alone other non-terrorist religio-political 
organizations seeking to represent and empower Sunni Muslims 
(Ahl-us Sunnah). Second, these are organizations, and not States, 
regimes, or representative bodies. While they aspire to represent 
the world’s 1.4 billion Sunni Muslims, their very nature as ter-
rorist entities resting on a terrorist modus operandi ensures their 
continuing marginality. The present writer concedes that despite 
its sociological utility, the concept of a “deviant organization” can 
be abused by regime apologists, to de-legitimize and thereby pro-
scribe various types of oppositional politics. 
258. See the Introduction of this book.
259. In an oft-quoted tradition (hadith), the notion that a true 
Muslim is one that regards other Muslims’ lives as sacred, is the 
essence of the matter. Narrated by Abdullah bin ‘Amr, the Proph-
et [Muhammad] said, “A Muslim is the one who avoids harming 
Muslims with his tongue and hands. And a Muhajir (emigrant) 
is the one who gives up (abandons) all what Allah has forbid-
den.” Abdullah bin ‘Amr, “The Book of Belief Faith),” in Dr. Mu-
hammad Muhsin Khan, The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih 
Al-Bukhari: Arabic-English, Vol. 1, Book 2, No. 10, Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Darussalam, 1997,  p. 59. 
260. A final tally of ISO’s mass murder, crimes against hu-
manity, torture, brutality, and inhumane conduct will one day be 
conducted. Ironically, ISO’s own penchant for fully documenting 
these atrocities will likely serve as exemplary exhibits in future 
proceedings. For a very brief summary of some of these, see Anup 
Kaphle, “The Islamic State’s atrocities,” The Washington Post, Feb-
ruary 17, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/
apps/g/page/world/the-islamic-states-atrocities/1608/, accessed on 
March 17, 2015; Jon Gambrell, Associated Press (AP), “A history 
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of the Islamic State group’s atrocities, gains,” The San Diego Union-
Tribune, February 16, 2015, available from www.sandiegounion-
tribune.com/news/2015/feb/16/a-history-of-the-islamic-state-groups-
atrocities/, accessed on August 31, 2016; Agence France-Presse 
(AFP), “Foreigners executed by IS militants: a factfile,” Yahoo 
News, August 12, 2015, available from news.yahoo.com/foreigners-
executed-militants-factfile-154627843.html, accessed on August 13, 
2015; “Syria: IS murders over 3,000 in year-long ‘caliphate’,” Al-
Araby al-Jadeed (The New Arab), June 29, 2015, available from 
www.opensource.co, accessed on June 29, 2015; IntelCenter, “Top 
10 Most Deadly Terrorist/Rebel Groups in 2014,” IntelCenter Da-
tabase, July 25, 2015, available from intelcenter.com/reports/charts/
most-deadly-groups-2014/index.html, accessed on January 12, 2015; 
Rami Abdurrahman (Ossama Suleiman), “Islamic State executes 
2154 people since the declaration of its alleged ‘Caliphate’,” Syr-
ian Observatory for Human Rights, April 28, 2015, available 
from www.syriahr.com/en/?p=18320, accessed on August 31, 2016; 
Sarah Almukhtar and Derek Watkins, “The Deadliest Attacks in 
Baghdad This Year,” The New York Times, July 3, 2016, available 
from www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/18/world/middleeast/
baghdad-attacks-isis-map.html?_r=0, accessed on July 6, 2016; Asso-
ciated Press, “Some of the Most Recent Deadly Attacks Claimed 
by IS,” Daily Mail, July 23, 2016, available from www.dailymail.
co.uk/wires/ap/article-3704877/Some-recent-deadly-attacks-claimed-
IS.html, accessed on July 25, 2016; Agence France-Presse (AFP), 
“Paris—Islamic State attacks on Western targets,”Agence France-
Presse (AFP), August 8, 2016, available from www.opensource.
gov, accessed on August 9, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State 
claims more than 700 suicide attacks since beginning of the year,” 
The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2016/09/islamic-state-claims-more-than-700-suicide-attacks-
since-beginning-of-the-year.php, accessed on September 7, 2016; 
Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Paris—Attacks in France since 
Charlie Hebdo slayings,” AFP, July 18, 2016, available from www.
opensource.gov, accessed on July 18, 2016; Erin Miller, “Patterns of 
Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002-2015,” START Background 
Report, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), August 2016, 
available from www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerror-
ismPatterns_BackgroundReport_Aug2016.pdf, accessed on August 9, 
2016; Lori Hinnant and Desmond Butler, “IS Buried Thousands 
in 72 Mass Graves, AP Finds,” AP The Big Story, August 30, 
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2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/7b538929486f493da85e8
4d7ee7470a5/buried-thousands-72-mass-graves-ap-finds, accessed on 
August 30, 2016.
261. That the “idea” of the ISO had yet to be understood, and 
required our full attention, was described by Major General Mi-
chael Nagata, U.S. Army, Special Operations Command Central 
(SOCCENT), former Director Combined Joint Interagency Task 
Force (CJIATF). See Michael Nagata, “Preface,” in Hriar Cabayan, 
Sarah Canna, eds., “Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL,” NSI White 
Paper, December 2014, pp. 1-2; see also, Eric Schmitt, “In Battle to 
Defang ISIS, U.S. Targets Its Psychology,” The New York Times, 
December 28, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/
us/politics/in-battle-to-defang-isis-us-targets-its-psychology-.html?_
r=0, accessed on September 14, 2015.
262. See for example: Paul Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Ca-
liph Ibrahim’s May 2015 Message to Muslims: Key Problems of 
Motivation, Marginalization, Illogic, and Empirical Delusion in 
the Caliphate Project,” Small Wars Journal, June 4, 2015, available 
from smallwarsjournal.com/print/24089, accessed on June 5, 2015. 
263. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack 
Obama,” May 23, 2013, Washington, DC: The White House, avail-
able from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-barack-obama, accessed on May 30, 2013.
264. For earlier formulations, see Barack Obama, 2010 Na-
tional Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White House, May 
2010, p. 4, pp. 19-22, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; Barack Obama, 
National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Washington, DC: The 
White House, June 2011, p. 1, 3, available from www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. v, 
6, 15, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defense 
Reviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf; Quadrennial De-
fense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting 
America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report 
of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Corrected Ad-
vance Copy, 2010, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, p. 26.
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265. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (aka: The 9/11 Commission Report), 
New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, ch. 12.
266. For background on this acronym and its relation to 
DIME, and DIMEFIL, see Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization 
and Recruitment to Al Qaeda, pp. 75-76.
267. For this incontrovertible evidence, and the United Na-
tions Security Council Resolutions formulated in response, see 
Paul Kamolnick, “Terrorism, Counterterrorism and the Rule of 
Law,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, p. 841, Notes 
#19 and #20. For USG diplomatic efforts, beginning with our rec-
ognition of the Taliban’s rise in 1994 until the immediate pre-9/11 
attack, see Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to 
Al-Qaeda, pp. 69-70, especially endnote #173 for an extensive ex-
amination of the declassified intelligence cables specifically perti-
nent to the claim that the USG at Mullah Omar’s initial request, 
had direct communication with then Emir Mullah Omar and his 
representatives. See finally, a telling excerpt from members of the 
Egyptian Islamic Group, translated from Arabic, in their book, 
Islam and the Laws of War, which appeared in serial form in the 
newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August-September 2006; 
Translated and excerpted in: The Middle East Media Research 
Institute, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” MEMRI Spe-
cial Dispatch No. 1301, available from www.memri.org/report/
en/0/0/0/0/0/804/1887.htm, accessed on January 16, 2013. They 
state in response to bin Laden’s and AQO’s accusation that the 
United States was intent on overthrowing the Taliban as part of its 
declared “War against Islam”: 
The conception that America is waging a Crusade against Mus-
lims is not true. . . in the worst of cases [one can say that] at 
times there have been American policies that have had a reli-
gious dimension in opposing some—and not all—of the Islamic 
world’s causes. [The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains 
America’s positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahideen 
in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and [America’s] 
positive stand [against] the ethnic cleansing operation against 
the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the province 
of Kosovo. Likewise, the conception that America aimed to 
bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not 
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have been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests 
to the fact that America attempted to come to terms with the 
Taliban regime in order to realize common strategic goals. . . 
and these attempts to come to an understanding ran up against 
the Al-Qaeda organization’s actions, which were launched 
from Afghanistan and targeted America, and which the Taliban 
authorities did not restrain . . . America at that time was look-
ing for new strategies for a new century, and if the Front [i.e., 
Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam had adopted serious 
Islamic strategy that would have given consideration to Ameri-
can interests together with Islamic interests, this would have 
prevented the continuation of this war or [at least] would have 
kept it from taking on a comprehensive nature.
268. See Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and Recruitment 
to Al-Qaeda, for more detailed discussion of these measures.
269. For attriting of AQO’s external operations branch (i.e., 
“the Khorasan Group”) based in Syria, see Bill Roggio and Thomas 
Joscelyn, “US military confirms it killed senior al Qaeda strategist 
Sanafi al Nasr in airstrike in Syria,” The Long War Journal, October 
18, 2015, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/
us-military-confirms-it-killed-senior-al-qaeda-strategist-sanafi-al-nasr-
in-airstrike-in-syria.php, accessed on October 20, 2015; Thomas Jos-
celyn, “Pentagon says al Qaeda veteran killed in ‘kinetic strike’ in 
Syria,” The Long War Journal, July 22, 2015, www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2015/07/pentagon-says-al-qaeda-veteran-killed-in-kinetic-
strike-in-syria.php, accessed on July 22, 2015. 
270. See for example: Kamolnick, Countering Radicalization and 
Recruitment to Al-Qaeda, pp. 20-34.
271. See for example: Jessica Rivinius, “Recommendations to 
counter violent extremism: New report offers framework to law 
enforcement, government agencies, community members,” Sep-
tember 28, 2015, available from www.start.umd.edu/news/recom-
mendations-counter-violent-extremism, accessed on September 29, 
2015; Telegraph View (staff), ”Stopping ISI’s Grooming,” June 
15, 2015, The Telegraph, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11676316/Stopping-Isils-grooming.html, 
accessed on June 16, 2015.
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272. Behavioral disengagement from terrorism, not “de-rad-
icalization” or “counter-radicalization,” is a preferable objective 
since radicalism per se, in attitude, beliefs, and ultimate objec-
tives, is not a predictor of terrorist action; and, a great majority of 
terrorist actors have no discernible coherent “radicalization” path 
that may be intercepted. For that reason, cessation from terrorist 
actions, and campaigns focused on the motivational factors most 
associated with that probability, is now considered the relevant 
objective. See for example: Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, Leaving 
Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement, London 
and New York: Routledge, 2009; John Horgan and Max Taylor, 
“Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism: Fu-
ture Directions for Research,” in Rik Coolsaet, ed., Jihadi Terror-
ism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experi-
ences, 2nd ed., Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011, ch. 13, pp. 173-225; 
Mary Beth Altier, Christian N. Thoroughgood, and John Horgan, 
“Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociol-
ogy, and criminology,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 51, No. 5, 
2014, pp. 647-661; Kira J. Harris, “Review: Disillusionment with 
Radical Social Groups,” 2010, orig. published in “Proceedings of 
the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference,” Edith Cowan 
University, Perth Western Australia, November 30, 2010, avail-
able from ro.ecu.edu.au/act/4.
273. Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President 
on ISIL,” September 10, 2014, Washington, DC: The White House, 
available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/re-
marks-president-barack-obama-address-nation, accessed on Septem-
ber 11, 2014; Jim Garamone, “Obama Discusses Anti-ISIL Strategy 
with National Security Team at Pentagon, DoD News, July 6, 2015, 
available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on July 9, 2015; 
Terri Moon Cronk, “Carter Vows Lasting Defeat of ISIL Forces,” 
DoD News, June 17, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news, ac-
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